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近五十年前，亨廷顿以其一贯的冷酷现实观尖锐指出治理问题体制化为什么错了："国与国之间最重要的区别，不在于政府的形式，而在于治理的水平"，也就是说，关键不在于体制形式的优劣，而在于国家治理的能力及水平。亨廷顿几乎是以一己之力，老辣独到地反驳了当时流行的"放弃国家"理论倾向，其后的政治理论演化与世界政治秩序变化也证明了这一反拨极为成功。

The institutional conditions of practical progress

The complete text of "Plasticity into Power: Comparative Historical Studies in the Institutional Conditions of Economic and Military Success," which forms part of the Politics series. The book was originally published in 1988 and is to be republished by Verso in the near future. It explores, in comparative historical detail, an idea that plays a major role in my social-theoretical writings: the idea of the practical as well as the moral advantages of institutional arrangements and discursive practices that facilitate their own revision.

"Plasticity into Power" was published by Verso in a new paperback edition in 2004 together with "False Necessity" and "Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task." To order this book go to the "my books" section of this website.

《广告克星》的编辑卡勒•拉森“占领华尔街”的呼吁今年九月得到了积极响应。从那时起，到占领者的帐篷城市一游并评头论足，就成了记者、博主和拍客的人生典礼。

重慶又來到歷史的拐點 邱立本重慶七十多年前是抗擊日軍的堡壘，今天則是抵抗階級矛盾尖銳化與社會不公的最新前線。重慶又來到了歷史的拐點。七十多年前，它是中國人抗擊日軍的堡壘；而在今天，它是中國人追求和諧社會、抵抗階級矛盾尖銳化和社會不公的最新前線。因為今天中國社會已面臨國歌所唱的「最危險的時候」。在經濟高速發展中，中國成為一個權貴資本主義最發達的地方。在豪華的大都會，大腕大款一擲千金，但底層的民工和弱勢群體卻是被邊緣化的角色。用馬克思的階級分析來看今天的中國社會，會發現它正走向馬克思理論的反面，也使中國共產黨的統治正當性受到嚴峻的挑戰。尤其今天的「新三座大山」——公共醫療、基礎教育、住房緊張，都還是沉重地壓在老百姓的頭上。儘管近年改革的聲音不斷，但進步緩慢，特別尷尬的是，在公共醫療方面，都比台灣和香港落後。在香港，市民遇上了車禍或意外，都會立刻得到最好的免費救護和醫療；而台灣的健保，也成為美國醫療改革學習的對象。但在中國大陸，車禍救治往往要看你的身份，口袋有沒有錢。不同的社會，竟是生死之別，讓人不禁慨嘆，哪裏才是社會主義？但中國的社會主義精神還是不滅。重慶最近就對公共醫療加速改革，要避免人民小病挺住、大病等死的悲慘命運，要尋回現代文明社會的人道精神。同時，在今天兩岸三地一片炒作房地產的狂飆中，重慶也出現住房是否應該列為「公共品」的反思，要走出近年中國房地產集團與地方官僚聯合謀取暴利的窠臼。重慶模式的發展，也在理論界掀起熱潮。芝加哥大學博士、清華大學教授崔之元就認為重慶融合國企與市場經濟的優勢，真正為人民服務，剛好可以實現諾貝爾經濟學得主米德（James　Meade）的「自由社會主義」的理想，也為中國發展軌跡找到一個兼備市場效率與社會公正的方向。不過社會公正不能只是靠公權力的膨脹，而是要靠權力的制衡，避免權力的濫用。落實法治（Rule　Of　Law），　而不是只靠法制（Rule　By　Law）。重慶最近在反黑的風暴中，也被批評缺乏程序正義，被告不准有律師，或律師看不到案卷，剝奪被告的辯護權，成為網上爭議的焦點。但重慶最新的實驗，畢竟有一種巨大的先驅作用。它找回了大半個世紀前中共的理想，要永遠為社會的公正和人間的正義奮鬥，而昔日「小米加步槍」的武器批判，要讓位給當下全球化時代的批判武器——打破GDP主義，不再迷信簡單的經濟增長率，而是要看老百姓的生活品質，要看反映貧富懸殊的基尼系數。這是中國最新的理想與實踐。它的成敗不僅靠一兩個人的努力，而要靠一個時代的反思和創意。重慶七十多年前不屈不撓的精神，也為今天的中國帶來信心和希望。

弗罗伊德说，作家真正的灵感一生只有一次。作家作品等身，总有一本是代表作。亨廷顿的代表作公认是《变迁社会的政治秩序》，出版于1968年，1996年重版，2006年又由耶鲁大学再版，自由主义大师福山写序，称这部书是20世纪下半世纪的政治学经典，研究的广度和分析深度少有匹敌。福山认为此书一出，斩杀了西方战后的现代化理论, 现代化的研究失去主心骨，至今乱成一团。本文选介作者对美国政制来源和性质的看法，不仅是因为美国学者论美国有趣味，   而且是因为什么是现代化的问题原来如此一言难尽。　　   1        美国与西方现代化的不同道路　　   50年代兴起的现代化理论试图总结由农业社会向工业社会的经验，这些理论家认为英美优先成为现代强国，英美历史经验是现代化的榜样，成为现代化理论的基础.。 亨廷顿认为这是不符合事实的误解，英，美和欧洲大陆国家由于前提不同，现代化过程走的是三类不同的道路。　   欧洲大陆国家以法国为典型，首先通过君主制中央集权来使国家权力合理化，合理化的标志是国家统一，行政效率，机构简化。由于大陆国家在农业时代封建割据，教会和贵族掌握地方权力，分散的权力保护多元的既得利益，自然不利工业，国防和制度的现代化。只有国家权力集中后才能压制教会，贵族和地主的分散抵抗，推行统一的政策，推进现代化。法皇路易十三在1630年宣布，在教会和国家之间，”我更加对国家负责”，被后人认为是欧洲现代国家的诞生日。以后普鲁士，瑞典，西班牙等等大陆国家都开始君主集权，依靠中央权力才能建立常备军，限制教会贵族的权力，推行法律改革，建立现代国家行政机构。英国的斯图亚特王朝起初也像大陆一样君主集权改革，但受到议会的抵制，最后国家权力集中到议会手里，从此议会便高于国王，国家集权和现代化主要由议会推动。　　   美国并没有经历同类的政治制度现代化。17世纪的清教徒移民将当时英国都铎王朝的制度带到北美殖民地，主要特征是：地方政府权重，依赖民兵，行政与立法和司法职能的混合，国王和议会的互相制衡，代议制，政府和社会结合的观念等等。此时英国本土却经历了“光荣的革命”，修改了旧宪法，产生新宪法。美国爆发独立战争，是因为北美殖民地坚持都铎时代的宪法体制，与建立集权宪法的英国议会发生冲突。独立后的美国宪法保留了都铎制度的框架，并一直延续至今，“今日美国政治制度的独特，很大程度上是因为古老。”　 2  现代化并非整体和同步　　   战后现代化理论的要点是认为国家现代化是一个同步过程，经济，教育，政治，国防等一齐推进才有现代化。 亨廷顿解剖了欧美各地现代化的过程，指出现代化不是一个整体，而是分为权力建立，机能区分，和扩大参与的不同领域，欧美社会不同，在这些领域的改革大不相同。　　　  如前所述， 欧洲大陆国家由于封建割据是现代化的主要阻力，现代化首先是中央集权化，宣传君权神授，以从教会和贵主手里夺权。英国也是由下到上集权，但国家权力集中于议会，英国议会本身的改革也表现了权力国家化的过程。英国原来国王代表全国，议员代表地方利益，议员被要求住在所代表的地区，并由地区支付议员薪俸。而在集权过程中，议会修改了法律，不再要求议员住在选区，薪俸也与地方脱钩，议员职业化，形成议会式中央集权。而美国则将英国改革前的旧制度写进1787年宪法，固定下来。类似都铎时代，美国政制至今实行双重代议制，总统代表国家利益，议会则代表地方利益。美国议员必须居住在选区是政治和法律规定。　   3 欧洲的分权和美国的混权　　 在中世纪的欧洲，对应于分散的社会，国家的权利和机能也是分散和混合的，例如都铎王朝的政治机能架构是混合的，一个机构可能承担几种职能   一种职能可能又分散在几个机构中，制衡有余，分权则不足。向工业社会过渡的17-18世纪，以国家主权建设为标志，英国权力向中央集中，而政府职能机构则进行专业化区分，以提高行政效率为。　　　　 美国则保持了都铎旧制，国家大权分散，而具体行政职能则由几个机构分享而不是区分，这是美国式制衡的含义。美国宪法强调分权制衡，却带来影响政府效率的代价。亨廷顿引用Pollord话来证明：“美国私人企业的效率高，而政府效率低，原因就是制衡理论；这使美国政制对许多美国精英也是没有吸引力的。”　 美国的司法复核制度，也是起源于都铎王朝，当时英国司法和立法的职能在法院和议会是混合状态，旧时议会又是法院，同时兼有立法，司法，和行政功能。法国议会也类似，而西班牙则是法院兼立法功能。英国光荣的革命之后，议会集权建立，司法和立法混合功能消除，司法不得干预立法决定，所谓三权分立，实际是议会的行政权力为主，即所谓行政吸纳。　　 而美国则保持了都铎时代的混合状态，法院一再通过司法复核手段否定立法，干预立法过程。欧洲人对美国法院和律师地位之高，难以理解。而大法官又是由总统提名，而总统府又有相当多司法，立法和否定立法的功能，美国行政，立法和司法之间的关系用三权分立来形容是不准确的，实际上是“你中有我，我中有你”的前现代政治。如Dowse所言：“英国封建国王和议会之间的关系，比现代英国制度更像美国总统和议会的关系。” 美国总统被称为民选皇帝，也是这个道理。 4 群众参与的差别　　   在大众参与方面，美国走在西欧前面。欧洲是先有权力改革，政府机能专门化分工，改造社会后，才逐步扩大人民参与。　　　   欧美现代化道路区别一个原因是军事压力和社会冲突情况的不同。16-17世纪，欧洲大陆最长的和平只有三年，大部分时间都在内战和国际冲突中度过。战争刺激了国家建设的必要。统一权力，压制地方和宗教势力，提高行动效率，增加税收，这些需求使欧洲各国优先开展权力集中和提高政府职能效率的工作。　　　  英国的权力国家化起初也是由于海上备战的需要，以便增加税收，提高对外战争能力。由于英吉利海峡的保护，英国军事压力较小，最终国王与议会在主权问题妥协。而北美殖民地主要治安威胁是当地印地安人，加上殖民点分散，当地居民的民兵就足以应付，所以美国很晚才建立常备军，也无建立中央集权的政府的动力。 另一个原因是社会关系的差别。16世纪的欧洲大陆国家充满内部冲突，法国30年内发生三次内战，西班牙，日尔曼也是宗教和诸侯斗争不停。而英国都铎时代由于玫瑰战争削弱了贵族势力，王朝和贵族通过联姻等手段改善关系，社会比较和谐，为成为英国历史的黄金时代。直到17世纪发生清教徒与国教之间冲突，出亡到北美的清教徒将都铎时代的政制带到北美，由于宗教，阶层和社会地位的大致平等，美国人采用了英国的旧制，“分裂的社会没有中央集权无法生存，而共识社会无法生存在中央集权下。”（P125）弱势的中央，自然地方坐大，给予基层更多参与机会。反之，由于社会分裂，欧洲必须先解决内部矛盾，压制冲突， 所以大众参与程度是长期渐进的过程。　   现代化不是一个整体。美国的例子可以说明一个社会可以一方面很现代，一方面很保守。政体与社会的关系是辩证的，而不是互补的。 一方面的稳定反而可以是促进另一方面的变化的前提。（P132）　　 美国的现代社会和都铎式政体的结合，使欧美的自由和保守概念的内容完全相反。欧洲自由主义支持中央集权，先是君主，然后是人民，认为政府是推动社会改革的中坚力量，而美国自由主义则支持一种古老的权力分散制度。这是基于社会较平等和外部安全压力低的殖民地社会的惯性。亨廷顿指出，今天美国外部安全变得脆弱，而内部的种族和阶级分化加剧，也许美国要学习17世纪的欧洲，补上中央集权和职能专门化的课，来应付国家安全和社会改造的任务。保尔，肯尼迪也提出美国要考虑修改建国早期的制度，以适应变动中的社会。软实力推手奈依也感到美国两年一次的大选， 影响美国外交战略的执行。果如此，美国模式就要大变了。     5  独孤的美国模式　　 美国被认为是现代革命的开创者，认为法国革命直到十月革命都是她的连锁反应，亚，非，拉的现代化斗争也被认为是继承美国革命。但美国革命性质是独立战争，而且是脱离母体的国内战争，而不是社会革命。独立战争时的美国与面临政治革命，社会革命，和经济革命的新兴国家差别很大，亨廷顿认为两者相关性很小，可借鉴的作用自然少。　　 美国又被认为是“第一个新民族国家”，因此值得新兴国家学习。但如前述，美国是个“新社会，旧国家”。而大多数新兴国家面临“旧社会，新国家”的环境，与美国建国时条件不同。例如拉丁美洲各国，独立后大部分仍然继承了旧时代的封建社会制度，美国政府在那里推行选举，代议制，多元宪制主义等等目标，结果造成弱势政府，不能胜任改造旧社会的任务，反而造成独裁的军政府上台。至今，美式民主在拉美大部分地区都不成功，反而滋生反美情绪。亨廷顿对欧美比较研究的结论是，现代国家的历程，议会制和一党制国家很多，美国式国家其实很少，欧洲人一直觉得美国的企业模式很吸引，但政治模式则少人羡慕；新兴国家更值得值得借鉴的是欧洲大陆模式，先政府现代化，然后扩大大众参与；社会经济发展和政治发展不是同步对应关系，政治改革和革命可能成功也可能失败；现代化各领域有先有后， 没有统一模式。　　 响应亨氏的结论，可以联想很多，例如“范式改革”理论认为，变革也可能是旧范式的复兴，就如文艺复兴，新柏拉图主义，和新托马斯主义等等思潮，美国政治的旧瓶装新酒，可以说是“吾道不孤。” 

The Libyan uprising is entering its fourth week. The courage and persistence of the Libyan people's efforts to overthrow Gaddafi have been met with ongoing regime brutality ranging from shoot-to-kill policies to the indiscriminate use of artillery against unarmed civilians.In addition to the current no-fly zone, the UN Security Council unanimously issued a resolution imposing tough measures against the Libyan regime including an arms embargo, asset freeze, travel ban and a referral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court for investigation.The desire to act in solidarity with the Libyan people demands that we assess the available options against the core principle of legitimacy that any intervention must satisfy: Do no harm (that is, do not do more harm on balance by intervening).The likelihood that coercive intervention would satisfy this principle is severely constrained when evaluated against the historical record, logistical realities, and the incentives and interests of the states in a position to serve as the would-be external interveners.Put simply, coercive external intervention to alter the balance of power on the ground in Libya in favor of the anti-Gaddafi revolt is likely to backfire badly.The attendant costs would, of course, be borne not by those who call for intervention from outside of Libya but by the Libyan people with whom we hope to show solidarity. In what follows we argue that embracing the call for solidarity requires a much more careful appraisal of the interventionist option, precisely because the potential risks will be borne by Libyan civilians.Mixed motivationsOf the arguments against intervention, the most straightforward draws on an assessment of the long history of external intervention in the Middle East and North Africa.There is no need to rehearse that history here since the failure of such past interventions to advance the humanitarian welfare or political aspirations of local populations is well-established. But because the possibility of intervention is debated in some circles as if the starting point is a clean slate, it is important to begin by recalling this dismal history. For instance, the imposition of a no-fly-zone on Iraq did little in and of itself to shift the balance of power against the Saddam Hussein regime, but it did result in the deaths of hundreds of civilians.Further, the no-fly zone served as a predicate for the subsequent invasion and occupation of Iraq insofar as the ongoing use of this coercive measure against the regime from 1991 until 2003 was cited in support of the argument that there was "implied authorisation" to forcibly topple the regime.While humanitarian considerations are often invoked in defense of intervention, humanitarianism is far from the only issue on the table. Other reasons that have been adduced in favor of intervention in Libya include vindicating international norms, re-establishing the leadership of the US in the region, preventing spill-over of the refugee crisis into Europe, and the stabilisation of world oil markets. The Libyan people are struggling to change their regime on their own terms and there is no reason to presume an overlap between these various logics of intervention and their interests.The historical record clearly establishes that an external regime change intervention based on mixed motives - even when accompanied with claims of humanitarianism - usually privileges the strategic and economic interests of interveners and results in disastrous consequences for the people on the ground. Indeed, the discord currently evidenced among Western powers concerning intervention in Libya is precisely based in their doubts as to whether their strategic interests are adequately served by such a course.The incongruence between the interests of external interveners and those on the ground in Libya is already apparent. Beyond their eleventh hour timing, serious mobilisations for intervention on the part of Western powers were issued only after most Western nationals had been safely evacuated from Libya.The fact that outside powers were unwilling to act while their nationals were on Libyan soil demonstrates their understanding that treating the regime with coercion may lead to civilian deaths either directly as a result of an intervention or indirectly through reprisals against civilians identified as opponents.Furthermore, the evacuation channels made available to Western nationals – airlifts across the Mediterranean – were not and are not being offered to Libyan civilians nor African migrant workers trapped in Libya. If the humanitarian welfare of civilians in Libya were paramount, they, too, would have been offered this secure escape route. Instead, once Western nationals were safely out of harm’s way, coercive measures were adopted without any effort to protect or evacuate the civilians that were left behind in Tripoli and beyond.No-fly zone, local calls, and solidarityTo be clear, we are not categorically rejecting any and all forms of intervention irrespective of the context. Instead, we reject forms of intervention that, on balance, are likely to produce more harm than benefit. This is a context-specific determination that requires an assessment of the forseeable consequences of particular proposed interventions. With respect to the context in Libya today we are critical of current proposals for intervention in light of the identities and interests of would-be interveners and the limited understanding of intra-Libyan political dynamics on which they rely. There are circumstances under which a no-fly zone might conceivably serve a humanitarian purpose.In particular, if air strikes were the principal means by which the regime was inflicting civilian casualties, there would be a much stronger case for a no-fly zone. Though the military situation within Libya remains unclear, the empirical evidence that is available suggests that Gaddafi’s artillery poses a more serious threat to both civilians and rebels than air strikes.In addition, the regime's aerial assaults have primarily employed helicopter gunships, which would be difficult to counter through a no-fly zone because they fly lower and are harder to target than warplanes.Further, the no-fly zone imposed through the UN Security Council involves attacks on Libyan runways, radars, and anti-aircraft artillery installations with the potential for significant "collateral damage" against civilians and civilian infrastructure. A no-fly zone that risks killing Libyans would also run the risk of strengthening the regime's hand by enabling Gaddafi to style himself as an anti-imperialist defender of Libyan sovereignty.Rather than persuading elements of the military and air force to defect, such a move might produce a counter-productive rally-round-the-flag effect in parts of Libya still under the control of the regime.The fact that for logistical and political reasons a no-fly zone poses a serious risk of backfiring is an important consideration. But it is not the only reason to question whether heeding local calls for a no-fly zone necessarily represent an act of solidarity.Fragmentation riskFurthermore, a response to calls emanating from one region may risk fragmenting the country. The fact that we know so little about the domestic context among non-regime actors in Libya is precisely the reason that the types of external intervention currently taking place are likely to backfire.The desire to act in solidarity with local Libyans struggling for their liberation is important. But without a clear sense of the consequences of a particular intervention – or the interests and diverse actors likely to be impacted – there is no way to satisfy the do-no-harm principle. Notwithstanding the provenance of the no-fly zone – whether within Libya or the Arab League – and their attendant "authenticity" or legitimacy, we cannot justify intervention unless we can appraise its likely consequences for the civilian population with whom we are allegedly acting in solidarity.This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that neither the Western nor Arab powers currently calling for intervention have a record of privileging particular domestic partners based on the interests or aspirations of local populations. There is little reason to expect that Libya will be exceptional in this regard, particularly in light of the mixed motives of any potential intervener.We do not argue that the international community has no obligation to support Libyan civilians. To the contrary, we strongly believe there is such an obligation, but that current coercive options pose serious risks to the Libyan population with little concomitant benefit in terms of humanitarian protections.The interests of potential external interveners are not well aligned with those of Libyans on the ground beyond that of regime change.Further, the identities of involved in the process of intervention reinforce concerns about such proposals. Many members of the Arab League are currently undertaking repression of democratic uprisings against their rule. The legitimacy and representativeness of any call they issue should be called into question by their own internal anti-democratic practices.As Saudi troops operate in Bahrain to shore up the defenses of an authoritarian ruling family against its own people, the bankruptcy of calls for intervention in Libya by members of the GCC and the Arab League is evident.Members of the Group of 8 are also compromised by their ambivalence towards democratic demands met with repression by their regional allies and their own long history of brutal interventions and direct support of authoritarian regimes.ICC referral 'counter-productive'Libyans have already made great inroads on the ground and without external support towards a goal of regime change in which they will determine the day-after scenarios for their country.To date, measures adopted by the international community have done little to aid, and may have undermined, Libyan efforts at liberation. For instance, the call for an ICC referral in the measures adopted by the UN Security Council was most likely counter-productive. The first priority should have been a negotiated exit strategy for Gaddafi and his family, not unlike the path already paved for the other recently deposed Arab despots, Ben Ali and Mubarak.Instead, by immediately referring the regime for investigation by the ICC the international community has signaled to Gaddafi that neither he nor his children will be allowed to go quietly, potentially redoubling his resolve to fight to the last.Allowing a negotiated exit to exile in an African or South American country would not have precluded a subsequent ICC referral, but might have facilitated an early end to the violence currently ravaging Libya. Further, the same resolution that referred Libyan authorities to the ICC contained a specific exemption from ICC jurisdiction for foreign interveners not party to the Rome Statute, anticipating and providing impunity in some cases for civilian deaths that result from possible UN Security Council-authorised operations in Libya down the line.The ICC referral has been described as an attempt to incentivise those around Gaddafi to defect. Rather than vindicating international accountability, this logic of incentives suggests impunity for last-minute defectors notwithstanding decades of crimes against the Libyan population.At its most basic, the ICC referral represents the triumph of a set of international goals (vindicating a constrained conception of international accountability through the Libyan regime) over the immediate interest in an early resolution of the Libyan crisis through the provision of a regime exit strategy. This privileging of international over local interests is typical of external intervention and would only be exacerbated by options involving the use of force.Useful assistanceWe argue for forms of international assistance that reverse this privileging and begin from the known interests of Libyan civilians. At a minimum, resources must be mobilised to offer relief supplies to the Libyan population that is currently outside of the control of the regime (bearing in mind some of the problematic dynamics also associated with such forms of "aid").Urgent priority should be given to addressing shortages of medical supplies and provision of essential foods and clean water. Beyond these basics, an evacuation corridor for civilians – including non-Libyan African workers trapped in the territory – should be secured and responsibility for shouldering the burden of refugee flows should not be restricted to Tunisia and Egypt.To the contrary, rather than imposing these costs on Libya's poorest neighbors – in the early stages of transitions of their own – Libya’s relatively wealthy northern neighbors in Europe should be absorbing a much larger share of the costs, human and material, of offering refuge to fleeing civilians.The fact that the airlifting of Libyan and other African civilians to safety out of Tripoli is an option that is not currently on the table speaks eloquently to the misalignment of priorities. Dropping the xenophobic European rhetoric on the "dangers" of African immigration would also have the benefit of removing one of the Libyan regime's major levers with the EU.As Gaddafi threatens to terminate the agreements by which he has been warehousing African migrants at Europe's behest, he lays bare the cruel logic of tacit alliances (based on immigration, energy, and security interests) that has long lent support to his rule.A Europe willing to take concrete steps to facilitate the evacuation to its own shores of civilians who wish to leave Libyan territory regardless of nationality would at least have broken with its record of shameful complicity in regime brutality.Acting in solidarity with the Libyan people within a do-no-harm principle presents many constraints and frustratingly few options. This is not because of an absence of concern for the interests of the Libyan population but because there are few good options beyond the provision of relief supplies and evacuation channels.Support Libyan rebels?There may be other alternatives short of external coercive intervention that might be considered – such as sharing tactical intelligence with Libyan rebels or jamming regime communications – though such options would have to be carefully evaluated in light of potential risks.By contrast, overt and covert coercive options ranging from no-fly zones to arming Libyan rebels or using regional commandos to train them all implicate external actors in altering the balance on the ground in unpredictable ways.To engage in such coercive strategies without being able to evaluate the full range of consequences amounts to subordinating the interests of the Libyan people to our own sense of purpose and justice.We strongly advocate creative strategies of solidarity with the Libyan people while underscoring that calls for coercive external intervention do not qualify. Indeed, it is possible that demands for Western support to the rebels may already have done more harm than good.In the end, we argue for humility in imagining the role we might play in the course of Libyans' struggle. The international community is neither entitled to take the reins today nor dictate the post-regime scenario tomorrow. Further, those of us who wish to stand in solidarity with Libyans from outside of their country must recognise that we may not be best placed to identify which local actors enjoy broad-based support.Solidarity cannot be reduced to the diplomatic politics of recognition nor to arguments for external intervention.In the end, we counsel acting from the outside only when our actions are clearly aligned with the interests of Libyan civilians. Imaginative strategies to offer much-needed relief and refuge to Libya’s vulnerable population represent a challenge the international community has yet to meet. That is a good starting point for transnational solidarity.Asli Ü. Bâli is a professor of law at the UCLA School of Law. Her research interests also include comparative law of the Middle East.Ziad Abu-Rish is a doctoral candidate in UCLA's Department of History. He is the co-editor of Jadaliyya Ezine.  The  article above first appeared on Jadaliyya.The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

分析奥巴马的当选演说。 “如果还有人对奥巴马的演说才能将信将疑，还有人怀疑一场草根性的群众运动在中产阶级的美国能否真正成功，还有人对激情和希望所能激发的巨大能量怀抱狐疑，……”

中国共产党从革命党到执政党，从冷战背景和计划经济体制下的执政党到全球化背景和改革开放条件下的执政党，民主集中制的形式、内容与运行方式都已经发生了很大变化。从这种历史演变轨迹中，我们看到了“民主集中制”作为工具性的制度理性在历史价值上对历史变迁的现实反映。在当前，如何在新的历史条件下创新发展和完善民主集中制是党和国家现代化转型的内在要求。面对新形势、新问题、新要求，笔者以为对于当代民主集中制的准确表述应当为科学民主制。

美国的罗马帝国化，欧洲联盟的不可能性，事实上已正将中国推为世界自由贸易体系的支持者，这样的角色并不是随便哪个国家都能承担的，在历史上，只有英、美在世界意义上曾如此。这就需要构想以光荣孤立为本、合作共赢为用的世界角色

孤立主义并不能限制国家力量的扩张，而在遭遇国家间的利益冲突时，价值边界就像一道铁幕一样，无情地将民族国家内部享有的价值伦理截然阻断。

社保号码与身份证号码统一的意义，需要放在整个福利国家史背景下来理解。福利国家的历史在西方并不长，从普鲁士建设最早的福利国家算起，不过百余年。但是，建设福利国家，增强政府的再分配能力，自现代民族国家兴起以来，就一直是声势最为浩大、投入最多、社会呼声最高的国家大事。

西班牙《起义报》2月9日文章，作者美国社会学家、历史学家伊曼纽尔•沃勒斯坦

初看上去，曾亦先生此书主题似乎仅限于讨论康有为晚期的政治思想，但实则作者念兹在兹的是中国传统与辛亥年革命之间的碰撞。作者以《共和与君主》为名，其实并非专论康有为政治思想中的政体学说

阿富汗战争已历时10年之久，美国因深陷阿战国力严重消耗。奥巴马政府再度大幅调整阿富汗政策，在阿战略重点由"反恐至上"转为"地缘优先"，并出台"新丝绸之路"计划。在美推动下，阿富汗形势面临重大拐点，并将对该地区安全及地缘政治格局产生深远影响。

9•11十周年之际，全球局势中最能在将来的历史中大书一笔的是什么？恐怕首先得说是愈演愈烈的欧债危机。实际上，9•11与欧债危机之间是有其关联的。9•11、次贷危机、欧债危机、美债危机以及中东动荡，从全球大格局来看，都是十年来全球政治经济秩序蜕变的结果，只不过9•11与美债危机的关系（反恐战争•美国财政与货币•次贷危机）被讨论得多一些，而9•11与欧债危机的关系讨论得比较少，所以本文着重谈一点这方面情况。 2001年9月11日发生了9•11事件，2002年2月28日欧元完全取代欧元区各国原有货币，欧元区诞生。当然这两件事彼此无直接关系，但时间点接近，因此两件事的后续事件就进入了一个共同的大框架，就是近十年来全球政治经济变化的大框架。 9•11事件之后，美国启动了反恐战争。反恐战争主要打哪里呢？当然大方向就是中东地区（阿富汗也算泛中东地区）。而欧元诞生，则对美元的地位构成了巨大冲击。这种冲击最直接的体现就是萨达姆宣布伊拉克的石油采用欧元结算，由此启发了委内瑞拉和俄罗斯，它们也宣布石油可以接受欧元结算。石油用欧元结算是美国绝对无法接受的，为什么呢？因为布雷顿森林体系崩溃、黄金与美元脱钩之后，1974年美国与海湾国家间的"石油只用美元"结算的协议成为了世界货币秩序的基础，石油变相地成为了美元新的"锚"。如果这个基础动摇了，那么美国主导的全球政治经济秩序就面临崩溃。 于是，欧元诞生仅仅一年之后，2003年3月，美国把"反恐战争"的矛头指向了伊拉克。伊拉克战争的主要目的是什么呢？看一下地图：只要把土耳其当作潜在的欧盟国家（土耳其一直在努力加入欧盟），就能看出来伊拉克是波斯湾与欧盟之间的"油路"。美国打伊拉克的主要目的就是扼制欧盟的"油喉"，借此控制新兴的欧元，这也就是为什么当时德国、法国激烈反对伊拉克战争的原因。实际上我们看到，伊拉克战争很好地达到了战略目的：最近美国需要"敲打"欧元的时候，欧洲的汽油价格就会上涨。而欧元区国家的CPI构成中，燃油的比重是很大的，只要汽油一涨价，欧元区的CPI就会上升，于是欧元就会面临货币紧缩压力，就难以果断"放水"救援"起火"的"欧猪五国"（PIIGS）。 当然伊拉克战争不是欧债危机的原因，只是危机已经发生之后，为需要跟欧元"比烂"的美元提供了一个武器。欧债危机的发生另有其原因，不过这个原因也的确是跟9•11有点关系的。这就要从"欧洲美元"（Eurodollar）说起。 二战结束时，美元在战后国际秩序设计中被安排为世界货币，不过当时美元还只是美国国内货币，尚未"走出国门"。而世界货币必须各国都持有才行。美元是怎么"走出国门"的呢？第一个重大步伐是马歇尔计划，通过援助欧洲的项目，大量美元进入了欧洲的银行体系。1956年匈牙利事件时，当时苏联由于顾虑朝鲜战争时美国冻结中国在美资产先例，就把苏联的美元资产转移到了英国，由此产生了"Eurodollar"一词。 通过马歇尔计划，欧洲恢复和新建了一批先进的工厂，工业体系得以复兴，开始向美国大量出口产品。1958之后美国成为经常项目逆差国，并且进口胃口越来越大。欧洲等国的制造企业出口方向主要是美国。欧洲的银行以美元贷款给这些企业，这样企业能规避汇率风险。这就使得欧洲美元流动性极好。欧洲企业用这些美元在全世界（大部分是其殖民地）采购原材料，这样美元在全世界的循环就建立起来了。美国本土以外的美元统称"海外美元"。 不过，布雷顿森林体系存在一个根本矛盾：整个国际货币体系支付手段和储备手段的供给完全依赖于美国的国际收支状况：若美国国际收支保持顺差，则国际市场美元短缺，势必影响国际贸易和金融的正常发展；若美国国际收逆差，美元流出美国，虽可满足国际市场对美元的需要，但却导致美元的泛滥，势必使布雷顿森林体系的核心规则：1盎司黄金=35美元的固定比价无法维持。 随着美国贸易逆差持续扩大和持久的越南战争造成的美元发行压力，在1960-1968年间，竟连续爆发了11次"黄金危机"，并且发生了法国1967年宣布退出"黄金总库"的重大事件。最终，布雷顿森林体系无法维持，在1971年宣告崩溃。也就是这一年，美国为了改变国际秩序濒临崩溃的状况，把中华人民共和国拉入了国际体系。 中国进入国际体系之后，世界制造业出现了一个很好的转移目的地。由此，欧美的制造业逐步开始向中国转移，一如马歇尔计划之后美国制造业开始向欧洲转移。中国从1980年代初开始了经济起飞。 欧洲在对美贸易顺差持续扩大的年代，也开启了高福利社会的进程。如果顺差局面能够持续，则高福利社会也可以维持。然而2001年这个转折性的年份改变了一切。 先是2000年底到2001年初，互联网泡沫破灭，导致经济增长的真正"发动机"失速。然后是9•11事件。之后不久，2001年11月11日，中国加入WTO。2002年2月28日，欧元区诞生。 中国加入WTO使中国这个13亿人口的巨大经济体整体纳入国际经济大循环，欧盟很快就成为中国的最大的贸易伙伴国，也就是中国对欧出口高速增长--这背后当然是欧洲的制造业产能快速向中国转移（欧洲产能向中国转移的一个最明显例子就是曾经由欧洲主导的手机制造业在2005年左右就完全变成了中国主导）。这样，欧洲经济也出现了持续加重的"空心化"--而这竟是与欧元"一统化"进程同时的！ 欧洲经济要想从欧元中得利的话，就得把欧元推向世界，形成全球欧元循环圈才行。然而欧元区刚一诞生，就被美元在伊拉克狠狠狙击。于是欧元的扩张只能掉头向南，向欧洲的原殖民地非洲扩张。这就是2007年萨科齐推出"地中海联盟"深层次原因。 对于北非来说，进入欧元经济圈意味着什么呢？意味着他们更容易（在手续方面更容易）买到欧洲的产品，这又说明什么呢？这就要联系北非国家能卖什么来想：北非国家主要卖的是石油、天然气、磷矿这样的资源性产品，大部分是以美元结算的（卖给欧洲的天然气是欧元结算，但北非天然气也大量出口东亚，是美元结算）。这样，卖出去的产品换回来的是美元，买东西要支付的却是欧元，尤其要考虑北非是几乎无法耕种而食用的粮食却是面食的地区，需要大量从法国意大利之类地方进口粮食。 9•11之后，由于美联储把资金引向房地产业，加之伊拉克造成的财政负担和美元印钞压力，造成国际美元泛滥。因此美元兑欧元呈现持续贬值趋势。这个对北非国家而言又意味着什么呢？意味着当你卖出一桶油的时候，如果卖价是50美元，这时这笔钱相当于40欧元；而当你要买东西的时候，你手里的钱还是50美元没变，却由于美元贬值，只能买价值35欧元的东西了！这就造成北非国家实质收入越来越"毛"，而粮食之类需要进口的民生必需品却越来越贵！由此，当2008年金融危机爆发之后，欧美比着滥发钞票之时，北非民生维艰也就日甚一日，终于在2011年初爆发了大规模动荡，而示威民众最初的口号其实是抗议物价上涨。 对于欧洲来说，北非的动荡意味着欧元的输出出现了巨大的问题，只能"倒逼"欧元区内部本已严重的积弊变成"火山喷发"。因此，与北非关系最为密切的南欧国家如西班牙、意大利，成为了最易被"倒逼"的国家，因此虽然在2010年就被列为"欧猪五国"，但西班牙和意大利的危机在2011年才真正爆发。下一步，欧元生死，关键就在意大利。 

对自由主义民主来说，有没有什么一致和可辩护的替代性选择？从内外两个视角出发，作者探讨了使改良的民主集中制合法化的可能性；其中，民主集中制是当前中国政治组织的官方组织原则。内部视角建立在当代中国政治理论的基础上；而外部视角则批判性地援引了罗尔斯关于"合宜社会"的观点，将其作为自己的标准。顺着这一方法，作者对于一个"合宜社会"所能支持的多元化的种类和程度，以及可能促使中国实现一个真实的及（或）合宜的民主集中制的特殊制度，给予了特别的关注。通过全盘考虑内外两个视角，以及它们相互渗透和批判性知晓的程度，作者主张，我们可以致力于一种全球性哲学，它既不对替代性的政治转轨做事先的判断，也不受错误的观念性障碍的困扰。

本文拟就当代西方马克思主义特别是“分析的马克思主义”者对罗尔斯正义论的批判作一初步述评。

在香港问题上，罗斯福的行动给予中国很多舆论支持。但罗斯福提出归还香港建议的真实目的是以下三点：拢络中国，寻求合作伙伴；打击英法殖民势力，扩大美国的影响；实现"门户开放"，维护美国的利益。面对中英双方，美国政府实行双重香港政策。

接到为这个关于保守主义未来的系列文章撰稿的邀请时，我有些犹豫，因为我认为，无论是在美国还是在欧洲，最需要的似乎不是一种新形式的保守主义，而是左翼思想的重塑。

为了更好的论述革命，我们需要首先回溯那些历史上的重大革命事件，先看看革命者及团结在其周围的人们提出哪些具体要求，追随着哪些基本的价值。一系列极其重要的文本集中而又深刻地反映了当时人民的普遍呼声。