巴迪乌：饱和的工人阶级一般认同

2006年10月16日，星期一

2006年2月，阿兰·巴迪乌在参加华盛顿大学的会议"文化大革命的历史可能吗？"时，做了这次访谈。这次访谈是受一家西雅图的报纸委托做的，首次对不了解巴迪乌的读者做出了简要的回答。

------------------------

问：我想问问您，从六十年代中期直到今天，您政治和知识上的轨迹是如何演变的？自那以后，您关于革命政治、马克思主义和毛主义的观点又是怎样变化的？

巴迪乌：在我从事政治活动的头些年里，有两件决定性的事件。第一件是五十年代末和六十年代初反对在阿尔及利亚的殖民战争的斗争。在这次政治斗争中，我知道了政治信念并非一个大多数人的问题。因为在阿尔及利亚战争之初，我们实际上是反对战争的那极少数人。这对我而言是个教训；当你认为某件事是必要的，是正确的，你就必须去做它，而不管大多数人是怎么看的。

第二次事件则是68年五月事件。在68年五月风暴中，我知道了我们不得不在知识分子和工人之间建立直接的联系。我们不能做那些仅仅是政党社团等等的中介要做的事。我们必须直接经历与政治的关系。在六十年代末和七十年代初，我对毛主义和文化大革命的兴趣是这样一个政治信念，即在知识分子和工人之间建立直接联系。

如果你愿意，我将其概括为以下两个伟大的教训：今天，我的信念是，政治行动必须是一个过程，一个原则的、信念的，而非大多数人的过程。所以，这是一个实践的层面。第二个伟大的教训则是，必需建立知识分子和工人之间的直接联系。

这是起点，主体的起点。在政治领域中，意识形态之间的关联--马克思主义、文化大革命、毛主义等等--都从属于主体的信念，就是你必须在实践上去直接参与政治，去组织，去同他人一道，去找到一条使原则存在下去的道路。

问：您的忠诚观是什么？

巴迪乌：答案已经包含在第一个回答中了。对我而言，忠诚是忠诚于那些构成我们政治主体性的伟大事件。或许这可以上溯到很早以前，因为在二战期间，我父亲参加了反纳粹抵抗组织。当然，在战争期间，他并没有向我透露任何东西；这是性命攸关的事。但在战后，我知道了他曾是一名抵抗者，知道了他真正地经历了反纳粹的抵抗。所以，我的忠诚也是忠诚于自己的父亲。战争一开始，罕有人在抵抗；两三年后，抵抗的人就多了。这也是教训，如果你喜欢，也可以说这个教训来自我父亲。

一般来说，我忠诚于两个伟大的事件：反对殖民战争的行动，以及六八年的五月事件及其结果。不只是类似于六八年五月这样的事件，也是其造成的结果。忠诚是个实践的事；你必须去组织一些事，去做一些事。这是忠诚的现实。

问：您曾说过存在一个断裂，说过当今政治的总问题是十分晦暗不明的。并且，您曾写道，我们必须思考一种没有政党的政治。在"阶级-政党"试验饱和之后，接下来是什么？

巴迪乌：我想，忠诚实际上并未完结，套用我的术语，有时它饱和了。存在着一种饱和；你不能在你最初忠诚的领域找到任何新的东西。在这种情形下，许多人会说，"它结束了"。实际上，一个政治序列既有起点，也有终点，一个以饱和为其形式的终点。饱和并不是一个残酷的断裂，它毋宁意味着越来越难在忠诚的领域找到新东西。

自从八十年代中期以来，革命政治在它的传统架构中，也就是在阶级斗争、政党、无产阶级专政等等中，越来越趋于饱和。所以我们必须找到某种像"忠诚于忠诚本身"的东西，这不是一种简单的忠诚。

对我们这一代来说，一方面，是认为"当今政治领域中，什么都是不可能的；"反动势力太猖獗了"。这是当今法国许多人的态度；这是饱和的消极解释。当忠诚饱和时，你会有一个选择。第一种可能是，说它已经结束了。

第二种可能则是：在特定事件的帮助下--诸如今天发生在南美的事件--你会发现我称之为"忠诚于忠诚"的东西。严格地说，"忠诚于忠诚"不是延续，也不是纯粹的断裂。我们必须发现某些新东西。我昨天所说的"在外部，能看到许多内部不可见的东西"，仅仅只是一条用以找到新东西的法则。

问：请允许我对"某些新的东西"向您做进一步追问：政党政治饱和之后，如今又当如何？

巴迪乌：如果这个问题的答案是清楚的，讨论也就结束了。你必须将其找出，因为它并不清楚。从政治实践的角度看，我们现在有的是一个实验性的序列。我们不得不接受大量的经验。我们缺乏一片统一的领域--这不只是指第三国际这样的组织，也是指在概念上没有统一的领域。所以你必须接受地方性的实验；我们必须去做关于所有这些的集体工作。我们必须找到--在哲学概念、经济学概念和历史学概念的帮助下--新的综合。

我认为，相较于二十世纪，我们的处境十分类似于十九世纪。如果你喜欢，也可以这样打个比方：离马克思比列宁更近。列宁实际上是革命政治这个新概念的思想家，其理念是：我们能胜利，革命是种可能。这确实不是今天的处境，今天，革命的理念自我隐蔽了。但是我们能像马克思那样--它是一个隐喻，一种比方。你必须思考大量的群众经验、哲学指导、新研究等等。你必须像马克思本人那样做这些事。

就当下资本主义的残酷性而言，今天的处境也类似于十九世纪。它并不完全新鲜，如在十九世纪的英格兰，资本主义通过其针对穷人的法律等等，也具有令人颤粟的残酷性。今天，资本主义是暴力和玩世不恭的，这十分像十九世纪的资本主义。在二十世纪，资本主义则被革命行动限制住了。

今天，资本家们无所畏惧。他们正处于原始积累的阶段，这种情况具有真正的残酷性。这就是为什么我认为今天的工作是要找到一个新的综合，一个新的组织形式，像我们十九世纪的前辈那样。如果你愿意，也可以说，在政治领域像我们的祖父，而非父亲那样。

问：我想问问您当下全球状况，以及造成这种状况与美国有什么关系，美国仅仅只是全球统治网中的特殊节点（如哈特和奈格里所论），抑或美国正扮演着列宁意义上的传统帝国主义国家的角色？

巴迪乌：我并不完全认同奈格里。这是个十分复杂的理论问题，但简单说两句，我想奈格里的看法太体系了。最终导致"帝国"也成为了一个体系。奈格里常常将其信念寄于体系之中，这体系也为革命政治学或解放政治学提供了资源。奈格里的信念总是认为在系统中存在着为革命政治或者解放政治创造新事物的资源。他总是坚信资本主义的强力同时即是大众的创造力。这是同一现象的两面：一面是压迫，另一面则是解放，二者处于一个统一体中。它不能说是黑格尔意义上的辩证统一，但仍可说是一个统一体。所以，事件在奈格里那里是不必要的；因为在解放运动中仍有某种结构性的东西。

我不会用这种方法看待当今的处境；这不是我的信念。这里不可能恰如其分地讨论这个问题，因为它太技术化了。但奈格里学说的一个结论是：政治领域的一个大问题是运动的问题。诚然，运动是十分重要的。但如今现实的问题并不是运动和国家之间的关系。现实的问题是，政党之后，什么才是组织的新形式？说得更通俗点，什么才是新的政治纪律？

人民，一无所有--没有权力，没有金钱，没有媒体--唯有他们的纪律，这是人民得以强大的可能。马克思列宁主义界定了人民纪律的最初形式，那就是工会和政党。它们有许多不同之处，但归根结蒂，这都是人民纪律的形式，是现实行动的可能。今天，我们不可能寄希望于这种形式还会持续下去。现实处境是，在人民的阵营中，我们没有纪律，所以我们十分脆弱。事实上，今天的最佳处境是，国家实际上并没有被反动派所掌握，例如，委内瑞拉的查韦斯所处的情况。但这并不能完全改变今天的处境；这是一个机会，地方性的机会，仅此而已。它是某种东西，但不是解决方案。在很长的一段时间里，问题的答案将由新形式的人民阵营的内部纪律所发明。在政党形式的成功--也是失败--之后，这将终结人民阵营的长期软弱。

问：哲学经历了一个漫长的历史变迁：它曾经包括，后来又排除了数学。在同辈人中，您几乎是唯一一个把数学包括到哲学中的人。您也曾说您的目标是政治和数学的一个新契合。除了可以解释您自己与数学的关系的一切传记的、偶然的因素，在今天，数学与政治又有什么关系？为什么您如今会期望，如您所言的"政治与数学的一个新契合"？

巴迪乌：从哲学上讲，新纪律的政治问题也是一个新逻辑的问题。一个新逻辑的问题也常常是哲学和数学之间关系的问题。因为数学是演绎的、形式理性的范式；不是经验理性，不是具体理性，而是形式理性的范式。在政党政治学中，其逻辑范式就是黑格尔的辩证法；它的矛盾理论。在整个马克思主义、列宁主义和毛主义的发展史中，矛盾论是其逻辑框架的心脏。在我的信念中，它也结束了。正是出于与前述政党同样的原因，黑格尔意义上的辩证逻辑在今天已经饱和了。我们不能再简单地使用矛盾范式。当然，矛盾仍然存在，这不是个关于事实的问题。但对于一个新纪律的定义而言，我们不能直接使用矛盾逻辑；我们必须找到另一个范式。

就我而言，数学本身不是范式，但在政治领域，且最终在所有新的人类经验领域中，它是找到一种新的逻辑范式的可能。（如你所知，马克思自己就对数学很感兴趣。他有一些关于微积分的长手稿；那是他自学的结果。）

在寻找新的逻辑范式的过程中，我们能从数学中学到一些东西。所以我运用数学，不只是家学渊源或柏拉图式的模仿使然；它是一个现实的必要。

问：在最近出版的《阵地》杂志中，在一份对您后毛主义的评论中，布鲁诺·波斯提尔斯套用了您写过的话，"对我而言，毛主义最终坐实了：在有效政治的实际空间中，而不只是在政治哲学中，最不妥协的形式主义与最激进的主体主义之间可以系上一个紧紧的结。"但在您自己的哲学中，这个结似乎被松开了。毫不妥协的形式主义在您的哲学中更凸显。

巴迪乌：我想，对布鲁诺·波斯提尔斯的讨论是关于哲学与政治之间区别的。激进的主体性是一个政治的问题；在我提及毛主义时，我就提及了政治。哲学并不是政治，波斯提尔斯，或其他某些人，可能并不清楚这点。当然，哲学上的形式主义--权且使用这个词--能有助于在政治领域开创某些可能性。但它并不是政治解决；政治解决从不能在哲学框架内被找到。所以，在哲学领域内，我同意我们能找到一个能适应激进的主体性的形式主义。但我们不能在那里找到激进主体性本身，因为激进主体性是一个行动的问题，战斗的问题；最终，它是一个政治的问题。

毛主义的问题，激进的问题，是一个政治问题。在哲学领域，我们必须找到概念框架--如果你喜欢，也可以说是形式主义--那是一个用以满足激进主体性的可能性的思想设置。所以哲学或多或少都与政治相互兼容，但它从不能取代政治。哲学与政治二者并非一个统一体；反倒是，哲学形式主义与激进主体性之间具有某些兼容性。我认为，在波斯提尔斯的解释中，存在着某些类似于政治和哲学之间循环的东西，那全然不是我所谓的二者的关联。

概言之，后毛主义就是：我对后毛主义的解释是，毛主义是指在经典列宁主义框架中的最后经验。毛主义并不是对列宁主义的亦步亦趋；它是一个创造性的发展，但它也是革命政治的最后形式，在革命政治领域中的最后尝试。那以后，这个框架本身已经饱和了。倘若我们拥有了某种后毛主义的东西，是因为毛主义本身已经是个饱和的领域了。我们能够解释毛泽东的工作，解释文化大革命，那都非常有趣，但我们不能忘记，它与其说是一个起点，毋宁说是某个终点。但是，一个终点也是某种新的东西。它是终点的开始，是终点的新事物。尽管那之后，这个领域就饱和了。所以，后毛主义是个非常重要的东西。我们正处于诸如后马克思主义，后列宁主义之中。

问：一些左翼人士诉诸直接民主以应对全球新自由主义，有时归于斯宾诺莎的概念"诸众"，有时则聚在无政府主义的麾下。但您似乎是在竭力批判民主。您能解释一下您对民主的批判么？

巴迪乌：民主的问题有两个部分。第一个部分是国家形式的问题。这是经典的、当代的界定。存在着许多政府，且你必须说它们中的一些是民主的，一些是专制的，等等。这是一般的定义，小布什的定义，说到底也是今天大多数人的定义。在这个意义上，民主是一种国家形式，即使选举等等。

民主的第二种可能的定义，则是在政治中，通过行动去实现的民主。在这点上，哈特和奈格里的观点是，民主是运动的创造性。这是一个生机论的概念：民主是运动的自发性，也是运动的创造能力。从根本上说，奈格里的概念始终停留在国家和运动的传统对抗中。

我们一方面把民主定义为国家的形式，另一方面，民主则作为集体运动的内在决断。但我认为，国家和运动的传统对抗已经饱和了。我们不能简单地将国家压迫或强权体制与运动的创造性对立起来。这是一个民主的旧概念，而不是新概念。我们必须找到一个新概念，它位于形式民主（即作为国家形式的民主）与具体民主（即人民运动的民主）的对立之外。而奈格里则始终停留在这种传统的对抗里面，只不过是用不同的名词：帝国对应国家，诸众对应运动。但新名词并不是新事物。

问：我想问问关于认同的政治的问题，它可以被归结为这个论题：哪里有压迫，哪里就有反抗--否则压迫（种族主义、性别主义、同性恋歧视等）就会持续下去--被压迫者，这种政治认同是您颇为批评的。

巴迪乌：政治进程的问题常常是个超越于各种认同的问题。两难的是，问题在于找到一个普遍认同、非认同的认同，超越于一切认同的认同。在马克思那里，"无产阶级"就是这类名号。在《1844年手稿》中，马克思指出，无产阶级的本性将是普遍的。它不是一种认同。它毋宁是一个非认同的认同；是人类本身。这就是为什么对于马克思而言，工人阶级的解放就是全人类的解放，因为工人阶级是普遍的，而不只是一个纯粹的认同。也许工人阶级的功能已经饱和了。我们不能仅以一系列认同去代替饱和的工人阶级一般认同。我想，我们必须找到能整合各种身份的政治上的决断，它的原则是超越认同的。在没有工人阶级的情况下，这么做是非常困难的。没有普遍性与特殊性的联系，因为工人阶级本身就是普遍性与特殊性的联系。工人阶级的特殊性在于，它处于一个独特的位置；只有它才是普遍的。就马克思而言，问题的解决在于那样一种人的群体，它并不确凿地是认同，它超越认同。

我们也得这样做，但也许不是这么处理。我们不能说，今天这个群体是一般群体，或这个群体的解放也是我们所有人的解放。所以我们必须去发现某种更形式的东西。为什么是形式的？因为它更少标记一个群体的独特性。它是一个各种原则之间的联系，是一个新纪律的形式主义与社会领域的所有认同之间的联系。它是一个我们至今仍未解决的问题。

马克思对问题的解决是个奇迹：你找到的这个群体，也是一般的群体。它是个超乎寻常的发明。这个马克思主义发明的历史，就它具体的政治决断而言，与其说是一般群体的历史，即工人阶级本身的历史，毋宁说是这个群体在政治组织中被代表的历史：即政党的历史。现在的危机是代表的危机，也是一般群体这个理念的危机。

当你发现一个解放政治的序列已经结束时，就有一个选择：你可以在同一个政治领域继续下去，或是找到对忠诚的忠诚。在此，同样的是，如果作为一般群体的工人阶级的理念已经饱和了，你就会有这样一个选择，即认为存在的只是各种认同，并且最好的可能就是某些认同类型起来反抗；或者，我们就必须找到某种更普遍、更一般的东西。但也许具有代表性的一般群体不再存在。

来自：Carceraglio的博客

感谢人文与社会 http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/c10/607供稿。

翻译：陕西师范大学历史系 傅正

校订：人文与社会 http://wen.org.cn

初稿：2013年5月5日

修改：2013年5月27日

校订：2013年6月8日

谨以此译文纪念马克思诞辰195周年！

Monday, October 16, 2006

The Saturated Generic Identity of Working Class: Interview with Alain Badiou

From Diana George and Nic Veroli, Carceraglio received this previously unpublished interview with Alain Badiou.

Alain Badiou gave this interview when he attended the "Is a History of the Cultural Revolution Possible?" conference at University of Washington, in February, 2006. The interview was commissioned by a Seattle newspaper; the first few answers address readers who might not know Badiou's work.

___________________________________

Q: I'd like to ask you about your political and intellectual trajectory from the mid 60s until today. How have your views about revolutionary politics, Marxism, and Maoism changed since then?

Badiou: During the first years of my political activity, there were two fundamental events. The first was the fight against the colonial war in Algeria at the end of the 50s and the beginning of the 60s. I learned during this fight that political conviction is not a question of numbers, of majority. Because at the beginning of the Algerian war, we were really very few against the war. It was a lesson for me; you have to do something when you think it's a necessity, when it's right, without caring about the numbers.

The second event was May 68. During May 68, I learned that we have to organize direct relations between intellectuals and workers. We cannot do that only by the mediation of parties, associations, and so on. We have to directly experience the relation with the political. My interest in Maoism and the Cultural Revolution during the end of 60s and the beginning of the 70s, was this: a political conviction that organizes something like direct relations between intellectuals and workers.

I'll recapitulate, if you like. There were two great lessons: It's my conviction today that political action has to be a process which is a process of principles, convictions, and not of a majority. So there is a practical dimension. And secondly, there is the necessity of direct relations between intellectuals and workers.

That was the beginning, the subjective beginning. In the political field, the correlation with ideologies --Marxism, Cultural Revolution, Maoism and so on -- is subordinate to the subjective conviction that you have to do politics directly, to organize, to be with others, to find a way for principles to exist practically.

Q: What is your idea of fidelity?

Badiou: That's already contained in the first answer. For me, fidelity is fidelity to great events which are constitutive of my political subjectivity. And perhaps there is also something much older, because during the war my father was in the Resistance against the Nazis. Naturally, during the war, he did not say anything about it to me; it was a matter of life and death. But just after the war, I learned that he had been a resistant, that he was really in that experience of resistance against the Nazis. So my fidelity is also a fidelity to my father. At the beginning of that war, very few were in the resistance; after two or three years, there were more. It is the same lesson, if you like, this lesson from my father.

Generally speaking, my fidelity is to two great events: the engagement against the colonial war, and to May 68 and its consequences. Not only the event of May 68 as such, but also its consequences. Fidelity is a practical matter; you have to organize something, to do something. This is the reality of fidelity.

Q: You've said that there has been a rupture, that the entire question of politics is currently in great obscurity. Also, you have written that we must think a politics without party. After the saturation of the class-party experiment, what next?

Badiou: I think a fidelity does not really finish, but sometimes it is saturated; that is my term for it. There is a saturation; you cannot find anything new in the field of your first fidelity. Many people, when this is the case, just say, "It's finished." And really, a political sequence has a beginning and an end, too, an end in the form of saturation. Saturation is not a brutal rupture, but it becomes progressively more difficult to find something new in the field of the fidelity.

Since the mid-80s, more and more, there has been something like a saturation of revolutionary politics in its conventional framework: class struggle, party, dictatorship of the proletariat, and so on. So we have to find something like a fidelity to the fidelity. Not a simple fidelity.

For my generation, it's a choice between saying, on the one hand, "Nothing is possible today in the political field; the reactionary tendency is too strong." That's the position of many people in France today; it's the negative interpretation of saturation.

When the fidelity is saturated, you have a choice. The first possibility is to say it's finished. The second possibility is this: With the help of certain events-- like the events in South America today-- you find what I name a fidelity to the fidelity. Fidelity to the fidelity is not a continuation, strictly speaking, and not a pure rupture, either. We have to find something new. When I was saying yesterday that "from outside, you can see something you don't see from inside," that's merely a rule by which to find something new.

Q: If I can press you further about the something new: After the saturation of party politics, what now?

Badiou: If the answer to that were clear, the discussion would be finished, too. You have to find that out; it's not so clear. Today we have an experimental sequence from the point of view of political practice. We have to accept the multiplicity of experiences. We lack a unified field -- not only in something like the Third International, but also in concepts there is no unified field. So you have to accept something like local experiments; we have to do collective work about all that. We have to find -- with help of philosophical concepts, economic concepts, historical concepts -- the new synthesis.

I think our situation is much more similar to that of the 19th century than to that of the 20th. Nearer Marx than Lenin, if you like, metaphorically speaking. Lenin was really the thinker of the new concept of revolutionary politics, with the idea that we could be victorious, that the revolution was a possibility. That's not exactly the situation today; the idea of revolution is obscure in itself today. But we can do as Marx did--it's a metaphor, an image. You have to think the multiplicity of popular experiences, philosophical directions, new studies, and so on. You must do these things as Marx himself did.

The situation today is also similar to 19th century in the brutality of capitalism today. It's not absolutely new; capitalism was of a terrible brutality in the 19th century in England, with the laws against the poor and so on. Today, there's something violent and cynical in capitalism, very much like the capitalism of the 19th century. In the 20th century, capitalism was limited by revolutionary action.

Today, the capitalists have no fear of anything. They are in the stage of primitive accumulation, and there is a real brutality to the situation. That's why I think the work today is to find a new synthesis, a new form of organization, like our predecessors of the 19th century. Our grandfathers, if you will, rather than our fathers in the political field.

Q: I'd like to ask about the current global situation and of the relationship of the US to that situation. Is the US simply a privileged node in a network of global sovereignty (as Hardt and Negri argue) or is the US playing the role of a traditional imperialist power in Lenin's sense?

Badiou: I don't completely agree with Negri. It's a very complex theoretical discussion, but, in a few words, I think Negri's perception is too systemic. Empire is a system, finally. Negri's conviction is always that within the system there are also resources for something new on the side of revolutionary politics, or politics of emancipation. There is always in Negri the conviction that the strength of capitalism is also the creativity of the multitude. Two faces of the same phenomenon: the oppressive face and, on the other side, the emancipatory, in something like a unity. Not exactly a dialectical unity in the Hegelian sense, but still a unity. So there is no necessity of an event in Negri, because there's something structural in the movement of emancipation.

I don't see the situation that way; it's not my conviction. It's not possible to discuss this precisely here and now, because it's too technical. But one consequence for Negri is that the great question in the political field is the question of the movement. Movements are certainly of great importance. But the real question today is not the relation between the movement and the state. The real question is, what is the new form of organization after the party? More generally, what is a new political discipline?

People who have nothing--no power, no money, no media--have only their discipline as a possibility of strength. Marxism and Leninism defined a first form of popular discipline, which was trade unions and party. There were many differences, but finally that was the form of popular discipline, and the possibility of real action. And today we cannot hope that this form will continue. The real situation is that we have no discipline in the popular camp, and so we have a great weakness. In fact the best situations today are ones where the state is not really in the hands of the reactionaries, for example, the situation of Chavez in Venezuela. But that's not a complete change of the situation; it's a chance, a local chance, nothing more. It's something, but it's not the solution. The solution of the problem in the long term will be the invention of a new form of immanent discipline in the popular camp. That will be the end of the long weakness of the popular camp after the success-- but also the failure-- of the form of the party.

Q: Philosophy has a long history of alternately including and then excluding mathematics. You, almost alone among your contemporaries, include it. You have also stated that your aim is a new articulation of politics and mathematics. Apart from any biographical, contingent factors that might explain your own relationship to mathematics, what's mathematics got to do with politics today? Why do you see a hope today for, as you've said, "a new articulation of politics and mathematics"?

Badiou: The political question of the new discipline is also, philosophically, the question of a new logic. The question of a new logic is always also the question of the relationship between philosophy and mathematics. Because mathematics is the paradigm of deduction, of formal rationality; not of empirical rationality, not of concrete rationality, but the paradigm of formal rationality. During the phase of party politics, the logical paradigm was the Hegelian dialectic; it was the theory of contradiction. During the entire development of Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism, the theory of contradiction was the heart of the logical framework. In my conviction, that is also finished. For the same reason as for the party, dialectical logic in the Hegelian sense is saturated today. We can no longer simply use the paradigm of contradiction. Naturally, there are contradictions; it's not a question of fact. But for the definition of a new discipline, we cannot directly use the logic of contradiction; we have to find another paradigm.

Mathematics is not the paradigm itself for me, but it's the possibility of finding a new logical paradigm in the political field, and finally in all fields of new human experiences.

(As you may know, Marx himself was very interested in mathematics. There are long manuscripts by Marx about the differential calculus and so on; it was something he studied for himself.)

In the search for the new logical paradigm, we have something to learn from mathematics. So my use of mathematics is not only a family obligation or a Platonist imitation; it's a real necessity.

Q: In a recent issue of the journal Positions, in an essay on your post-Maoism, Bruno Bosteels quotes you as having written, "Maoism, in the end, has been the proof for me that in the actual space of effective politics, and not just in political philosophy, a close knot could be tied between the most uncompromising formalism and the most radical subjectivism." But in your own philosophy, this knot seems to be looser. It is the uncompromising formalism that comes through in your philosophy.

Badiou: I think the discussion with Bruno Bosteels is about the distinction between philosophy and politics. Radical subjectivity is a matter of politics; when I speak of Maoism, I speak of politics. Philosophy is not politics, which may not be clear to Bosteels, or to some others. Naturally, philosophical formalism--to use that word-- can help to open some possibilities in the political field. But it is not the political solution; the political solution is never found inside the philosophical framework. So I agree, in the philosophical field, we can find a formalism adequate to radical subjectivity. But we cannot find radical subjectivity itself there, because radical subjectivity is a matter of action, of engagement; it's a matter of politics, finally.

The question of Maoism, of radicality, is a political one. In the philosophical field, we have to find the conceptual framework--the formalism, if you like--which is a disposition of thinking that is adequate to the possibility of a radical subjectivity. So philosophy is more or less in the situation of compatibility with politics, but it is never a substitute for politics. There is no unity between philosophy and politics; instead, there is something like compatibility between philosophical formalism and radical subjectivity. I think that in Bosteels' interpretation there is something like a circulation between politics and philosophy, which is not exactly my vision of the correlation of the two.

A word on the expression "post-Maoism": My interpretation of post-Maoism is that Maoism is the name of the last experience within the framework of classical Leninism. Maoism is not the same as Leninism; it's a creative development, but it's the last form of revolutionary politics, the last attempt in the field of revolutionary politics. After that, the framework itself is saturated. If we have something like post-Maoism, it's because Maoism itself is the saturation of the field. We can interpret the work of Mao, the Cultural Revolution, that's all very interesting, but we cannot forget that it's also the end of something, much more than a beginning. But an end is also something new. It's the beginning of the end, the newness of the end. After that, though, the field is saturated. And so post-Maoism is something very important. We are in something like post-Marxism, post-Leninism.

Q: Some people on the left argue for direct democracy as a response to global neoliberalism, sometimes under the heading of a Spinozist concept of 'multitude' and sometimes under the heading of anarchism. But you seem quite critical of democracy. Can you explain your critique of democracy?

Badiou: The question of democracy has two parts. The first one is the question of the form of the state. That's the classical, contemporary definition. There are governments, and you have to say which ones are democratic, which ones despotic, and so on. That is the common definition, the definition of Bush, and also of the majority today, finally. Democracy in this first sense is a form of the state, with elections and so on.

The second possible definition of democracy is what is really democracy within politics, in action. Hardt and Negri's concept on this point is that democracy is the creativity of the movement. It's a vitalist concept: democracy is the spontaneity and the creative capacity of the movement. Ultimately, Negri's concept remains inside the classical opposition of movement and state.

We have on the one side the definition of democracy as a form of the state, and on the other, democracy as an immanent determination of the collective movement. But I think the classical opposition of state and movement is saturated. We cannot simply oppose state oppression or the oppressive system, with, on the other side, the creativity of the movement. That's an old concept, not a new one. We have to find a new concept of democracy, one that is outside the opposition of formal democracy (which is democracy as form of state) and concrete democracy (which is the democracy of the popular movement). Negri remains inside this classical opposition, while using other names: Empire for state, multitude for movement. But new names are not new things.

Q: I'd like to ask about the politics of identity, which can be summed up in the thesis that for every oppression there must be a resistance by the group which is being oppressed--otherwise the oppression (racism, sexism, homophobia, etc...) will remain unaddressed--this politics of identity is something you are quite critical of.

Badiou: The question of the political process is always a question that goes beyond identities. It's the question of finding something that is, paradoxically, a generic identity, the identity of no-identity, the identity which is beyond all identities. For Marx, "proletariat" was the name of something like that. In the Manuscripts of 1844, Marx writes that the very nature of the proletariat is to be generic. It's not an identity. It's something like an identity which is non-identity; it's humanity as such. That's why for Marx the liberation of the working class is liberation of humanity as such, because the working class is something generic and not a pure identity. Probably that function of the working class is saturated. We cannot substitute a mere collection of identities for the saturated generic identity of the working class. I think we have to find the political determination that integrates the identities, the principles of which are beyond identity. The great difficulty is to do that without something like the working class. Without something that was a connection between particularity and universality, because that's what the working class was. The particularity of the working class was its location in a singular place; the working class was generic. The solution of the problem for Marxism was the human group which is not really an identity, which is beyond identity.

We have to do the same thing, but probably without that sort of solution. We cannot say that today this group is the generic group and that the emancipation of this group is also the emancipation of us all. So we have to find something more formal. Why formal? Because it's less inscribed in the singularity of a group. It's a relation between principles, between the formalism of the new discipline and all identities in the social field. It's a problem now for which we don't yet have the solution.

Marx's solution a sort of miracle: you find the group which is also the generic group. It was an extraordinary invention. The history of this Marxist invention, in its concrete political determination, was not so much the history of the generic group, of the working class as such, but rather history of the representation of this generic group in a political organization: it was the history of the party. The crisis now is the crisis of representation, and also the crisis of the idea of the generic group.

When you see that a sequence of politics of emancipation is finished, you have a choice: you can continue in the same political field, or you can find the fidelity to the fidelity. It's the same thing here: If the idea of the working class as a generic group is saturated, you have the choice of saying that there are only identities, and that the best hope is the revolt of some particular identity. Or you can say that we have to find something much more universal, much more generic. But probably without the representative generic group.

来自：Carceraglio的博客

http://scentedgardensfortheblind.blog ... e.html#116103479719156657