文章 » 社会

沙其:穆巴拉克之后

伦敦书评2011.2.17 vol33, no4; czy
如果这是“新中东的分娩阵痛”,那么它们也完全不同于康多莉扎·赖斯辩称在2006年夏天以色列对黎巴嫩的战争期间看到的那种。

After Mubarak

穆巴拉克之后
 
Adam Shatz
 
孙捷、彭玉玲译
 
Popular uprisings are clarifying events, and so it is with the revolt in Egypt. The Mubarak regime – or some post-Mubarak continuation of it – may survive this challenge, but the illusions that have held it in place have crumbled. The protests in Tahrir Square are a message not only to Mubarak and the military regime that has ruled Egypt since the Free Officers coup of 1952; they are a message to all the region”s autocrats, particularly those supported by the West, and to Washington and Tel Aviv, which, after spending years lamenting the lack of democracy in the Muslim world, have responded with a mixture of trepidation, fear and hostility to the emergence of a pro-democracy movement in the Arab world’s largest country. If these are the ‘birth pangs of a new Middle East’, they are very different from those Condoleezza Rice claimed to discern during Israel’s war on Lebanon in the summer of 2006.
 
人民起义是澄清事件,而在埃及,与之相伴的是反抗。穆巴拉克政权——或者延续它的后穆巴拉克政权,也许会在这次挑战中生存下来,但全面控制国家的幻想是破灭了。解放广场的抗议事件向穆巴拉克和自1952年自由军官政变而上台统治埃及的军事政权,传递了一个信息;向那些尤其依靠西方资助的政权独裁者,向资助多年后却一直感叹在穆斯林世界缺乏民主,如今对一个出现在阿拉伯世界最大国家的民主派运动却报以不安、怕和敌视的复杂回应的华盛顿、特拉维夫之流传递了一个信息。如果这是“新中东的分娩阵痛”,那么它们也完全不同于康多莉扎·赖斯在2006年夏天以色列对黎巴嫩的战争期间辩称的。
 
The first illusion to crumble was the myth of Egyptian passivity, a myth that had exerted a powerful hold over Egyptians. ‘We’re all just waiting for someone to do the job for us,’ an Egyptian journalist said to me when I reported from Cairo last year (LRB, 27 May 2010); despite the proliferation of social movements since the 1970s, the notion of a mass revolt against the regime was inconceivable to her. When Galal Amin, a popular Egyptian sociologist, remarked that ‘Egyptians are not a revolutionary nation’ in a recent al-Jazeera documentary, few would have disagreed. And until the Day of Rage on 25 January many Egyptians – including a number of liberal reformers – would have resigned themselves to a caretaker regime led by the intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, if only to save themselves from the president’s son Gamal Mubarak. The first to be surprised by the uprising were the Egyptians themselves, who – in the lyrical early days of the revolt, culminating in the ‘million-man march’ on Tahrir Square on 1 February – discovered that they were capable of taking matters into their own hands, of overcoming their fear of the police and collectively organising against the regime. And as they acquired a thrilling sense of their own power, they would settle only for the regime’s removal.
 
第一个破灭的幻想是关于埃及人只是被动接受的神话,它已经产生强大的力量控制埃及人。“我们所有人只是等待某人来为我们工作,”我去年去开罗做报道时,一个埃及记者如是说(LRB,2010年5月27日)。尽管自二十世纪70年代以来社会运动不断扩散,群众反抗政权的主张对埃及来说,还是不可思议的。贾拉尔·阿明,埃及著名的社会学家,在最近半岛电视台的纪录片中声称“埃及人并非革命的民族”,这一观点,很少有人会不认同。直到愤怒日(1月25日)那天,许多埃及人——包括一定数量的民主派改革者,只为了从总统的儿子贾迈勒·穆巴拉克手中拯救自己,听从于看守政权的情报长官奥马尔·苏莱曼。起义带来的第一个震惊是埃及人自己,在反抗的最初几天里,2月1日解放广场就汇聚了百万人游行,他们发现自己可以掌握自己的命运,克服对警察的恐惧,集体组织起来反抗这个政权。当他们品尝到权力的滋味时,他们要自己来解决政权的更替。
 
The Mubarak regime was not the only Arab government to be shaken by the protests: the reverberations were soon felt in Yemen and Jordan, and in the West Bank, where Mahmoud Abbas’s police cracked down on a march called in solidarity with Egypt’s pro-democracy forces. What we’re seeing in Cairo is both new and old: not an Islamist revolt but a broad-based social movement bridging the secular-religious divide, a 21st-century version of the Arab nationalism that had for many years seemed a spent force. And though the Egyptian protests have found a provisional figurehead in Mohammed ElBaradei, the movement is largely leaderless, in striking contrast to the heroic age of Arab nationalism, dominated by charismatic, authoritarian figures like Nasser and Boumedienne.
 
穆巴拉克政权并非是唯一被反抗运动动摇的阿拉伯政府:这一余震在也门、约旦、约旦河西岸地区也感受得到,在那里,马哈茂德阿巴斯的警察部队镇压了一个呼应埃及民主派的示威游行。我们在开罗正目睹的的现象是新旧共存。它不仅是一个伊斯兰起义,而且是一个基础广泛、架构在世俗宗教之上的社会运动,一个21世纪版本的阿拉伯民族主义,过去曾认为它已是强弩之末。尽管埃及的反抗者找来了一个临时的名义领袖穆罕默德·巴拉迪,该运动在很大程度上是群龙无首,与之形成鲜明对比的是阿拉伯民族主义的英雄时代,占主导地位的专制人物纳赛尔或布迈丁。
 
The revolt that began in Tunisia and spread to Egypt is a struggle against what Algerians call hogra, ‘contempt’, a struggle fed by anger over authoritarian rule, torture, corruption, unemployment and inequality, and – a lightning rod everywhere in the Arab world – deference to the US strategic agenda. Not surprisingly, US officials are nervous that revolts could break out in other friendly states. Asked whether he expected similar unrest in Jordan, John Kerry, who was admirably forthright in calling for Mubarak to stand down, dismissed the idea: ‘King Abdullah of Jordan is extraordinarily intelligent, thoughtful, sensitive, in touch with his people. The monarchy there is very well respected, even revered.’
这始于突尼斯并蔓延至埃及的反抗运动是一场阿尔及利亚人称hogra(即“鄙视”)的反抗斗争,是一场对专制、酷刑、腐败、失业和不平,及尊重美国的战略议程——阿拉伯世界无处不在的避雷针,感到愤怒而引发的社会反抗运动。毫不奇怪,美国官员所担心的是这场斗争会在其他的友好国家爆发。当约翰·克里,这位曾坦率要求穆巴拉克下台的美国官员,被询问是否期望类似的动乱出现在约旦时,他驳回了这一想法,说“约旦的阿布杜拉国王是非常睿智、有思想、敏感、同他的人民有密切联系的人。在那里,君主制是非常受尊重,甚至崇敬”。
 
For years, Arab rulers told their Western patrons not to worry about their subjects, as though they were obedient, if sometimes unruly children, and these patrons were only too happy to follow this advice. There was nothing to fear from the Egyptians, accustomed as they were to despotism since the Pharaonic age. Mubarak might be hated by them, but he was our man in Cairo: ‘family’, as Hillary Clinton put it. (The Clinton and Mubarak families have been close for years.) So long as he opened the economy to multinationals, achieved high growth rates and honoured his foreign policy commitments – allowing swift passage for US warships through the Suez Canal, interrogating radical Islamists kidnapped by the CIA as part of the extraordinary rendition programme, maintaining the peace with Israel, tightening the siege of Gaza, opposing the ‘resistance’ front led by Iran – American military aid would continue to flow, at a rate of $1.3 billion a year.
多年来,阿拉伯的统治者告知他们的西方观众,不用担心他们的人民,就好像他们是听话的、有时不守规矩的孩子,这些观众们很高兴地跟进这个建议。埃及人没有任何可担心的地方,自从法老时代起,埃及人就已经习惯了生活在专制下。希拉里·克林顿指出,穆巴拉克可能被埃及人所厌恶,但他仍然是我们在开罗这个家庭的人(克林顿和穆巴拉克家庭已彼此接近多年)。只要他向跨国公司开放经济,实现高增长率,兑现他的外交政策承诺——允许美国军舰迅速通过苏伊士运河,作为非常规引渡方案的一部分,允许中央情报局绑架、审问激进的伊斯兰主义者,维护与以色列的和平,围困加沙,反对由伊朗领导的抵抗,美国的军事援助将继续以一年130亿美元的速度流入埃及。
 
A facade of euphemism had to be erected to disguise the nature of Mubarak’s regime, and press accounts seemed to bolster it. Reading Western – particularly American – newspapers before the recent crackdown, one would hardly have known the degree of discontent in Egypt. Mubarak was typically described as an ‘authoritarian’ but ‘moderate’ and ‘responsible’ leader, almost never as a dictator. Popular anger over torture – and over the regime’s cosy relations with Israel – was rarely discussed. But when the police attacked peaceful protesters throughout Egypt, and especially after Mubarak’s thugs – armed with grenades, knives and petrol bombs, some wearing pro-Mubarak T-shirts that seemed to have been designed for the occasion – charged through Tahrir Square on 2 February on horses and camels, the regime’s face was revealed: coarse, brutal, an unwitting parody of Orientalist clichés. Newspapers not known for their candour about Egypt began to describe it with a new, hard clarity.
一个正面的委婉用语已经树立,掩盖了穆巴拉克政权的本质,而且新闻报道也加强这方面的内容。阅读一下西方尤其美国,在最近镇压前的报纸,人们几乎无法知晓埃及国内的不满程度。穆巴拉克通常被描述成一个“专制”但“温和”和“负责”的领导者,几乎从不认为是一个独裁主义者。大众对酷刑的愤怒——及以上政权的舒适与以色列的关系,很少有人讨论。但是,当警方袭击了整个埃及的和平示威者,特别是在穆巴拉克的暴徒——用手榴弹、刀和汽油炸弹武装后,穿着亲穆巴拉克T恤衫,似乎是为这个场合而设计的,骑着骆驼和马在2月2日冲过解放广场之后,政权的真面目露出来了:粗鲁、野蛮、一个不知情的东方的滑稽模仿。那些不以对埃及坦率著称的新闻报纸开始以一个新的、生硬的方式来描述这些事。
 
The crisis in Egypt has also been a crisis for the Obama administration. Unlike the ‘colour’ revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Lebanese protests against Syrian troops or the Green Movement in Iran, the uprising in Egypt targeted an old and trusted ally, not an enemy. Coming out in support of the Tunisian protesters made the Obama administration feel good, but it required no sacrifice. Egypt, a pillar of US strategy in the greater Middle East, particularly in the ‘peace process’, was a harder case. Until late January, the US did not hesitate to call Mubarak a friend, or to extend all courtesies to visiting members of the Egyptian military. But when Egyptians went into open revolt, the US was suddenly very tight-lipped about its old friend in Cairo. A new discourse was rapidly invented. Some Western officials failed to catch on to the shift: Joe Biden was widely ridiculed for saying that Mubarak couldn’t be a dictator because he was friendly with Israel; Tony Blair praised him as ‘immensely courageous and a force for good’ – yesterday’s message. But when Blair said that Egypt’s transition had to be ‘managed’ – presumably by the West – so as not to jeopardise the ‘peace process’, he was only saying openly what Washington believed.
埃及的危机对奥巴马政府而言也是一场危机。不像中东欧的“颜色”革命,黎巴嫩反抗叙利亚军队,或者是伊朗的绿色运动那样,埃及的起义针对的是一个信任的老盟友,而不是一个敌人。支持突尼斯的抗议者,对奥巴马政府非常划算,因为不需任何付出。而埃及则不同。因为埃及是美国大中东战略的一个支柱,



Xoops 苏ICP备10024138 | © 06-12 人文与社会