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2003年于纽约建立的eVolo建筑论坛主要推广方法之一就是举办建筑设计比赛，从06－08年比赛中心都是摩天楼设计，奖金很低，一等奖也就2000美元，网站也不是那么多人访问，但其褒扬的设计风格与贵阳花溪CBD风一脉相承，乍看某些渲染成暮色的电脑绘画，略有人与机器发生战斗的世界末日即将来临的感觉。--人文与社会

The world's tallest skyscraper will open soon in Dubai, even as the emirate continues to be battered by the financial crisis. Is Burj Dubai an expression of failed megalomania or proof of Dubai leader Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum's stunning vision?The view is clear, the air is soft and silky, and only a thick strip of red separates the sky and the sea at sundown. The boundary between grandeur and kitsch becomes blurred here, halfway up the Burj Dubai, the world's tallest tower.It smells of paint, varnish and new leather, and the steps of female visitors on parquet and marble produce an elegant-sounding echo that suddenly disappears when they step onto soft carpets. An artificial island in the shape of a palm tree is visible to the southwest, and farther to the north is a man-made archipelago that looks like a map of the world.But only the furniture, the carpets, the smells and the sounds are real. The rest is an illusion. The visitor isn't gazing out at the Persian Gulf from 400 meters (1,312 feet) up in the air; in fact, he or she is standing at ground level -- in a model apartment with an enormous mural stretched outside its floor-to-ceiling windows -- at the foot of a hermetically sealed building.The model apartment is located at the recently closed sales office of Emaar Properties, the real estate development company behind the Burj Dubai, which has over-extended itself -- with projects from India to Morocco -- and is now selling some of its condominiums at half the list price. After falling by 32 percent in last two weeks, Emaar's stock price gained 15 percentage points again last Thursday. Emaar, like the entire city, is on the brink of ruin, and yet it behaves as if nothing has happened.Dubai, like no other place in the world, epitomizes globalization, "innovation" and "astonishing progress," as US President Barack Obama said admiringly in his speech to the Muslim world in Cairo in June. But it also stands for mind-boggling excess. In Dubai, utopias almost feel real sometimes, and reality is sometimes nothing but a mirage.The tower, at any rate, is real. With its 160 habitable stories, it juts 818 meters (2,683 feet) into the sky. Tourists have to kneel down on the sidewalk to photograph the building in its entirety, from base to tip.The Burj Dubai is so tall that Bedouins can see it from their oases 100 kilometers (63 miles) inland and sailors can see it from their supertankers, 50 nautical miles out in the Gulf -- at least on the few winter days when the air is as clear as it's portrayed on the mural in front of the model apartment window.The tower is so enormous that the air temperature at the top is up to 8 degrees Celsius (14 degrees Fahrenheit) lower than at the base. If anyone ever hit upon the idea of opening a door at the top and a door at the bottom, as well as the airlocks in between, a storm would rush through the air-conditioned building that would destroy most everything in its wake, except perhaps the heavy marble tiles in the luxury apartments. The phenomenon is called the "chimney effect."AN ARMY OF IMMIGRANT WORKERSAn army of immigrant workers from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who make up about two-thirds of Dubai's residents, built the Burj. Only one in five residents is considered a "local" entitled to a United Arab Emirates passport. Scores of marketing strategists take steps to ensure that no one scrapes away at the silver varnish of this architectural marvel.Security guards quickly remind anyone who comes too close to the construction site of the meaning of the word "unauthorized." Those who are invited to tour the building, or even just the grounds, are required to sign a non-disclosure agreement, the terms of which are to be obey "finally, irrevocably and unconditionally." Anyone who violates the terms can expect to face a judge in Dubai.All of this will apply for only a little more than two weeks, until Jan. 4, 2010, the official opening date -- already rescheduled several times -- when the developers hope that the tower will begin serving its purpose as a magnet for a two-square-kilometer new development zone, where the wind was still blowing empty plastic bags across the desert sand only five years ago. And when the Burj Dubai opens, it will likely be one of the last major projects for some time in a city that has risen to dizzying heights and now faces the prospect of a precipitous fall.On a single day, Tuesday of last week, prices on Dubai's stock exchange fell by an average of 6 percent. The Islamic bond issued by real estate developer Nakheel fell to 52 cents a share, at a face value of $1 per share. The rating agency Moody's downgraded six other government-related firms to junk status. Hardly anyone believes that Dubai World, the largest of these companies, will be able to refinance its $26 billion debt within six months, as originally scheduled. The US bank Morgan Stanley predicts another drastic increase in the debt restructuring needs of Dubai's government-related firms to double the current level, or about $47 billion."Within a year, Dubai went from being the best-performing real estate market to one of the world's worst," writes the International Herald Tribune. Has the Persian Gulf emirate, once praised for its seemingly dazzling future, bitten off more than it can chew? Is the role model for a future-oriented Arabian Peninsula, with aspirations to become a hub of globalization between the East and the West, nothing less than a model for the future -- a failure?Ironically, it was the Wall Street Journal, standard-bearer of the West's brand of conservative capitalism, that warned against American and European arrogance and the tendency to write off the upstarts in the Gulf region and in the Third World in general. "The old centers ... view the Dubais, the Shanghais and the Rios with suspicion and with errant conviction that their models are built on foundations of sand, ready to collapse, when it was their own foundations that have proved to be weak," the paper writes. "Judging from the misguided reaction to Dubai's challenges, the past year hasn't changed those attitudes. That should make us worried, very worried, but not about Dubai."It is too early to sound the death bell for Dubai. That, at least, is the impression the sheikhs will try to make when they open the Burj Dubai in early January.A SUPREMELY ELEGANT EDIFICEStill, it would be condescending to dispute that the tower is an impressive, supremely elegant edifice, or that it is nothing less than graceful compared with the plain, cuboids from the age of functionalism or the gaudy, modern towers in places like Kuala Lumpur and Taipei.According to the tower's US architect, Adrian Smith, the floor plan, a central core surrounded by three lobes, is patterned on the blossom structure of the Hymenocallis flower, a shape that simultaneously creates more visible surface area and reduces the wind pressure acting on buildings this tall. As it tapers upward, one of the three lobes is shifted slightly backward about every eight floors, an effect that is reminiscent of an Islamic spiral minaret and provides the tower with 26 terraces. There will be an outdoor pool on one of the terraces, on the 78th floor, and the 124th floor (at 442 meters, or 1,450 feet, above sea level) will feature the world's third-highest observation deck.Uwe Hinrichs, 68, a native of the northern German city of Bremen, had already been involved in the construction of another Dubai landmark, the sail-shaped Burj-al-Arab Hotel, when he arrived on the construction site of his life in late 2004. The concrete foundation had already been poured, on top of 850 piles, driven up to 55 meters into the desert floor to support a load of 230,000 cubic meters of concrete and 31,000 tons of steel."From a construction standpoint," says Hinrichs, "the Burj Dubai is a relatively simple structure." One of the biggest challenges, according to Hinrichs, was the logistics of the project, an around-the-clock effort that lasted five years -- five years during which people, machines and material always had to be in the right place at the right time, 24 hours a day. Coordinating the whole thing was Hinrichs' job. His levelheaded northern German disposition proved advantageous in his position as chief coordinator, as did the fact that the people he reported to had no objection to the fact that he occassionally leaves Dubai to attend a concert in Vienna or a Rembrandt exhibition in Muscat in the neighboring country of Oman.PART 2: BAILOUTS FROM ABU DHABIIn 2004, a crew of about 2,000 people began building one floor at a time, completing an average of one per week. When interior construction entered its final phase in the fall of 2009, there were 14,000 people working on the project, people from 45 nations, speaking 35 different languages -- engineers in white helmets, security personnel in red helmets and laborers in blue helmets -- and yet there was no Babylonian linguistic confusion on the site. The workers completed a total of 95 million working hours, many at starvation wages. A skilled carpenter earned no more than €12 a day, while ordinary laborers made even less.Façade components were shipped from China, marble panels from Italy and veneers from Brazil. German companies were also involved in Burj Dubai's construction: Lopark, from the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia, supplied parquet flooring, entire football fields of it. The German branch of the US firm Guardian, based in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt, provided 174,000 square meters (1.8 million square feet) of solar glass. Dorma, from Ennepetal in North Rhine-Westphalia, supplied hinges and fittings. Duravit provided approximately 4,000 bidets and toilets. And Miele delivered 7,650 household appliances -- the biggest single order in the company's history. Designer Giorgio Armani bought 15,200 plates and cups from Bavarian porcelain maker Rosenthal for his hotel on the first eight floors of the building.German companies also played important roles in the development and processing of the basic core material of the Burj Dubai: concrete. Because concrete dries too quickly at daytime temperatures above 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit), the concrete was poured at night. German chemical giant BASF developed a special chemical to make the concrete more malleable initially and later rigid. Putzmeister, a maker of concrete pumps near Stuttgart, provided special high-performance pumps to pump the concrete up to the 160th floor.Quietly and uneventfully, which was entirely to Hinrichs' liking, the tower grew, floor after floor -- until June 6, 2007, when the weather service at the airport e-mailed Hinrichs a satellite image showing a cyclone that had developed over the Indian Ocean, the biggest storm ever recorded in the region, which was heading directly for the Strait of Hormuz. "That was the only day in five years," says Hinrichs, "when we had to close the construction site."The Dubai tower had already surpassed all superlatives in building history. It had overtaken the 509-meter Taipei 101 Tower as the tallest inhabited building in the world, as well as Toronto's 553-meter CN Tower as the tallest freestanding structure. Dubai had arrived at what had become the most ambitious of its goals. The city, a village of pearl divers only a generation earlier, had brought a world record back to the Middle East. For almost four millennia, the Great Pyramid of Giza (138.8 meters) was the world's tallest man-made structure, before it was overtaken by Lincoln Cathedral in England (160 meters, at the time) in 1311.TREMORSWhat could now unhinge this economic miracle on the Gulf? A terrorist attack? A new Gulf war, this time against Iran? Another earthquake, even stronger than the one that hit the region on Sept. 10, 2008?On the day of the cyclone on Sept. 10, 2008, a crane operator working 700 meters above the ground had called Hinrichs to report that it was "shaking" where he was standing. Tremors had shaken the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas, but in Dubai, few (other than the crane operator) had even noticed.Five days later, Dubai was struck by another sort of tremor, but this one had its epicenter in New York, another city of skyscrapers. On Sept. 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, the world's fourth-largest investment bank, filed for bankruptcy.Not just Dubai, but the West, too, had been building a tower in the years of the real estate boom, a tower of debt, which now came crashing down. But despite the vast sums of money involved in the crisis in the West, it was and largely remains a strangely abstract phenomenon. Not so in Dubai, however, which reflects the financial debacle more vividly than any other city in the world."Classic megalomania seems to have migrated from people's minds to the system itself. Nowadays the system is crazier than the people," says German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk. "That's why we, as human beings, are terribly disappointed by the course of the crisis. There was not a single colorful individual (in Europe) to make the crisis more interesting. I've never seen such an enormous conspiracy of petty bourgeoise people than at the moment."Sloterdijk may be right when it comes to the bankers, analysts and finance ministers of the West. But he apparently has never heard of Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, 60, a horse breeder and poet, a lover of fast powerful cars, an avid falconer and a juggler of billions. Maktoum is the ruler of Dubai and the prime minister of the United Arab Emirates. "Many leaders make promises," he said in February 2008, when the Free University of Berlin awarded him its medal of honor, "but we deliver."Maktoum had artificial islands built in the waters off his city, with names like The Palm, The World and The Universe. Not just the Free University, but the entire West was fascinated by his energy and optimism. Like the thoroughbred horses in his racing stable, he sent the most capable of his lieutenants into the orbit of globalization, and along the way they built new towers, bought ports and sent airliners out into the world.'CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS?'One real estate company after the next was founded -- Dubai Holding, Dubai Properties, Tatweer, Meraas, Sama -- and it soon became difficult to keep track of who was building what and with whose money. Apparently not even the sheikh himself was always in the know.Only about a year ago, investors were still crowding into the "CityScape Dubai" real estate convention. Former race-car driver Michael Schumacher was there, touting a skyscraper with a covered yacht berth. Nakheel, which is now in very dire financial straits, was seriously talking about the possibility of building a 1,000-meter tower. And, on the palm-shaped Jumeirah island, Dubai spent $20 million on fireworks to celebrate the opening of the fairytale Atlantis Hotel. "Crisis?" the city seemed to ask, "what crisis?"A year few weeks later, one of Sheikh Mohammed's officials presented the bill: Dubai had amassed $80 billion in debt, $50 billion of which, or about two-thirds of its gross domestic product, was scheduled to mature by 2013.For a few days, the sheikh suddenly disappeared from the scene. Rumors emerged he was ill and that he was "melancholy." Then he reappeared and began to whitewash the situation, claiming that the crisis had not affected Dubai, that Dubai had actually overcome the crisis, and that Dubai and its wealthy neighbor, Abu Dhabi, were as close and inseparable as brothers.But the "brothers" from the neighboring sheikdom, with whom the Dubaians form the bulk of the United Arab Emirates, no longer wanted any part of Dubai's excesses. Abu Dhabi has 7 percent of worldwide oil reserves, and its 64-year-old emir, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, is the president of the UAE, while Dubai's Sheikh Mohammed is only its premier -- and Abu Dhabi now views the prestigious activities of his relative in the neighboring emirate with growing mistrust, and probably some envy.At the beginning of the year, Abu Dhabi rescued Dubai from the worst of its problems with a $20 billion cash injection. The emirate stepped in again earlier this week, providing Dubai with an additional $10 billion in financial aid. The emirate may have abundant assets in its $500 billion sovereign wealth fund, but how much longer will it be willing to bailout its neighbor? The sheikhs of Abu Dhabi seem to prefer to spend their money on sounder, more sustainable projects, such as an emissions-free eco-city called Masdar, where the emirate plans to conduct research on projects for the post-petroleum age.In the last four weeks, the sheikh has revealed -- not always voluntarily -- how serious the crisis is and how deeply it affects him. At first, the normally restrained sheikh lost his composure and told the critical Western media to "shut up," and then he dismissed three of his closest advisers on the emirate's central financial council. A short time later, he waxed poetic when he described the crisis as "the fruit-bearing tree that becomes the target of stone-throwers."PART 3: A SYMBOL OF EARTHLY TEMPTATIONIn truth, Sheikh Mohammed, the poet-prince, has good reasons to look forward to the day when the Burj Dubai opens its doors. With one snip of the red ribbon, he will be taking up the thread of a great epic, a saga of humanity that goes well beyond the financial problems of a debt-ridden Gulf emirate. Once before, the Eastern World is said to have been the home another groundbreaking tower, in Babylon, the legendary Mesopotamian city between the Tigris and the Euphrates.Archeologists have confirmed that the Tower of Babel did indeed exist in the 3rd century B.C. They estimate that the skyscraper of antiquity was 90 meters tall, a marvel of the day, and was constructed on a platform that was 90 meters square. If this were true, the tower would have been one-ninth as tall as the latest wonder of the modern world. According to the Bible, the Tower of Babel was much more than a building, but rather a symbol of earthly temptation. "Come, let us build ourselves a city, and a tower with its top in the heavens, and let us make a name for ourselves." These words, which sound strikingly like a motto of today's rulers of Dubai, are in fact from the Book of Genesis in the Old Testament. Even today, many of the faithful believe that endeavoring to be like God is a presumption that must invariably lead to punishment.MEGALOMANIA OR A GRAND ACHIEVEMENT?Nevertheless, the excessive building of cities and towers seems to be a cross-cultural constant, a dream and nightmare alike for mankind, from the Babylonians to the heroes and villains of the present. The ruler of Dubai isn't the only one who has carried out his plans in reinforced concrete and gleaming facades.President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan had Astana, an entire city of monumental avenues, triumphal arches and pyramids built as his new capital, where marble contrasts with granite, buildings are topped by gigantic glass domes and, on the Bayterek Tower, every subject can place his or her hand in a golden imprint of the president's hand.In the Burmese jungle, dictatorial generals had an absurd new capital, Naypyidaw, or "Seat of the Kings," conjured up out of nothing. Yamoussoukro, the capital of Côte d'Ivoire and a memorial to the country's now-deceased first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, is even a step closer to the brink. The city is filled with grandiose buildings, but there are hardly any people to be seen. The Basilica of Notre Dame de la Paix is a piece of lunacy inspired by the Basilica of St. Peter in the Vatican, but the African church is even bigger than St. Peter's. Indeed, it is the world's largest Catholic church.It is easy to ridicule the megalomaniacs and their hubris and to rail against the record-breaking mania reflected in their ostentatious buildings, phallic symbols of the rise to power of nouveau-riche potentates.And yet, aren't Brasilia and Canberra, the South American and Australian versions of the man-made model city, remarkable successes? Hasn't history proven at least a few visionaries right, people whose achievements we continue to marvel at today: the creators of Giza on the Nile, Machu Picchu in the Andes and Angkor in Cambodia, or the planners of St. Petersburg?Today, the pyramids of the pharaohs, the mountain fortress of the Incas and the sacral ruins of the Khmer are admired as part of the world's cultural heritage, places that attest to man's greatness. They are the great and magnificent achievements of past eras. Nowadays, the center of St. Petersburg -- designed on the drawing board, like Dubai today, more than 300 years ago -- is still considered an ideal city and an example of successful urban planning.Where the emirates are built on sand, the banks of the Neva River were once swampland. At the behest of the czar, St. Petersburg was not just created as Russia's window to the West, but as a reflection of what the modernists of the day defined as utopian. "Now, city of Peter, stand thou fast, Foursquare, like Russia; vaunt thy splendor! The very element shall surrender And make her peace with thee at last," Alexander Pushkin, the congenial poetic counterpart to Peter the Great, wrote in his poem "The Bronze Horseman." It was pure hubris, cast in the form of magnificent verse.What happens today in Dubai -- or in Shanghai or Astana -- generally happens under the conditions of an authoritarian form of government. In democracies, people cannot be dispossessed and driven off their property but, instead, can hire attorneys to assert their rights. In democracies, more or less reasonable building codes and ordinances, as well as licensed appraisers, ensure that uncontrolled growth and injustices are kept in check. But this limiting effect also applies to creativity, spontaneity and "positive" megalomania, resulting in a general leveling of things.THE VIRTUE OF TAKING THE PLUNGE"This society is mediocre," the poet and sharp-tongued contemporary critic Hans Magnus Enzensberger once wrote about German reality. "Its political leaders and its works of art are mediocre, as are its representatives and its taste, its joys, its opinions, its architecture, its media, its fears, vices and afflictions." And then, in his essay "Mediocrity and Delusion," Enzensberger writes: "There is something cathartic about this realization."Somewhere between Western suburbs and Yamoussoukro lies Dubai. Whether its Burj, its tower, will ever become a part of the world's cultural heritage is still open, as is the question of how long it will remain the world's tallest structure. China, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are already planning towers that will be much taller than the Burj Dubai, reaching more than 1,000 meters into the sky.In the Book of Isaiah, the Bible describes the fall of Babel as follows: "And suddenly your downfall will come, and it will come unexpectedly." If the words of the Old Testament are to be believed, the megalomaniacal tower builders of today cannot expect external support: "Thus shall they be unto thee with whom thou hast labored, even thy merchants, from thy youth: They shall wander every one to his quarter; none shall save thee."The Burj Dubai was not cheap, and perhaps it was even unaffordable. But at least the sheikhs of Dubai have taught their contemporaries one virtue: the virtue of taking the plunge.

互联网继续向低端学历群体渗透。2011 年上半年,我国网民中低学历网民继续增加, 初中及以下学历网民占比从 2010 年底的 41.2%攀升至 43.8%。而高中以上学历群体从 58.9% 降低为 56.1%。

CCTV：《今日观察》栏目何帆、丁一凡谈金融危机，他们认为，“绝对地偏向市场”是导致美金融危机的致命伤，美国批评中国储蓄率太高导致美国消费率高的牵强逻辑行不通，贪婪和纵容是这次危机的根源。

Derek Jarman最后一个feature电影的文本。

我刚从印度回来。在印度期间，我站在美国总统奥巴马最近发表演讲的讲台上给国会议员们讲课。这个国家最近丑闻缠身，手机行业一个涉及部长级官员的巨大骗局，让一个政客敛财高达数十亿美元。

但一些议员们也惊讶地发现，原来奥巴马向他们发表演讲时使用了一台"隐形"提词机（"invisible" teleprompter）。这让听众误以为他是即席演讲的，这在印度可是一项备受推崇的技巧。

自1948年以来，BBC每年举办里斯讲座，谈当代问题

前言近几年来国际上有了许多关于“中国在非洲”（China in Africa）的讨论，特别是在那些与非洲联系密切的的西方国家，即美国、英国和法国。中国在非洲的作为当然应该接受监察，然而西方精英把中国看作是与西方争夺非洲资源和影响力的对手，从而扭曲了关于“中国在非洲”的看法。他们关于“中国在非洲”的话语比其关于“西方在非洲”的话语要负面得多。这种话语包括中国在非洲的作为如何对非洲的治理造成了“坏的影响”。[1]与此相伴随的一种观点套用发展权的话语，认为中国在非洲的作为阻碍了非洲的发展。[2]2007年《纽约时报》的社论典型地显示了西方媒体是如何进行这种讨论的；其标题《非洲乱治的庇护者》指的是中国。[3]这篇社论说如果非洲国家把自然资源抵押给中国，中国将为他们开出巨额的支票，而不关心腐败或专制的问题。它说中国正在进行“冷酷的人民币外交”， 与实行“种族灭绝”的苏丹政府保持“丑陋的伙伴关系”， 并把津巴布韦总统罗伯特•穆加贝当作“最喜欢的人”，使津巴布韦缺乏自由选举和“理智的经济政策”。《纽约时报》还断言，中国正在用廉价商品充斥非洲，给非洲国家提供贷款却不坚持西方国家所努力推动的《采掘业透明度倡议》 (EITI)的准则，从而使最贫穷的非洲工人变得更加困苦。社论还对中国公司对赞比亚矿工的剥削表示愤慨。这种话语的本质是指责中国在非洲的政策有损人权，甚至是一种“殖民主义政策”，这种指责建立了一个假设，即在话语的背后“高尚”的西方当然与此不同。[4]中国在非洲大陆的有些活动确实侵犯了非洲人的人权，但不是以西方精英所声称的那种方式进行的，而是以与西方政策相同的方式进行的，包括不利的贸易条件、对自然资源的大量开采、压迫性的劳动制度以及对独裁统治者的支持，所有这些都是现代世界体系的共同特征。中国的精英们过去曾经谴责过这些做法，但现在却几乎把这些颂扬为有活力的资本主义（dynamic capitalism）。例如，在2007年，复旦大学学者简军波在颇有影响的《Beijing Review》杂志上回应对中国在非洲搞“殖民主义”指责说：“越来越多的中国公司进入了非洲，它们只是专注于利润，而不管对非洲社会的有害影响，例如环境污染、过度开发和对当地劳动力的剥削”。但是他认为中国所采取的路径“与市场资本主义自由贸易的逻辑是一致的”，因而这些作为并没有把中国变成一个殖民主义者，而是变成一个“在非洲成功的资本家”。[5]对西方的话语我们的论点不是反其道而行之。我们并不想说“中国在非洲”是积极的，西方的是消极的，或者说中国在非洲的作为是可以理解的，因为西方也有类似的作为。对中非关系的分析既不能简单地用“双赢”来概括，也不是西方媒体所描述的噩梦。中国的行为应放在世界体系的大环境下来看，应使用比较的方法来进行分析讨论。我们的论点包括三个方面：1）在世界体系的背景下，很难对中非关系的长短处进行单独的评估；2）作为世界体系的成员，中国在非洲与西方在非洲的共同之处要远比人们想象的多；3）中国和西方在非洲的作为仍然存在着显著的差异；其中一个重要原因是中国曾经是一个半殖民地国家，她有社会主义的遗产以及她作为发展中国家的定位，这些因素使中国的政策不象西方的政策那么有损于非洲人的权利观。[6]在下文中，我们主要讨论中国在非洲的贸易和投资活动，西方往往谴责说这些活动损害了非洲的利益。我们也要考查“中国在非洲”的话语在什么背景下产生，以及非洲人是否同意这个话语的主要观点。 一、非洲的发展与中国的进口 中国与非洲的贸易急剧上升。在1995年时中非贸易额只有30亿美元，到2006年为止中非贸易额已达到550亿美元，非洲在中非贸易中略有顺差。但是当年中国与非洲的贸易仅仅是中国外贸总额（1.76万亿美元）的3％。 2008年中国与非洲的贸易总额为1070亿美元，非洲明显享有顺差，但是因为中国对外的贸易总额已达到2.56万亿美元，中非贸易还是只占了4%。2006年中国是非洲的第三大贸易伙伴，仅次于美国和法国，而到了2008年中国已经超越法国，排在美非贸易1400亿美元的后面。[7]中国宣称中非贸易为非洲经济增长的贡献达到20％。[8]西方有关“中国在非洲”的话语涉及中国对非洲的出口与进口的问题。在进口方面，这种话语主要围绕中国从非洲进口石油的问题，许多西方人指责中国使非洲更加依赖于通过出卖原材料来获得收入。一位加拿大学者指出，西方人经常强调说“北京对非洲石油和其他原材料的需求必然会延续非洲对石油出口的依赖，从而进一步阻碍了劳动密集型产业的增长 ， 如农产企业和制造业”。[9] 然而，下面我们会指出美国的石油进口其实最依赖非洲。在2005年撒哈拉以南的非洲国家有10%的出口产品是运往中国的；到2007年，该比例已增长到13.4%。5个石油和矿产国对中国的出口占中国从非洲进口的85％。2004年，石油和天然气占非洲对中国出口额的62%，矿石和金属占17％，农业原料占7％。2009年，石油、天然气和矿产占非洲对中国出口额的86%。[10] 这种结构并非奇特：除了南非之外，非洲大陆的制造业主要限于纺织品和服装，而中国也大量生产纺织品和服装。事实上，中国和美国各自从非洲的进口有相似的结构。 2005年美国从撒哈拉以南的非洲国家的进口中石油占80％，服装不到3％，其余大部分为矿物质。2005年，通过美国对非洲优惠的《非洲增长与机会法案》（AGOA）计划进入美国的石油产品占该计划内美国进口非洲产品总价值的92％。2008年，上述比例依然保持在92%，当年进入美国市场的石油产品（无论通过AGOA计划与否）占了美非贸易总额的88%。仅仅四个非洲国家就占了AGOA全部贸易的84%。[11]中国2006年消耗的石油中大约有47％是进口的，2008年则是50%。2006年中国的石油进口占世界石油贸易的6.8％，占中国所需能源的12％（煤炭、水电、核电也是中国主要的能源）。[12]2005年中国从非洲进口的石油占中国能源总需求的4％。在中国从非洲进口石油的31%的份额中，安哥拉的份额为14％，苏丹为5％，刚果为4％，赤道几内亚为3％。[13]非洲国家所供应的石油占2006年中国所有石油消耗的14.5％，占2008年中国所有石油消耗的16%，占美国所有石油消耗的13.2%，两者没有什么大不同，非洲石油进口为美国提供了5.2％的能源需求。[14]中国进口石油主要用于为生产提供能源：其石油需求的70％是为了工业用途，而美国石油需求的70％被用于汽车消耗。[15]2009年中国的非洲事务特使指出中国进口了非洲石油出口8.7%，而欧盟和美国各获得33％。中国总理也指出中国只占全球在在非洲石油和天然气工业总投资的十六分之一。[16]因此，中国并没有支配非洲的石油市场。然而“中国在非洲”的话语认为中国企图成为非洲资源的主要获取者，并认为中国仅对非洲的资源有兴趣。[17]。中国确实参与了具有剥削性的商贸：历史上，石油和其他全球性交易的初级产品相对于工业商品的价格主要由政治力量的不对称所决定。[18]影响石油和初级产品的因素除了“不平等和不同类的交易”之外，[19]还包括：石油是资本密集型产品，创造很少的就业机会，却破坏了环境，引起石油生产国的贪污腐败。盛产石油的地区，如苏丹和尼日利亚南部的尼日尔三角洲，从他们的这种世袭财产得到的利益太少了，以致于暴力冲突接踵而至。[20]中国在非洲有石油的目的，因为世界已探明的常规石油储量的80％都是国有的，占世界石油生产的三分之二。剩余的大部分储备被西方石油企业开采。[21]中国获得非洲石油的方式不同于西方国家：中国经常把石油交易与基础设施项目贷款打包。[22]自20世纪70年代以来发达国家和国际金融机构基本上放弃了非洲的基础设施项目，而且这些基础设施项目也得不到私人和公共的融资。[23] 尽管基础设施的缺乏已阻碍了非洲的发展，从1992年到2003年，非洲基础设施的国际投资只达到除北美以外的所有此类投资的4％。[24]在过去的40年里中国一直致力于建设非洲的基础设施，并成为卓越的建设者。世界银行估计，截至2006年年中，中国进出口银行对非洲基础设施的贷款超过了125亿美元。在2007年，该银行承诺在未来三年内用于与非洲有关的基础设施和贸易融资贷款将达到200亿美元，除此之外，在2006年第三次中非合作论坛上为了鼓励中国企业对非洲的投资，中国政府宣布成立50亿美元的中非发展基金。[25]八国财长批评了中国的贷款，理由是应该避免“贷款和免除债务的恶性循环”，但是非政府组织指出，富国在2005年承诺给非洲的额外250亿美元援助款中已交付的只有23亿美元。[26]中国在非洲取得石油的做法体现在2004年与安哥拉达成的协议所引起的关于“中国在非洲”争议中。这个协议之所以会引发争议，是因为这个交易涉及向腐败的安哥拉政府提供的基础设施贷款并没有要求安哥拉政府报告资金如何使用。最初的20亿美元的贷款主要是用于铁路维修、道路建设和办公建筑等方面。这笔贷款将以每天生产10000桶的前壳牌石油区块的石油来偿还。印度最大的石油企业一直在寻求这个区块，但中国却获得了这个区块，原因在于中国投资于基础设施的贷款，利息定在1.5％，在17年内偿还，其中还包括5年的免息期。后来利息被降至0.25％。协议还保证它所资助的基础设施中将有价值达30％的项目会保留给安哥拉人来做，其余70％公开招标，当然70%公开招标的项目多数很可能由中国公司得标。[27]到2007年为止，中国为安哥拉的基础设施项目至少贷款60亿美元。[28]中国给安哥拉的和其他非洲国家的贷款受到了世界银行负责人保罗•沃尔福威茨、英国政府和国际货币基金组织的指责，他们说中国的举措可能会使非洲陷入债务之中。美国财政部把中国称为“流氓债权人。”[29]然而非洲仍然深陷于西方设立的“债务陷阱”之中，欠债多达3000亿美元，并支付大量利息。[30]就象美国的非洲研究者者戴博拉•布劳地根（Deborah Brautigam）所指出的，中国“经常取消非洲国家的债款，这些贷款通常是以零利率发放的，并没有世界银行和国际货币基金组织所要求的长期谈判和令人质疑的条件”。[31]例如，加纳两个主要城市阿克拉和库马西之间的公路是用中国的无息贷款在2006年修造的。[32]经合组织的研究人员更进一步得出结论说中国在非洲的活动并没有加深非洲国家政府的腐败。[33]中国的领导人知道腐败官员会抽走他们的基础设施贷款的一部分，但中国提供的贷款不会象西方的援助那样被腐败耗尽。正如一个香港记者所指出的，因为中国的贷款和援助与基础设施项目绑在了一起，“腐败的统治者就没那么方便地用它来购买奔驰了”。[34]美国的一名关于中国在非洲经营活动的观察员认为，中国的援助比西方的援助更为有效，因为中国的许多援助被用于“水电站大坝、铁路、公路和光纤电缆，这有可能造福老百姓，无论他们生活下的制度是多么腐败”。[35]尽管西方国家在言辞上要促进非洲石油生产者的透明度，但是在实际上却并没有约束在非洲开采石油的西方国家的公民和公司。对非洲石油区块的招标一般有支付给政府的“签字费”，这笔钱往往达到数亿美元。外国石油公司明知道在他们支付的数额与在政府官员瞒报之后东道国政府所获得的数额之间存在着明显的差别。有一个罕见的被公开的案例：西方石油公司告诉国际货币基金组织说在2001年他们为石油管道项目向安哥拉支付了4亿美元，但是安哥拉政府声称只收到2.85亿美元，这中间的差额大概就被贪污了。[36] 安哥拉国家石油公司和总统办公室控制着石油收入。调查人员已追查到西方跨国公司支付给安哥拉官员海外私人账户的数亿美元的奖金和贿赂款。多数跨国公司拒绝公布他们为获取开采权所支付的金额。西方国家政府不要求本国的石油公司作出这种披露，但是却“与虎谋皮”，要求腐败的政府公开自己的腐败。[37]西方的政策干预并没有真正减少“资源的灾祸”（resource curse）。[38]一些非洲学者争辩说，只要非洲官员以及贿赂他们的西方石油公司总裁容忍这种犯罪行为，那么仅仅提倡透明度不足以结束与石油有关的腐败。英国政府的《采掘业透明度倡议》很难监管他们的行为，因为接受监管全靠自愿，而披露腐败的责任被放在非洲各国政府身上。[39]非政府组织倡导针对公开交易自然资源的公司--非交易的自然资源公司或国有企业除外--必须强制性地要求它们披露支付金额，。大多数西方石油公司，特别是美国的公司，一直在成功地抵制披露支付金额的要求。[40]西方媒体经常引述世界银行与乍得的协议作为一个外部干预得以遏制石油引发的腐败的成功例子，认为这个协议避免了资源灾祸，促进了扶贫。为了获得世界银行的少量资助来建设从乍得到喀麦隆的管道（这是撒哈拉以南非洲的最大私人投资项目），自2003年以来乍得政府把来自埃克森美孚公司和其他管道运营商的特许权使用费存入伦敦银行。外国监督员监督着这个帐户， 向乍得发放资金，主要用于扶贫项目。管道建设中，由于石油价格低，跨国公司不愿意在没有世界银行支持的情况下冒险建设。一项研究发现，世界银行与乍得协议是一个“在一组特定的历史条件下产生的一次性事件，这些历史条件现在已不存在”。随着油价升涨和供应紧张，石油公司不再需要世行批准来投资项目。有人认为世界银行与乍得协议的地域范围和期限极其有限，对于减轻贫困不可能发挥多大作用。[41]“中国在非洲”的话语很可能会继续集中在中国从非洲进口石油的问题上。美国分析家尤其认为，在战略上中国与美国在争夺非洲石油。[42]到2007年为止，非洲为美国提供其每日石油进口的24％，超过中东所占的18.6％，到2009年非洲仍然每日为美国提供其石油进口的24%，超过中东。[43]美国政府估计，在2002到2025年之间非洲石油产量将增长91％，而全球产量将增长53％。2007年成立的美军非洲司令部武装部队的主要任务将是保护美国获得石油。[44]与美国在获得非洲石油的突出地位相伴随着的是美国对所有石油生产国的独裁统治者的支持。[45]苏丹是半个特例：美国与苏丹的军事和情报机构的领导人合作，并给他们提供保护，但是美国反对苏丹政权里伊斯兰主义的政治家。[46]美国精英用这半个特例和中国在苏丹投资和开发石油来使话语集中于所谓的中国在非洲“争夺石油”，尽管中国现在远不能与西方企业在控制非洲石油方面进行竞争，[47]况且中国从非洲（包括苏丹）获得的许多石油并没有运回中国，而是在国际市场上交易。[48]二、非洲的发展与中国的出口“中国在非洲”的话语也尖锐地批评中国对非洲的出口，认为产品质量差，不能很好地服务消费者，并导致非洲制造业的衰退。[49]在非洲大部分地区，许多价格昂贵的基本消费品是从发达国家进口的，但由于基础设施落后和腐败现象使非洲的生产成本非常高，这些进口产品往往比本地制造的产品更便宜。[50]中国的商品价格比两者都低，因此对基层非洲人有很大的吸引力。在马达加斯加的中国货物比本地或进口商品便宜2-3倍以上。[51]随着越来越多的中国人到非洲从事贸易和投资，并且互相竞争，价格更加走低。在刚果首都金沙萨，中国商人开始时12美元卖一双鞋，随着越来越多的华人到来，价格跌至6美元一双。[52]在加纳，随着进口的中国自行车越来越多，价格在两年内从67美元降至25美元。[53]如果说廉价的中国产品使非洲基层消费者受益，[54]那也只有在7个非洲国家中国进口的比重占到5-14％。[55] 在中国的出口中基本消费品并不占主导地位，而“机械，电子设备和高新技术产品”占据了主导地位。[56]英国政府的一项研究发现，只有乌干达这个非洲国家，基本消费品的进口超过了从中国进口商品总值的五分之一，并且对于非洲国家来说，来自中国的进口主要是取代了来自其他地方的进口，对当地生产的影响不大。[57]中国政府承认，确实有些产品质量比较差。许多中国货物是由中国或非洲的私营商人带进非洲的，中国政府并不能控制他们。然而，中国政府已“采取严格的措施，以确保中国的所有出口产品符合最低的质量标准，并成立了一个部门，以阻止劣质货物的出口。”[58]不仅中国对非洲的大多数出口没有取代本地生产者，而且中国出口到世界市场的产品也没有传说的那样破坏非洲出口，而这种指责在西方国家相当普遍。[59]出口相似性指数（Export Similarity Index）是用来衡量的国家或地区各自出口产品的之间价值重叠多少的指数，中国和整个非洲的出口相似性指数只有4％，而且几乎都涉及纺织品和服装。[60]而有关“中国在非洲”的话语不断指责中国破坏了非洲的纺织品和服装生产。[61]中国出口到非洲的纺织品在2003年前后开始大幅上升，但是那时许多非洲国家的纺织品和服装行业已经遭遇了长期的衰退。1977年加纳的纺织品和服装业的就业人数为2.5万人，但是2000年只有5000名就业人员。[62]在20世纪80年代赞比亚的纺织品和服装业的就业人数为2.5万人，但是到2002年只剩下1万人。在20世纪60年代和70年代，许多非洲国家实行“进口替代”的工业化，把纺织品和服装就业人数提高到正规部门就业岗位的20-30％。然而到了80年代和90年代，大多数非洲国家已失去偿还债务的能力，国际金融机构坚持要求这些国家对外国商品开放市场，从而使一些国家遭遇去工业化，特别是纺织品和服装业。[63]世界银行和国际货币基金组织的结构调整方案是非洲的纺织品和服装生产的真正掘墓者。尤其是发达国家的二手服装涌入非洲市场挤压了非洲纺织品和服装生产商的市场。[64]例如，在20世纪90年代，肯尼亚向美国和欧盟的二手服装和新服装开放市场，而美国和欧盟增加了对其棉农的补贴，导致肯尼亚棉花产业的萎缩，从而减少了对肯尼亚纺织品和服装生产商的供应。肯尼亚的新自由主义改革提高了电力和其他原料的成本，使纺织生产企业更难以生产出低廉的有竞争力的产品。现在二手服装的销售涉及50万肯尼亚人，而该国的纺织品和服装产业—这个在20世纪八十年代初曾雇佣20万人的产业--几乎崩溃了。多达7万个企业工作岗位丧失。[65]截至2004年，即使美国的《非洲增长与机会法案》产生了一些效果，也只有不到3.5万人在肯尼亚的出口服装行业中工作。[66]2001年开始中国纺织品和服装的出口开始迅速增长。[67]虽然面临着激烈的竞争和大规模的失业，在中国设厂的公司在世界纺织品和服装出口中的份额从1990年的9％增长到2005年的24％。[68]纺织品和服装出口占中国2006年1770亿美元全球贸易盈余的70％。[69]从1974年开始，《国际纺织品贸易协定》（MFA）限制中国向发达国家出口纺织品和服装。1994年以后世贸组织的《纺织品与服装协议》（ATC）把《国际纺织品贸易协定》的配额一直维持到2005年1月1日。此后非洲对美的纺织品和服装出口一下子下降20％。在2005和2006年期间，一些国家的纺织品和服装行业的就业岗位大幅减少,[70]明显的原因在于“相对较高的水电等费用成本和运输成本以及运往美国较长的运输时间，比亚洲相比较低的生产率和非熟练劳动力，与中国和印度相比要少得多的棉纱来源和价格高得多的面料。”[71]“中国在非洲”话语指责说中国竞争尤其严重地冲击了莱索托、马达加斯加、摩洛哥和南非。然而，除南非以外，莱索托、马达加斯加、摩洛哥的纺织业到2000年是已经病入膏肓。后来的结果证明这几个国家纺织业并没有因为中国的竞争而死亡。在莱索托，纺织品和服装业的老板一直是外国人（主要来自台湾和香港的华人），雇佣了该国大部分正规部门的工人。2006年他们重塑自己，把自己包装成替美国市场生产“道德服装”的生产商，从而基本上恢复了原先就业水平。[72]马达加斯加的纺织服装业共有10万个就业岗位，在2005年损失了5000个此类岗位， 但是2006年他们把自己的优势锁定在高端纺织品和服装产品上。其实马达加斯加的纺织业和服装工业在2005-2007期间增长了3%，到2009年就业岗位又达到了10万。它的产出实际上占了AGOA计划下非洲对美国非石油产品类出口的25%。 [73]摩洛哥对策是提升其纺织品在价值链上的位置，因此出口已经开始复苏。他们使自己面向欧洲市场准时生产，因为欧洲市场有50-60％的需求不可能由遥远的中国出口商来满足。[74]据称，2003-2006年期间南非的纺织品和服装行业丧失了5.5万个就业岗位，其中有1.8万个就业岗位是从2004年底以来丧失的。除了中国产品的大量涌入这一因素之外，南非货币兰特在2002-2004年期间升值了50％，使南非、莱索托和斯威士兰的出口商品更加昂贵。[75]南非的纺织服装企业也没法得到亚洲的廉价面料，来生产产品出口到美国，也无法按照《非洲增长与机会法案》的优惠关税来向美国出口。[76]南非的服装工业面临着资金缺乏和管理不善的困境。该行业日益增长的非正规化就业已经导致劳动力去技能化，使得产品质量的无法保证。[77]中国纺织品的大量涌入对就业的影响也应置于一个更广泛的背景下来考查。约翰内斯堡大学的一位经济学家已经指出，因为有来自中国的廉价纺织品和服装，南非零售部门的就业大大增加，为南非的国内生产总值做出了主要贡献。南非零售业新增的就业机会补偿了纺织品和服装工业就业岗位的丧失。[78]无论如何，为了减少中国产品在南非引发的争议，中国在2007-2008年期间给向南非出口的31类纺织品和服装的定下限制性的配额。南非政府认为这将使中国进口减少三分之一，大概会创造出自2003年以来所丧失的就业岗位。[79]中国政府还同意为南非的纺织品和服装业培训计划资助250万美元，将“在必要情况下向南非提供优惠贷款，以促进南非纺织工业的现代化”。然而，不难想象，实际发生的情况是，南非市场上因为中国纺织品的减少而产生的空白被其它国家的纺织品的增加所填补。与2006年的水平相比，受配额控制的31类纺织品对南非的出口到2008年下降了50%, 而其中的40%则主要由其它亚洲国家（印度、印尼、香港、巴基斯坦，还有毛里求斯）的纺织品所替代。[80]在中国对非洲出口的积极影响和消极影响之间，孰大孰小不容易划定。然而，就纺织品和服装行业而言，其影响并非象西方人所说的那样糟糕。西方国家对非洲纺织品和服装行业的关注没有采用比较分析法， 没有把它置于历史背景之下。应该指出的是，通过推动结构调整方案造成非洲纺织品和服装行业萧条的是西方而不是中国，而且西方国家如果真正关心非洲纺织品产业的话，他们还必须限制向非洲出口二手服装和新服装。三、非洲的发展与中国的投资流入非洲的大部分外国直接投资（FDI）来自欧洲、南非和美国。这些国家对非洲的投资加起来超过流入非洲所有FDI的一半。在1990年中国在非洲的FDI仅为4900万美元 ，在2003年达到6亿美元。在2005年中国在非洲的FDI存量为16亿美元，而中国在全球的FDI存量为570亿美元。从1979年至2000年，也就是能获得数据的最近几年，中国投在非洲制造业的FDI占到中国对非投资的46％（其中，纺织业就占15％），资源开采占28％，服务业（主要为建筑）占18％，农业占7％。中国曾表示，将鼓励对非洲的加工工业、基础设施、农业和自然资源的投资。[81]中国企业对非投资增幅巨大，有人估计到2006年底实现的和承诺的投资将达到117亿美元，其中包括制造业、贸易、运输和农业。[82]到2008年为止中国对非实现的投资存量达到78亿美元。2008年一年内实现和承诺的直接投资达55亿美元。据报道2009年的头9个月中国的直接投资比2008年同期增长了77%。中国将有可能很快成为非洲FDI的主要来源，而中国政府机构也为在国外进行直接投资活动的企业提供税收优惠、贷款、信贷以及使用外汇的权利。[83]因此投资问题也常常出现在“中国在非洲”的话语中。[84]然而在投资问题上，话语的关注面甚至比贸易还要狭隘，其主要焦点一直是一个中国国有企业的投资，而中国在非洲大陆的大型企业超过800家，其中有100家是大型国有企业。[85]西方媒体报道特别关注的企业是中国有色矿业集团有限公司拥有的中色非洲矿业有限公司（NFCA）在赞比亚经营的谦比希铜矿。[86]这些报道的结论是“中国人”是非洲的超级剥削者。赞比亚两个非政府组织2007年出的一份报告涉及到谦比希铜矿是否有超常压迫的劳动条件的问题，但是没有给出完整的答案。该报告认为私有化是赞比亚矿工劳动条件急剧恶化的主要原因。报告指出，常常有人说NFCA是赞比亚铜带省的最恶劣的投资者，印度公司韦丹塔（Vedanta）是第二恶劣的公司，而“通常被标示为‘白人’的瑞士、英国、南非、加拿大和其他投资者”据说是最好的投资者，而报告认为“这种观点显然来自于种族主义的假设和和经常被重复的都市神话”。[87]NFCA于1998年购买已倒闭的谦比希铜矿，使它恢复运营，把就业岗位从100增加到2200个，而赞比亚共有39,000名矿工。[88]然而该矿的炸药厂在2005年4月发生爆炸，造成47名赞比亚工人的死亡。2006年该矿的工人为了反对拖延支付工资而自发举行罢工，有两名示威者被枪杀。与该矿的180名中国雇员不同，赞比亚工人中只有少数能签上带有退休金的长期合同（permanent contract）。开始的时候NFCA使工会很难代表合同工人的权益，后来公司缓和了对工会的态度，2008年我们做调查时，80%多的工人是工会会员。它所支付的工资开始在赞比亚私营采矿公司中是最低的。高级经理中有11个中国人，而只有一个赞比亚人。赞比亚矿业在国有化期间，矿工家庭享有免费的医疗保健，但是现在他们很难享用矿区医院。虽然许多矿工和他们的家人遭受艾滋病毒之苦，但是这里缺乏预防保健。矿工生活的小镇设施条件很简陋。直到最近为止，赞比亚政府基本上忽视了矿区的生活条件。近来，赞比亚政府威胁要惩罚NFCA和和其他业主，因为他们的行为“过分,…把政府置于一个可笑的境地”。2006年收入最低的工人的工资有所增加，但仍只是在政府规定的最低工资标准左右。关注铜矿业的赞比亚经济学家在2008年指出，“NFCA[在工资水平方面]基本上赶上了其它的公司。所有的公司都有同样的看法，即这里有大量的普工，公司不必付高薪。”[89]无论如何，许多赞比亚人感到所有矿区的工作条件和生活条件比私有化之前恶化，他们指责政府接受世界银行的要求，把矿区迅速交给多国公司。的确，世界银行和国际货币基金组织发放了5亿美元的国际收支的援款，条件是赞比亚尽快完成私有化。[90]非政府组织的报告指出，在赞比亚的矿区中有“许多低劣的公司行为案例，特别是在麦特瑞克（Metorex）公司”。 麦特瑞克公司是南非的白人公司，拥有奇布卢马（Chibuluma）矿区的90%份额。该报告详细列举了该公司的剥削活动。[91]加拿大公司第一量子金属公司（First Quantum Metals）是坎桑希（Kansanshi）矿区的所有者，它和麦特瑞克公司共同抵制赞比亚政府把矿业费率（royalty rates）提高到2.5-3％的努力。该政策的目标是更好地支持公共教育和卫生项目。赞比亚的多数外国矿业公司现在缴纳是可能是世界上最低的费率。[92]麦特瑞克公司2006年在赞比亚采矿业中赚取了最高的利润。[93]印度公司韦丹塔（Vedanta）则拥有大型的孔科拉（Konkola）矿。麦特瑞克公司、第一量子金属公司和韦丹塔公司都只支付0.6％的费率和25％的公司税。然而，NFCA支付了2％的费率和35％的公司税。[94]1992年，当铜的价格是每吨2,280美元时，当时的国有铜矿向赞比亚的国库上缴了2亿多美元。2004年，当铜的价格是2868美元时，在相同产量的条件下，外资拥有的铜矿只向赞比亚政府上缴了800万美元。与私有化之前的时期相比，这些矿区现在往往与当地社区缺乏关联，社区不可能靠矿区致富。只有少数公司为雇员及其家属提供健康和教育服务。[95]谦比西铜矿业主诚然是苛刻的剥削者，然而所谓的白人经营者比较好、印度矿业经营者比较坏、而中国人是超级剥削者这样的等级分类是一种误导。[96]参加2006年总统竞选的爱国阵线（Patriotic Front）领导人迈克尔•萨塔（Michael Sata）表示，他将赶走中国人、印度人和黎巴嫩人，他把他们称作“侵扰者”。[97]萨塔接受了台湾的捐赠，并表示若他当选，他将承认台湾的独立。在竞选失败后，他访问了台湾；而他的一些追随者在赞比亚首都卢萨卡袭击了中国人的商店。[98]萨塔在参加2008年一轮的总统竞选时降低了他对中国和中国人的抨击。在落选后他很快又继续他的抨击。2009年底萨塔仍然把中国人（“the China Man”）当靶子，尽管NFCA新收购了因为08年铜价低靡而被瑞士老板抛弃的铜矿，从而给当地创造了3000个新的就业岗位。赞比亚谦比希铜矿绝不是非洲最大的中资企业。在尼日利亚有一个私人的、华人集团公司，拥有2万名员工，其中有许多尼日利亚人是其经理，有许多大陆国有企业在制造和工程建设方面与它合作。[99]在非洲还有一些大型的中资企业，例如在坦桑尼亚的友谊纺织厂（Urifiki Textile Mill）有2000名工人，在尼日利亚的一些鞋厂和纺织工厂雇用了1000-2000名工人。[100]然而，“中国在非洲”的话语却将谦比希铜矿在读者的印象里打下了深深地烙印。经过比较研究，你就会发现，在非洲的企业，无论是中国的，还是西方的，都存在着压迫性的劳动条件。然而，应当指出的是，中国公司在非洲投资所获得的利润要远远低于来自西方的投资。[101]世界银行指出，非洲“为外国直接投资提供了世界上最高的回报”。[102]在20世纪90年代，其回报率平均为29％，此后又有所增加。例如，美国在非洲子公司的利润率要远远高于他们在其他国家的子公司的收益；[103]但是中国公司在非洲的收益要低于在其他国家的收益。与非洲的许多西方投资不同的是，很多中国投资是与非洲企业的合资企业，非洲企业分享了利润。他们中大多数是为非洲市场生产的中小型企业。[104]中国企业在应对非洲发展计划方面是很灵活的。例如，在2007年，刚果民主共和国（金）禁止出口钴精矿。以前购买钴精矿的中国企业迅速顺应新政策，在刚果设厂生产铜钴合金。[105]与西方在非投资相比，中国的投资似乎没有那么集中于自然资源开采，而比较多地投入于基础设施和制造业。部分的原因是西方国家“在几十年前已放弃了在非洲从事大型基础设施建设和制造业，认为这些无利可图或太危险了”。2009年在美国的调查显示，多国公司的高管还是认为非洲商务环境险峻，不宜成规模地投资。[106] 2005年美国在非洲的直接投资有220亿美元，其中只有10％投资于制造业。[107]美国在非洲的直接投资中，有83％分布在5个非洲国家。除了南非之外，美国在其他四个国家的的直接投资绝大多数是在石油领域；在石油领域里，西方石油公司与中国国营企业之间也存在着差异：壳牌和其他西方大企业已在尼日利亚已经开采了半世纪，但是尼日利亚这个原油产出大国所使用的大部分汽油还依赖进口，而中国公司在苏丹则建立了勘探、生产、提炼、运输和销售的结构。[108]中国石油天然气股份有限公司声称：“随着石油工业的增长，中国石油天然气股份有限公司为10万个苏丹人提供过就业，同时促进了苏丹其他就业部门的增长。”[109] 西方有关“中国在非洲”的话语大部分是指责中国人具备了有利的条件，如通过支持苏丹和津巴布韦的统治者，来剥削非洲和非洲人。[110]但是，有几个西方国家直接支持非洲的暴君，为他们提供军事援助和合法性。实际上，奥巴马上台后，美国提供了更多的援助给非洲政府从美国购买军火和获取军事培训。[111]因此，如果我们通过比较来评价外国投资如何影响了非洲的发展权和人权，中国的作为不会比西方差。四、结论: 我们质疑全球体系人们谈及贸易方式对发展的影响往往关心的是货物的进口和出口。然而，世界上也存在着人和金钱的进出口。非洲私人财富的40%出口到了西方的银行，而不是中国的银行，而在这个交易里西方银行提供的是保密服务和利息。[112]西方国家还用他们的国籍来换取第三世界培养的专业技能，特别是非洲的医生和护士。这些非洲培养的专业人才大批流失到西方去。[113]这些贸易形式和交换侵犯了非洲的发展权。“中国在非洲”的话语的主要问题不是它对中国在非洲的行为有不准确的描述，[114]而是因为存在意识形态的取向，它对中国的批评脱离了世界体系的背景，也缺乏比较分析的视角。有些分析者把西方的正面行为来和中国做比较，指责中国在非洲的活动；有的则在讨论中国在非洲的消极影响时缺乏比较分析法，从而使话语的消费者们只能看到一些树木，而不能见到森林。这些分析反映了西方精英的国家利益观和道德优越感，因为这些密切涉及到与中国的“战略竞争”。[115]许多分析家几乎毫不质疑“援助非洲的发展”和“促进非洲的民主”之类的西方言论，而对于捕获中国企业进行剥削和压迫的例子则尤其眼明手快。[116]对中国和西方在非洲的行为的进行全面考查，将会使我们质疑全球体系，这个体系在许多方面使非洲失去了发展，虽然中国的贸易和投资行为不完全符合新自由主义，从而不完全支持西方的使命，然而中国正在日益融入这个全球体系之中。如果看不到这一点，那么我们无法诚实有效地回应所谓的西方在非洲行使“文明的使命”而中国则“不守道德”的二元论。在回击这种二元论时，中国批评西方自命不凡地把自己当成非洲的新导师，认为自己则避免充当指手画脚的角色、以促进“双赢”的贸易和投资推动非洲发展。许多非洲人也有类似的驳斥。[117] 与主要的西方国家相比，中国在非洲不仅仅收到非洲精英的欢迎。[118]2007年皮尤全球民意调查（Pew Global Attitudes Survey）要求10个非洲国家的老百姓把中国和美国对自己国家的影响进行比较。其中9个非洲国家的61-91％的受访者表示，中国的影响对他们的国家比较好，比例上大大超过了美国。2009年的皮尤调查抽查了26国的百姓关于中国的态度。其中仅有的两个撒哈拉以南的非洲国家，尼日利亚和肯尼亚，分别有85%和73%的人对中国表示好感，好感率分别为26国中的第二（仅次于中国本土）和第四。[119]中国在非洲的一个重要意义是，西方国家和企业可能需要对自身在非洲大陆的作为进行更多的反省。 “中国在非洲”的话语，特别是关于中国的贸易和投资对发展的影响，今后将持续下去，而读者将对相互竞争的观点进行权衡。2009年西方主流媒体出现过一个对中非关系比较公正的报道。[120]如果我们关注一下在非洲人们如何看待这个问题的话，我们可能已经发现，许多非洲人对于这种二元对立保持谨慎的态度。许多非洲人正在拒绝让这种话语来转移人们对非洲在世界体系中处于长期屈从地位的关注，这个世界体系本身建立在剥削和侵权的基础之上。注释：[1]参见Maxi Schoeman, “China in Africa: the Rise of a Hegemony?” 刊载于China and Africa: Partners in Development and Security?， Danish Institute of International Affairs, Copenhagen, Aug. 23, 2007.[2]具有讽刺意味的是，这种话语在美国最盛行，而在1998年联合国通过发展权的决议时，只有美国拒绝承认这种权利。参见 “US Votes Against Development as Basic Human Right,” Inter Press Service (IPS), Dec. 10, 1998.[3]参见 “Patron of African Misgovernment,” New York Times (下注简称为NYT), Feb. 19, 2007, 页3.[4]参见Yaroslav Trofimov, “In Africa, China's Expansion Begins to Stir Resentment,” Wall Street Journal (下注简称为WSJ), Feb. 2, 2007, 页 4.[5]参见Jian Junbo, “China's Role in Africa,” Beijing Review 6: (February 8, 2007),页 15.[6]美国政府已经注意到了中国在非洲的吸引力。参见James Swan (副助理国务卿), “Remarks to Columbia University's Third Annual China Symposium,” Apr. 20, 2007, www.state.gov/ p/af/ris/rm/83474.htm ; Darren Taylor, “African Respect for Chinese Expatriates Grows” VOA News, May 8, 2007, www.voanews.com/english/Africa ... se-Expatriates-Grows.cfm.[7]参见Robyn Dixon, “Africa Holds Attractions for China Leaders.” Los Angeles Times (下文简称LAT), Jan. 31, 2007; “China,” Mbendi: Information for Africa, 2007, http://www.mbendi.co.za/land/as/cj/p0005.htm; “Foreign Firms are Driving our Surplus,” Xinhua (下文简称XH), March 12, 2007; “Goodwill Gives Obama Added Leverage in Africa,” Reuters, July 9, 2009; “China SOEs Move to Fill Africa Investment Gap,” Business Daily Update, June 16, 2009; “China Says Export Slide Deep,” United Press International (UPI), Aug. 13, 2009.[8]参见“World must do more for Africa, China’s Premier says,” Agence France Presse (下文简称AFP), May 16, 2007.[9]参见 Hany Besada, “China in Africa – a Reliable Friend?” Taipei Times, March 25, 2007:页8.[10]参见Harry Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier (Washington: World Bank, 2006):页11-12, 81; “Africa Trade Profile,” Africa News, July 21, 2009; “Continent Must Engage China with Win-Win Strategies, Mmegi (博茨瓦纳报纸), Oct. 20, 2009; “AGOA’s Poor Show Blamed on Issues ‘Unique’ to Continent,” The East African (肯尼亚报纸),July 6, 2009。2005年中国棉花进口约21%和钻石进口的26％来自非洲。非洲原木出口约15.4％到了中国。参见 Ron Sandrey, “The African Merchandise Trading Relationship with China,” Inside Asia, 2006 (3-4):8-10.[11]参见 US Department of Commerce, U.S.-African Trade Profile (Washington: International Trade Administration, 2006):1, 2, 12；“US Trade Preference Programs,” CQ Congressional Testimony, Nov. 17, 2009.; “Reforming African Economies Continue to Reap Benefits,” US State News, Sept. 7, 2009；“AGOA’s Poor Show Blamed on Issues ‘Unique’ to Continent,” The East African, July 6, 2009。[12]参见“Analysis of China’s Energy Import and Export,” XH, Mar. 19, 2007; “China Oil Demand Seen at 7.01 mln bpd,” XH, Nov. 10, 2006; “China’s Thirst for Energy Complicating Global Policy,” Petroleumworld. com, Jan. 18, 2006, www.petroleumworld.com/story06011809.htm; “China Oil Dependence Sparks Concerns,” Radio Free Asia, Jan. 5, 2009.[13]参见 Erica Downs, China (Washington: Brookings Institution 2006):31. 与此相类似的是，尼日利亚对美国的原油出口占美国原油进口的11％。参见“US Warns of Al-Qaeda Attacks,” This Day (下文简称TD，尼日利亚报纸), September 7, 2007.[14]参见B. McKenna, “Don’t Expect ‘Energy Independence’ to Clear the Air on Climate Change,” Globe & Mail (多伦多报纸)(G&M), Jan. 30, 2007 (美国2006年消耗的石油中60.3%为进口。); David Bird, “Africa Tops Mideast for US Crude,” Houston Chronicle (下文简称HC), Feb. 25, 2007 (美国2006年进口的石油22%来自非洲).[15]参见David Nason, “Troubled Waters Over Oil’s Future,” The Australian, June 20, 2005.[16] John Ekongo “China and Equal Partner to Africa,” New Era (纳米比亚报纸), May 6, 2009; “Full Text of Chinese Premier's Press Conference in Egypt," XH, Nov. 10, 2009。[17]参见Peter Brookes, “Into Africa: China’s Scramble for Influence and Oil,” Heritage Lectures No. 1006 (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2007):2; Hamish Macrae, “We Fail to Work with China at our Peril,” The Independent, Feb. 14, 2007:32.[18]参见Bassam Fattouh, “The Origins and Evolution of the Current International Oil Pricing System: a Critical Assessment,” 刊载于 Robert Mabro (编辑), Oil in the 21st Century: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006):41-100.[19]参见Peter Custers, “Unequal Exchange and Poverty in African Countries Exporting Primary Commodities.” European Conference of People’s Global Action. Sept. 2, 2002, www.nadir.org/ nadir/iniativ/agp/ pgaeurope/leiden/poverty_africa.htm. “不同类的交易”（disparate exchange）主要是指通过直接或间接的交易，一方获取的商品是财富，而另一方获取的商品却是社会财富的浪费，比如一方获取的是财富类的石油，而另一方获取的是武器，武器属于社会财富的浪费。参见Peter Custers,“The Civil War in Sudan and the Trading Mechanism of Disparate Exchange,” European Conference of People's Global Action PGA, Sept 2, 2002, www.petercusters.nl/file/11.[20]参见Terry Lynn Karl, “The Social and Political Consequences of Oil,” 刊载于 Cutler Cleveland (编辑), Encyclopedia of Energy (San Diego: Elsevier, 2004). 安哥拉每100万桶石油在美国创造的就业岗位是在安哥拉创造就业岗位的两倍。参见 Keith Myers, “Petroleum, Poverty and Security,” (London: Chatham House Africa Programme Briefing Paper 2005):6.[21]参见 Lynn Cook, “Big Oil Hashes Out Issues with State-Run Firms,” HC, Sept. 17, 2004.[22]从1956年到2005年，中国为非洲国家的900个基础设施项目提供了440亿美元的低息或无息贷款。参见 “China Looks to Africa with an Eye to Reaping Financial and Political Gains,” Associated Press (下文简称AP), June 18, 2006.[23]参见Robert Shephard, et al., “Financing Infrastructure in Africa,” Gridlines No. 13 (Sept. 2006):2.[24]参见Tony Elumelu, “Obstacles and Opportunities to Financing Infrastructure Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa: the UBA Experience” (Washington: UBA 2006), www.africacncl.org/downloads/2006_IC/Elumelu.pdf; United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2007 (New York: UN DE&SA, 2007):105.[25]参见“Financial Collaboration a New Focus in China-Africa Economic Cooperation,” XH, May 17, 2007；“China’s Emerging Role in Africa,” Grid Lines (Washington: World Bank, s.d.,2008?), www.eu-africa-infrastructure-t ... erging-role-in-africa.pdf。 到2007年年中为止，中国进出口银行已为非洲的有关项目提供了132亿美元的贷款；仍未偿付的贷款占该银行业务的20%。参见“Briefing: Asia Banking,” Asia Pulse, July 30, 2007. 这些贷款中，给电力行业的贷款占40％，交通运输占20％，电信占12％，水占4％，给多领域的承诺占24％。参见Broad (2005):275。 2007年承诺的200亿美元将用于资助中国的“高科技”产品的出口，目的是建设非洲的基础设施。参见Wang Jian-Ye, What Drives China’s Growing Role in Africa? (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2007):10; “The Export-Import Bank of China,” http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/profile/introduction.jsp.[26]参见“G8 Raps China for Lending $20b to Africa,” United Press International, (UPI), May 21, 2007. 八国集团把减免债务称作援助。如果不算这部分援助，那么从2005年到2006年八国集团对非洲的援助下降2%。参见Jeffrey Sachs, “Empty Promises,” South China Morning Post (下文简称SCMP), Apr. 24, 2007。中国不把减免债务称作援助。参见Darren Taylor, “Chinese Aid Flows into Africa,” VOANews, May 8, 2007, www.voanews.com/english/Africa ... id-Flows-into-Africa.cfm.[27]参见“Angola: Oil Backed Loan Will Finance Recovery Projects,” Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Feb. 21, 2005, www.irinnews.org/ report.asp?ReportID=45688; IRIN, “Angola: Cautious Optimism for 2005, Jan. 14, 2005, www.irinnews. org/report.asp?ReportID=45077; “Angola/China: an Example of South-South Cooperation,” Angolan Press Agency, Mar. 25, 2004; Cindy Hurst, China’s Oil Rush in Africa (Washington: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security 2006):10.[28]参见Lucy Corkin, “Angola Flexes New-Found Muscle,”Business Day (下文简称BD)(South Africa报纸), Mar. 23, 2007; Gill, “China’s Expanding Role . . . , 2007:9. 一位匿名的审稿人告诉我们一个未公开的信息，说中国对安哥拉的贷款总共达到130亿美元。[29]参见“China-Africa Ties Come Under Fresh Scrutiny,” The Nation (肯尼亚报纸), December 12, 2006; “Beijing Summit: Implications for Africa,” TD, Nov. 5, 2006; Michael Phillips, “G-7 to Warn China over Costly Loans to Poor Countries,” WSJ, Sept. 15, 2006:A2.[30]参见“It’s Trade Not Aid that will Lift Africa from Poverty,” East African (肯尼亚报纸), November 8, 2005. 撒哈拉以南的非洲在2003年支付了82亿美元的利息; George Kerevan, “So we all Take to the Streets. Will it Work?” Scotsman, June 2, 2005.截止2005年，尼日利亚、肯尼亚和赞比亚等国把其国家预算的40%用于偿还债务。参见“Debt in Africa,” Mbendi, www.mbendi.co.za/land/af/p0060.htm.[31]参见Deborah Brautigam and Adama Gaye, “Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa?” Council on Foreign Relations, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/region/143/africa.html.前世界银行经济学家威廉•伊斯特利（William Easterly）认为，减免债务将引起道德风险，因为它会鼓励被减免债务的国家在将来借贷之后又期望更多的债务减免。参见The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). 当然，中国至今一直对非洲国家减免债务，这并不能保证中国在将来还会继续这样做。[32]参见“Chinese Investors Outpace Indians, British in Ghana,” AFP, June 17, 2006.[33]参见Andrea Goldstein, et al. China and India: What’s in it for Africa? (Paris: OECD 2006):53.[34]参见Frank Ching, “Cosy Ties, but China Needs to do more for Africa.” Business Times, July 13, 2005.[35]参见Jennifer Brea, “China’s New Scramble for Africa,” American.Com: a Magazine of Ideas Online, www.american.com/archive/2006/ ... -new-scramble-for-africa.[36]参见“Signing On,” Petroleum Economist, Oct. 2004:1.[37]参见John McMillan, “Promoting Transparency in Angola,” Journal of Democracy 16:3 (2005)155-169.[38]参见John Ghazvinian, Untapped: the Scramble for Africa’s Oil (New York: Harcourt 2007).“资源灾祸”在这里指的是一种悖论，即自然资源的丰富不仅没有给一些国家带来更多经济增长和发展，反而使它们有较少的经济增长、更多的发展恶果。[39]参见Nicholas Shaxson, Poisoned Wells: the Dirty Politics of African Oil (New York: Palgrave 2007): 217-218. 虽然一般西方不认为中国考虑透明度，然而惠特克男爵夫人（Baroness Whitaker）在英国上议院辩论中说，由于中国与国际组织的联系“中国可能会支持采掘业透明度倡议的原则”。参见“Africa: Chinese Investment,” Lords Hansard, Feb. 6, 2007: Column 670.[40]参见Afeikhena Jerome, et al., “Addressing Oil Related Corruption in Africa: Is the Push for Transparency Enough?” Review of Human Factor Studies 11(1) (2005):7-32.埃塞俄比亚总理梅莱斯•泽纳维（Meles Zenawi）曾表示：“西方人若认为他们可以买到非洲的善政廉政，这将是错误的想法，善政廉政只能来自内部。中国根本没有威胁非洲的善政廉政与民主的改革，因为只有土生土长的才有成功的机会”。参见“Ethiopia: PM Opposes ‘Neo-Liberal’ Economic Reforms,” Africa News, Feb. 17, 2007.[41]参见Scott Pegg, “Can Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse? Evidence from the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project,” African Affairs (下文简称AA) 105/418 (2005):1-25.[42]参见Joshua Eisenman and Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” Current History 105 (691) (2006):219-224; Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, “The African ‘Oil Rush’ and American National Security,” Third World Quarterly 27:4(2006):22-35; Gregory Kane, The Strategic Competition for the Continent of Africa (Carlisle PA: US Army War College 2006); Donovan Chau, Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: US Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 2007).[43]参见“U.S. Military to Help Secure Oil,” Vanguard (尼日利亚报纸), May 22, 2007； “The Oil Need that Fuels US ‘Outreach’ in Africa,” Washington Post (WP), May 28, 2009。[44]参见Michael Klare, Blood and Oil: the Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependence on Imported Oil (New York: Metropolitan, 2004):144; Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: US Strategic Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa,” Congressional Research Service, May 16, 2007.[45]参见Paul Lubeck, et al., “Convergent Interests: US Energy Security and the ‘Securing’ of Nigerian Democracy,” International Policy Report, Feb., 2007:10. 在暗中操纵尼日利亚2007年的选举之后，美国宣称尼日利亚是一个战略伙伴，将继续与尼日利亚合作。 参见Constante Ikokwu, “US: Nigeria Still Strategic Partner, Despite Election Flaws,” TD, May 19, 2007.[46]参见Paul Moorcraft, “Strange Bedfellows in Khartoum,” BD, June 22, 2007; Greg Miller, “U.S. Relies on Sudan Despite Condemning It,” LAT, June 11, 2007 (美国和苏丹情报部门“每日都安排互访”); US State Dep’t, Country Reports on Terrorism, April 30, 2007, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736. htm (美国国务院的国家报告称苏丹是“与恐怖作战的坚定的伙伴”).中国为苏丹提供了20%的武器进口，俄罗斯则为她提供了40%的武器进口。参见Mark Bromley and Andrea Goldstein, “What China Model can do for Africa,” Financial Times, Feb. 16, 2007。法国和其他国家也为苏丹提供武器，参见F. William Engdahl, “Darfur: Forget Genocide, There’s Oil,” Asia Times, May 25, 2007, www.atimes.com/atimes/China_ Business/IE25Cb04. html.关于中国在劝说苏丹同意联合国维和人员进入达尔富尔方面所发挥的作用，请参见Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Diplomatic Victory in Darfur” (Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2007)。尽管有达尔富尔问题，在2005年苏丹南北议和之后，美国石油企业重新对苏丹的石油产生了兴趣，参见Matthew Chen, “Chinese National Oil Companies and Human Rights”, Orbis (Winter 2007):41-54.印度与中国和马来西亚合作开发苏丹的石油。印度支持苏丹关于达尔富尔问题的立场。 参见Luke Patey, “A Complex Reality: The Strategic Behavior of Multinational Oil Corporations and the New Wars in Sudan” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006):37.[47]参见Jedrezej George Frynas and Manuel Paul, “A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political and Business Perspectives,” AA 106:423(2007):229-251。非洲最大的石油出产国尼日利亚的石油95%由五个西方公司所生产：壳牌石油公司、埃克森公司、雪佛龙公司（Chevron）、道达尔石油公司（Total）和阿吉普石油公司。出处同上。[48]参见Darren Taylor, “Concerns Mount about Chinese Oil Interests in Africa, VOANews, May 3, 2007, www.voanews.com/english/Africa ... Chinese-Oil-Interersts-in–Africa.cfm; Nicholas Freeman, The Dragon on the Nile: China’s Pursuit of Energy Security in Sudan (Annapolis: US Naval Academy 2006):79.[49]参见Michael Wines, “China’s Influence in Africa Arouses Some Resistance,” NYT, Feb. 10, 2007:3; “Frankenstein in Africa: China Sets Out to Destroy Africa’s Manufacturing Sector,” Jan. 1, 2007, http://pundita.blogspot.com/2007/01/frankenstein -in-africa-china-sets-out-html .[50]参见“Zambia to Initiate Campaign to Boost Local Products Consumption,” XH, Aug. 16, 2005；Nigel Harris, The Return of Cosmopolitan Capital: Globalization, the State and War (London: Taurus, 2003)。在生产T恤衫之类产品上，许多非洲国家同样不能与拉美国家进行竞争。参见Uma Subramanian and Matthias Matthijs, “Can Sub-Saharan Africa Leap into Global Network Trade?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4112 (2007).[51]参见“Africa a Frontier of Opportunity for Expanding China,” AP, February 8, 2007; Catherine Fournet-Guerin, “New Chinese Immigration in Antananarivo,” Chinese Perspectives, No. 67 (2006):45-57.[52]参见《中国个体商人淘金非洲 艰苦创业“敢想敢干”》，人民网2005年8月17日, http://chinese.people.com.cn/GB/42316/3622666.html.[53]参见“Is the Awakening Giant a Monster,” The Economist, Feb. 13, 2003.[54]这些消费者并不仅仅是基本商品的购买者。许多非洲企业购买的中国商品通常包括机器、生产原料和批发商品。参见“How Chinese are Taking Over Kampala’s Business Hub,” New Vision (乌干达报纸), May 2, 2007.[55]参见Jane Kennan and Christopher Stevens. Opening the Package: the Asian Drivers and Poor-Country Trade (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies [IDS], 2005):2.[56]参见“China to Promote Trade, Economic Links with Africa in 2006,” XH, January 6. [57]参见Chris Edwards and Rhys Jenkins, The Effect of China and India’s Growth and Trade Liberalisation on Poverty in Africa (London: UK Department for International Development, 2005):28-29, 38。这种研究当然没有考虑到走私商品，走私品中的消费品和非消费品的比例不得而知。[58]参见Nick Thiong’o, “China Unveils Move to Curb Sub-Standard Exports,” Kenya Times, Nov. 23, 2006。中国商务部要求在非洲的中国企业雇佣当地的工人，并遵守国际安全标准。参见Gill and Riley, “The Tenuous . . .,” 2007:47。中国国务院发布了“鼓励企业海外投资并使其标准化的九条原则”，要求中国海外企业遵守当地法律，保护劳工权利和环境，履行企业的社会责任。参见Stephen Marks, “The Summit in Beijing,” Pambazuka News, Dec. 14, 2006.[59]这并不是说，在某些领域和在特定条件下其影响不会显著。参见Raphael Kaplinsky, et al., “The Impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa,” April 2006, http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/Asian ... fs/DFIDAgendaPaper06.pdf.[60]参见Robert Devlin, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007): Table 5.5.[61]参见Karen Palmer, “Asian Imports Gutting African Textile Trade,” SCMP, Dec. 14, 2005:9. 非洲2003年的纺织品和服装出口总价值为23亿美元，比4000亿美元的世界贸易的1%还要少。参见“How Many Will Closure of Textile Company Affect?” New Era (纳米比亚报纸), Jan. 22, 2007.[62]参见Peter Quartey, “The Textile and Clothing Industry in Ghana,” 刊载于 Herbert Rauch and Rudolph Traub-Merz (编辑), The Future of the Textile and Clothing Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2006):135-146。到2005年3月为止，该工业仅仅雇佣了3000人，出处同上，第136页.[63]参见Rudolf Traub-Merz, “The African Textile and Clothing Industry: From Import Substitution to Export Orientation,” in Rauch and Traub-Merz, The Future . . ., 2006:9-35。 2001年的纪录片《T恤衫的全球之旅》（T-Shirt Travels）表明，在1991年赞比亚市场向二手服装开放之后，所有的服装工厂都倒闭了。参见http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/tshirttravels/film.html。有些人声称中国商品破坏了津巴布韦的纺织工业。参见“Cheap Chinese Goods Destroyed Zim Economy”，The Namibian, August 28, 2007。然而国际纺织品、成衣、皮革工人联合会的领导人指出，“津巴布韦20000个纺织品和服装业就业岗位的丧失，直接或间接起因于从西方进口旧衣服。”参见“Western Charity Undermines African Textiles,” New Internationalist, no. 373 (Nov. 2004):1。津巴布韦的纺织品和服装生产商把津巴布韦的去工业化归因于进口二手服装、西方强加的结构调整计划和干旱。参见Simone Field, The Internationalisation of the Second-Hand Clothing Trade: the Case of Zimbabwe, 未出版的博士论文, Coventry University, 2000:301.[64] 2003年二手衣服占了撒哈拉以南非洲国家进口价值总量的26.8%。参见Sally Baden and Catherine Barber, “The Impact of the Second Hand Clothing Trade on Developing Countries,” Oxfam Briefing Paper (2005):5, http://www.maketradefair.com/en/assets/english/shc_0905.pdf.[65]参见“Social Forum Best Placed to Question World Order,” East African Standard (肯尼亚) (下文简称EAS), January 22, 2007; Gloria Otieno, Trade Liberalization and Poverty in Kenya: A Case Study of the Cotton Textiles Subsector (Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2006). [66]参见Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris, “Dangling by a Thread: How Sharp are the Chinese Scissors?” (Brighton: IDS 2006):vi, http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/AsianDriverpdfs/ RKDanglingbyathread.pdf.[67]参见Duane Newman, “Duane’s World,” BD, December 4, 2006; Mills Soko, “SA Can Cut Lessons from Chinese Cloth,” BD, Oct. 19, 2006.[68]参见“Lesotho Shows Textile Woes are About More than China,” BD, July 1, 2006. 中国纺织品出口的约三分之一是由“外商”企业生产的，主要是香港或台湾的企业。 参见“E-TV Interview with Charge d’Affaire Mr. Zhou Yuxiao,” PRC Embassy, South Africa, April 13, 2006, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t246214.htm; Mills Soko, “The Lessons of China’s Rag Trade Revolution,” Cape Argus (南非报纸), Feb. 1, 2007. [69]参见“Poorer Nations Feel China’s Weight,” International Herald Tribune (下文简称IHT), Apr. 3, 2007:14. [70]参见Gumisai Mutume, “Loss of Textile Market Costs African Jobs,” Africa Renewal 20(1) (2006):18-22; Kaplinsky and Morris, “The Impact . . .” 2006:34.[71]参见John Miller, “Nike to the Rescue? Africa Needs Better Jobs, Not Sweatshops,” Dollars & Sense, Oct. 21,2006. [72]参见“Textiles No Longer Hanging by a Thread,” IRIN, July 3, 2006; Stephanie Hanes, “Hey, Nice Clothes, But are They Ethical,” Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 13, 2006:1; “Textile Producers Get a Boost from Trade Bill . . ,” allAfrica.com, Dec. 12, 2006. [73]参见Ralaivelo Maminirinarivo, “The Textile and Clothing Industry of Madagascar,” in Jauch and Traub-Merz, The Future . . . 2006:178-192; “A Nice Dairy Tale,” Economist, Dec. 9, 2006; “International Textile Markets Rushing on for Eco-Friendly Fabrics,” World Trade Review, Apr. 1-15, 2007; 参见“Madagascar: Outlook for 2007-08: Economic Growth,” Economist Intelligence Unit, Mar. 7, 2007；“Community of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Deputy Secretary General Stephen Karangizi Testifies Before House Ways and Means Sub-Committee,” Fair Disclosure (FD) Wire, Nov. 17, 2009; “Business Presses Administration for Quick Madagascar AGOA Business Decision, “ Inside US Trade, Oct. 30, 2009.[74]参见“Moroccan Textiles Manufacturers . . .” Reuters (TV), Mar. 28, 2007, http:rtv.rtvlondon.co.uk/2007-03-28/30fb69ca.html.[75]参见Traub-Merz, “The African Textile . . .,” 2006:17, 25. 南非工会估计丧失了60000—70000个就业岗位，然而开普敦大学经济学院发现丧失的就业岗位是以上数字的三分之一；其他就业岗位被非正式化了。参见Dave Marrs, “Chinese Textile Quotas a Case of Too Little, Too Late,” BD, Nov. 13, 2006. [76]参见Kaplinsky, “The Impact . . .,” 2006:13。非洲对美出口的成衣所使用的织料85%来自亚洲，其中主要来自中国。参见“AGOA Forum 2006: Stakeholders Seek Ways to Broaden AGOA Opportunities,” http://agoa.info/?view=.&story=news&subtext=687.[77]参见“Lesotho Shows . . .,” 2006. 也可参见 Kaplinsky, “The Impact . . .,” 2006:13, 26.[78]参见Lumengo Bonga-Bonga, “China Can Help Revive the African Textile Industry,” Univers Foreign Affairs, December 7, 2006, www.tilburguniversity.nl/unive ... fairs/0607/12/bonga.html. Interview with Prof. Bonga-Bonga; Johannesburg, Aug. 1, 2007.[79]参见“Quotas on Chinese Textile-Clothing Imports Start,” China Monitor (南非出版物) No. 14 (Jan. 2007):16。这些配额从2007年3月开始废除，因为一些纺织品和服装制造商不能从中国得到织料，从而引起就业岗位的丧失，而这正是配额所要防止的。参见Mathabo Le Roux, “Minister Rows Back on Chinese Imports,” BD, Mar. 29, 2007:1。南非的工业把这些配额看作一种胜利。参见“High Hopes as New Talks Start in Clothing Industry,” Business Times, May 13, 2007。参见Ethel Hazelhurst, “Imports from China Fall,but Products Take Detour to SA,” Star , Sept. 3, 2007；Don Ross, “Let Quotas on Clothing and Textile Imports Die,” The Star (Johannesburg), May 28, 2008。[80]参见“China to Make More Efforts to Help Africa Develop Textile Industry,” XH, Oct. 18, 2006; “E-TV Interview . . . 2006.[81]参见United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation (New York: United Nations, 2007):12, 19, 51, 56-57.[82]参见“China Plays Increasing Role in Continent’s Development,” IPS, May 17, 2007； Chen Deming, “Cooperation Benefits All People,” Business Daily Update, Nov. 9, 2009; “China-Africa Cooperation Builds on Africa’s Capacity: Chinese Premier,” XH, Nov. 8, 2009.[83]参见UNDP, Asian Foreign . . . 2007:55-56.[84]参见Brautigam and Gaye, “Is Chinese Investment . . ..,” 2007.[85]参见“Africa to be More Attractive for Chinese Investors,” XH, Feb. 3, 2007.[86]参见Trofimov, “In Africa . . .,” 2007; Olin Freeman, “Africa Discovers Dark Side of its New Colonial Master,” Sunday Telegraph, Feb. 4, 2007; Robyn Dixon, “Africans Lash Out at Chinese Employers,” LAT, Oct. 6, 2006; Roy Carroll, “China’s Goldmine,” Guardian, Mar.28, 2006.[87]参见Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, For Whom the Windfalls: Winners and Losers in the Privatisation of Zambia’s Copper Mines (Lusaka: Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia and Catholic Centre for Justice, Peace and Development, 2007).[88]参见Christian Aid, A Rich Seam: Who Benefits from Rising Commodity Prices (London: CA, 2007):21.[89]参见Dixon, “Africans Lash . . . ,” 2006. NFCA声称要在未来的支出计划中推动有关矿工的“企业社会责任计划”，关于这一点，请参见“Zambian Councilor Praises Chinese Investment,” XH, July 14, 2007; “Chambishi Mines Launches Social Responsibility Plan,” Times of Zambia (下文简称TOZ), July 10, 2007；约翰•隆古（John Lungu）教授访谈, Copperbelt University（铜带省大学）, July 14, 2008。[90]参见John Craig, “Putting Privatization into Practice: the Case of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited,” Journal of Modern African Studies 30:3 (2001):389-410; Christian Aid, A Rich Seam . . . 2007:21.[91]参见Fraser and Lungu, For Whom . . . , 2007:48.[92]参见Charlotte Mathews, “Metorex Ramps Up its Copper Exposure,” BD, Feb. 5, 2007; “Zambia: Conflict Looms Over Revision of Mineral Tax,” IPS, Nov. 15, 2005.[93]参见“State Gets $71 Million Tax from Mines,” TOZ, Feb. 22, 2007.[94]参见Christian Aid, A Rich Seam . . ., 2007:22. 2007年夏天孔科拉铜矿（Konkola）和坎桑希铜矿（Kansanshi）发生了罢工，导致随后罢工组织者被枪杀。参见“FQMO Fires Four Kansanshi Miners,” TOZ, July 27, 2007; Andy Blamey, “Lost Output from Strikes around 39,000 mt: Barclays,” Metals Week, August 6, 2007.[95]参见Christian Aid, A Rich Seam . . .: 24.[96]西方媒体经常引用一个政客谈论这个等级论。盖伊•史考特（Guy Scott）是一个白人农场主，前农业部长，反对派爱国阵线（Patriotic Front）的总书记，他说：“我们一直都碰到坏人。白人是坏人，印度人更坏，但是中国人最坏”。参见Chris McGreal, “Chinese Influx Revives Colonial Fears,” Guardian, Feb. 9, 2007.[97]参见“Zambia Opposition Chief Files Complaint Over Amin Comparison,” AFP, Sept. 17, 2006.[98]参见Amos Malupeng and Brighton Phiri, “Sata Visits Taiwan,” The Post (赞比亚报纸), Feb. 6, 2007.[99]参见Ni Yangshuo. 2006. “Servir d’intermediaire pour Faciliter les Rapports entre la Chine et le Nigeria” (To serve as an intermediary to facilitate rapport between China and Africa), Chinafrique. No. 10,www.chinafrique.com/zf-2005/2006-10/2006.10-hz-1.htm； “’The China Man is the Rider, the African is the Horse’: Sata,” TOZ, Dec. 18, 2009; “The Might of China,” TOZ, Dec. 21, 2009。[100]参见UNDP, Asian Foreign . . . 2007:59-60; Craig Timberg, “From Competitors to Trade Partners,” WP, Dec. 3, 2006.[101]西方人常常预设因为中国国有建筑公司有中国政府的补贴，所以它们在非洲能承受较低的利润率。但是实际情况是建筑公司在中国国内建筑市场获得的利润率就很低，平均只有2-3%。参见“High Debt Rate, Price War Haunt China’s Construction Industry,” XH, Mar. 21, 2007。至于在中国政府资助的非洲工程中，中国企业是否有优势获得合同，这一点还有待证实。[102]参见World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington: WB, 2003):95.[103]参见Ernest Harsch, “Foreign Investment on Africa’s Agenda,” Africa Recovery 17:2 (July, 2003):12-16; “Encouraging Businesswomen in Africa,” 2002, www.cipe.org/publications/overseas0002/features/ encouraging.html (1997年美国所属的公司在非洲的利润率是25%，而在世界范围内是12%)。[104]参见UNDP, Asian Foreign . . . , 2007:57-59。中国也在其它非洲国家建筑大型冶炼厂，例如赞比亚和埃及。参见“How China is Cementing Resources Globally,” Asia Pulse, Aug. 20, 2007; “CITIC to Construct Smelter in Egypt,”IHT, September 12, 2006.[105]参见“China Cobalt Firms Mull Congo Plants After Export Ban,” Reuters, May 9, 2007.[106]参见Shashank Bengali, “An African Building Boom Made in China,” Star Tribune (美国明尼阿波利斯报纸), Sept. 18, 2006:13A；Africa Business Initiative, US Chamber of Commerce, “Inside the Boardroom: How Corporate America Really Views Africa,” 2009, http://www.usafricainvestment.com/pdf_files/14930_Inside-2.pdf。[107]参见James K. Jackson, “US Direct Investment Abroad: Trends and Current Issues,” Congressional Research Service, 2006:3[108]参见US Department of Commerce, “US-African . . . ,”2006:13。关于西方石油企业在非洲投资的统计数据，请参见贺文萍， “中非关系发展触动了谁的神经”, 《世界知识》，No. 19 (2006): 30-32.[109]参见“Good Man in Africa,” China Daily, May 11, 2007.[110]参见Kevin Kerr, “Into Africa: Commentary: China’s Tentacles Reach Throughout the Continent,” MarketWatch, Jan. 9, 2007，www.marketwath.com/news/story/ ... F38F-31C4-45A7-8048-168C; Will Hutton, “Does the Future Really Belong to China?” Prospect (Jan. 2007), www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=8174.[111]参见William Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “Militarization of U.S. Africa Policy, 2000-2005,” World Policy Institute Arms Trade Center, http://worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/AfricaMarch2005.html；Daniel Volman, “Obama Moves Ahead with Africom, The Zeleza Post, Dec. 13, 2009, http://www.zeleza.com/ blogging/u-s-affairs/obama-moves-ahead-africom-daniel-volman。 根据2007年斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所武器转让数据库（http://armstrade.sipri.org/），从1997年到2006年美国向12个非洲国家出售武器的总销量为64.15亿美元，而同时期中国向13个非洲国家出售武器的总销量为5.64亿美元。[112]参见“African States Urged to Maintain Stability,” EAS, May 6, 2004; Nick Mathiason, “Western Bankers and Lawyers ‘Rob Africa of $150bn Every Year,’” Independent, Jan. 21, 2007, p.1; Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, The Other Side of the Coin: the UK and Corruption in Africa (London: AAPPG, 2006):20; “$11.5 Trillion Siphoned Offshore,” Public Agenda (加纳报纸), Mar 10, 2006, www.ghanaweb.com/public_agenda/article.php?ID=4951.[113]关于非洲人才外流到发达国家和非洲专家在中国接受培训的比较，请参见Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” African Studies Review 50:3 (Dec. 2007).[114]比如有人认为中国支配着苏丹和津巴布韦，保护这些国家的政权，使西方不能推动“民主和人权”。参见Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, the West and ‘Colonialism’ in Africa (Baltimore: University of Maryland Series on Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 182, 2007); Schoeman 2007.[115]一个美国官员曾说：“说美国政府和私人领域 对‘中国在非洲’的话题着迷，这还是保守的说法。”参见Claudia Anyaso, “Remarks at the China in Africa Today Seminar,” US Department of State, March 6, 2007, www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/81652.htm.美国众议院非洲小组委员会副主席曾说：“中国对非洲的投资日益增多，这是个令人忧虑的事。我们必须关注这个问题，以防中国在非洲完全站稳脚跟。”参见Kathy Legget, “China’s Expansion into Africa Poses New Challenges for the US,” WSJ, March 30, 2005:1。 美国关于“中国在非洲”的讨论把中国当作一个非西方国家对美国霸权的挑战。参见Steven Weber, “A World with the West,” National Interest (July-Aug. 2007)。在一个对7500个美国人进行的民意测验中，一半的应答者认为中国对非洲的影响是对美国国家利益的“巨大威胁”或“威胁”。参见“UPI/ZogbyPoll: China’s Influence in Africa,” UPI, July 27, 2007.[116]援助政策的问题超出了本文的范围。然而，据经济学人智库（Economist Intelligence Unit）估计，中国作为一个发展中国家，在2000年到2006年期间，为非洲提供了55亿美元的援助。 参见Africapractice, The Impact of the Chinese Presence in Africa (London: Africapractice 2007):8。中国外援的44%是给非洲的；而美国用于撒哈拉以南非洲国家的援助要少于其援助预算的1%。参见“Comoran President Praises China-Africa Cooperation as Model,” XH, Oct. 23, 2006; Torcuil Crichton, “When it Comes to Africa, Bush has More on his Mind than Aid,” Sunday Herald (苏格兰报纸), June 12, 2005. 直至马英九在台湾上台以前，两岸在非洲存在“政治承认”的竞争。2008年时，只有四个非洲国家和台湾有外交关系。此后，两岸暂停了在非洲的竞争。参见 “Minister Francisco H.L. Ou from the Taiwan Foreign Ministry Gives a Talk at National Cheng Kung University,” Research Express 8:10 (May 22, 2009), http://research.ncku.edu.tw/re/news/e/20090522/1.pdf.[117]参见“China Means Well in Africa – Ngatjizeko,” The Namibian, Apr. 3, 2007; “A Scramble for the Continent that We May Not Gain From,” EAS, Mar. 27, 2007.[118]参见Emma Mawdsley, “China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power,” Geography Compass 1 (2007):1-17; Paul Moorcraft,“Why Beijing is Winning in Africa.” BD, Feb. 2, 2007.[119]参见Global Unease with Major World Powers (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2007):45. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Opinion of China,” 2009, http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24[120]参见David Pilling, “Africa Builds as Beijing Scrambles to Invest,” FT, Dec. 10, 2009.

今年是海顿逝世200周年，维也纳的2009年新年音乐会演奏了他的交响乐“告别”，这支曲子的特色是演奏者在最后一个乐章时，逐个离开舞台。

7月5日至7日聚在汕头大学讨论“中国人文社会科学三十年”的那些各领域学者而言，从更长的历史视野来反思和总结改革开放三十年以及此一时期的人文社会科学状况，则是基于一种文化自觉。这一主题为“中国人文社会科学三十年”的学术论坛，系由李嘉诚基金会支持的“中国文化论坛”的第四届（2008）年度论坛。由于篇幅的限制，本文并不试图全面介绍此次论坛讨论的基本情况，只是从部分议题入手呈现学者们在这三天对“中国人文社会科学三十年”的一些思考。因此这里只根据主题需要引述部分讨论，会议述要会另有专文及出版物。

10月15日2012亚洲思想上海论坛第四场会议记录，发言者包括白乐晴，查特吉， 板垣雄三，新崎盛晖，阿希斯南迪，等

我国近20年来癌症呈现年轻化及发病率和死亡率“三线”走高的趋势。全国肿瘤登记中心发布的《2012中国肿瘤登记年报》资料称，每分钟就有6人确诊为癌症。

2011年社科界十大热点关注（社会科学报编写）

阿拉伯之春对考古产生何等影响？陕西战国墓中的一锅肉汤是什么肉做的？美刊《考古学》评选2011年世界十大考古事件

该会议主要反对计划生育的继续执行。但在一份发言记录中，提出的观点是资源在理论上可以无限发现、人口继续增长资源消耗无忧、地球环境并非因人口剧增而遭到破坏，这些理由都有待商榷。

2009年5月，中国互联网络信息中心发布《西部地区互联网络发展报告》，数据显示，西部地区互联网发展迅速，无论在网民增规模以及渗透率方面均有较大提升，但总体而言，西部互联网依然处于萌芽阶段，网民特征以及行为特征明显。截止2008年12 月，西部地区网民达到5822万人，增长率从2007年的44.1%升至2008年的52.0%，高于全国41.9%的网民增长比例。但西部地区网民在整体人口渗透率仅为15.8%，与东部地区33.6%的网民渗透率相差一倍以上。

2004年給贵屿的定义就是：走私电子垃圾集散地。

最近这十年才是社会科学遇到的挑战外显化的时期，因为这一段时间社会学危机比较明显，有被边缘化的危险。

一部揭露乌干达圣灵军绑架童军暴行的视频影片《Kony 2012》于2012年3月5日公布，赢得上亿人关注并引发强烈争议。乌干达学者马姆达尼认为夸大圣灵军当前的威胁，明显是在为美国增加在这一地区的军事存在设立借口，向乌干达北部增派士兵和武装，然后扩展到整个地区。

中国农业发展正面临一系列前所未有的挑战：一是面临着国际国内农产品价格倒挂的压力。二是面临着农业生产成本上升的挑战。三是农业支持保护制度面临新挑战。四是农业生态环境难以承受当前的农业生产方式，所面临的挑战和压力前所未有。五是农业科技实力不强。六是农业生产的组织化程度和市场化程度比较低，还面临着很多现实的困难和问题。