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中国共产党从革命党到执政党，从冷战背景和计划经济体制下的执政党到全球化背景和改革开放条件下的执政党，民主集中制的形式、内容与运行方式都已经发生了很大变化。从这种历史演变轨迹中，我们看到了“民主集中制”作为工具性的制度理性在历史价值上对历史变迁的现实反映。在当前，如何在新的历史条件下创新发展和完善民主集中制是党和国家现代化转型的内在要求。面对新形势、新问题、新要求，笔者以为对于当代民主集中制的准确表述应当为科学民主制。

光绪死因问题,尽管众说纷纭,但在国家清史纂修工程重大学术研究专项课题组利用现代科学技术,在光绪遗体的头发、遗骨和衣服中检测到大量砒霜之后,再结合我们的历史研究,应该可以盖棺论定。

孤立主义并不能限制国家力量的扩张，而在遭遇国家间的利益冲突时，价值边界就像一道铁幕一样，无情地将民族国家内部享有的价值伦理截然阻断。

1960年4月16日，《鲁迅传》顾问团团长夏衍召集《鲁迅传》顾问团成员开会，讨论《鲁迅传》剧本的提纲草案。巴金作为顾问团成员之一在这次会议上发表了意见

到高校任教五年了，对于社会科学研究的普遍性问题有了初步认识，归纳如下。

为什么老百姓感到食品安全问题越来越多？

目前的治理在很多情况下是啃"硬骨头"，如在荒漠上造林，在北方山区的阳坡"爆破造林"，而在一些很容易自然恢复的地方如四大沙地、北方山地的阴坡与沟谷、南方山地、南方湿地投入的生态恢复费用不大，或者有投入，但是治理上又在很大程度上用人力代替自然力，形成了许多所谓物种单一的"绿色荒漠"。

中国古代族群而论，少数族裔文学与主体族裔文学之间的互译由来已久，从周代开始，从口译到笔译，从宗教经典翻译到科技文献，虽然史书记载并不详尽，但一直是草蛇灰线、不绝如缕。

占领运动一直以来的发展令人极度兴奋。事实上我还没看过先例。如果它所建立起的人与人的牵系和关联,能持续不断地穿透我们眼前这漫长而黑暗的时代－因为任何的胜利都得来不易－就可以证明它是美国历史上一个非常了得的事件。

作者认为中国的经济增幅已经开始放缓。中国即将面临一直以来困扰着日本、韩国和其他东亚国家的问题--经济放缓所带来的问题。

仅就藏彝走廊而言,这条走廊中的人口,我统计过一下,共有1000余万人,530万是少数民族,其他是汉族。其中,彝语支民族有293万,藏语支民族185万,羌语支民族48万,共526万,其他是讲壮侗语和苗瑶语的民族共3万人。可说情况是相当复杂的。

截止2006年上半年，新疆累计艾滋病病毒感染报告人数为18206人，同时估计全区约有近6万名艾滋病病毒感染者。88%的新疆感染者集中在伊犁州、乌鲁木齐市、阿克苏地区和喀什地区，77%是由于静脉注射吸毒（IDU）感染。截至2010年9月底，新疆累计报告感染者和病人32532例，其中病人5651例，报告感染人数位居全国第五，性传播成为感染主因。

好些日子以前，汤一介先生在”世纪大讲堂”上，谈中国古典思想。完结前，特别提到亚里士多德﹝为省篇幅，后文尽量简称亚氏﹞，说他是西方古典思想界的表表者，值得大家研究。但为甚么要研究他的《伦理学》？再问：为甚么读过《伦理学》后，还要继续读他的”下集”-- 《政治学》？后一个问题，亚氏在《伦理学》一书结束以前，自有解答。我们不必在这里“抢答”。那前一问题呢？ 假定说，读这本书，为要探索西方思想本源，那为甚么不从亚氏的老师入手？为甚么不先读柏拉图的作品，特别是《理想国》？这话不无道理。我也细想了好一会，才决定先选《伦理学》。 在古代希腊思想中，道德哲学和政治哲学，没有明显的分界线。不过作者的表达形式，却有不同。柏拉图的道德学说比较抽象，更牵涉好些神话。亚氏的道德论述也有抽象的地方；但大体来说，比较“平易近人”。即使没有受过哲学训练的读者，只要稍有耐性，都不难看得懂。为了让读者知道两位智者的同异，我也在书中恰当的地方，把两人的说法并列。 亚氏的论点，和我国先秦儒的看法有合有不合。但起码，中国人看起来，总比较容易产生熟悉感。对一般读者来说，这很有用。固然也有不合的地方；但比起柏拉图的理论来说，陌生感与差距感，是小了。这点也十分重要。 一定有人会问：这本书有甚么用？我倒要反问一句：在西方学府，到今天还在读的古代经典不多，《伦理学》是一本；为甚么？再说，甚么叫“用”？是“中学为体，西学为用”的“用”，还是”学以致用”的”用”？这本书的特点，是体用合一；任何人好好读过，都可以派上用场的。我们说的伦理，自成系统很久，从来没有比较。近代学术，着重”参照系”。和中国的相比，亚氏的道德著述，就是个非常有价值的参照系。同意不同意他的论点，还在其次；最低限度本书帮助我们了解，中西同异的根源在哪里。仅仅这一点，就可以说《伦理学》很有用。 《伦理学》假如是一本抽象的、纯道德理论的作品，也许就不值得大家去细读。它固然是谈道德哲学的，可它更是指路明灯：它告诉读者，道德是怎样实践的。道德实践，如果只是适合古代社会，那我们也不必特别关注。亚氏的教诲，不合现代社会吗？ 一九七六年，博克﹝Derek Bok﹞当哈佛大学校长。他提出当年引起学术界广泛讨论的问题：你怎样教导伦理学？按他日后的说法，是因为认为，当时的学院内外，包括了学院中的哲学教授，都不曾认真面对道德实践的问题。终于，在一九八六年，他筹办了一所探讨伦理学的中心，设在哈佛校内。今年﹝二O O七﹞五月，中心请来了诺贝尔经济学奖得主阿玛泰‧森﹝Amartya Sen﹞教授，特别主持了一系列讨论会。主题正是怎样实践伦理和公义。森教授讲题的主人公，一古一今。古是亚氏，今是罗尔斯﹝J. Rawls﹞。如果亚氏哲学不合今人所需，也没有人会再提他了。 当然，亚氏的论述，不是本”会议手册”；他还是有自己的理论的。我们也得虚心求学，才可以有所得着。就让我先概略地介绍本书的纲领吧。 ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ 古典希腊人材辈出，传世作品不少。花上整本书来探讨道德哲学的，首推亚里士多德的《伦理学》。该书享负盛名，历两千年不坠。亚氏推崇“德善”﹝moral virtue, 道德行为上的美善﹞ -- 也就是人在伦理层面所能发挥的优点，说那是事物两端的”中点”，是人追求福乐所不可或缺的。奇特的是，全书开十卷﹝依次列出，分别是：一)美好事物、二)德善本源、三)德善种类﹝上﹞、四)德善种类﹝下﹞、五)特别的德善 – 公义、六)论智善、七)论克己、八)论情谊﹝上﹞、九)论情谊﹝下﹞、十)论快慰与福乐﹞，每卷长度相若，泛谈各类德善的只两卷半﹝从卷三中段到卷五结束﹞，而〈卷五〉终卷只谈一个题目：公义。严格算起来，论德善本身，仅一卷半﹝卷三中到卷四完﹞，而他论情谊，就用上八、九两卷，比德善所占篇幅还多！这就奇怪了：明明是一本伦理学作品，怎么会这样的？ 稍稍涉猎过亚氏作品的人都知道，除了德善以外，他尤称颂“智善”﹝intellectual virtue, 理性知识上的美善﹞-- 也就是人在思维层面所能发挥的优点，特别以玄思的生命为高。这一点，我们要到〈卷六〉才开始看到；然后，〈卷七〉的论述又回到道德探索上。不过，后四卷﹝七到十﹞论的，只有三大重点；自制﹝说克己吧﹞、情谊、﹝愉悦带来的﹞福乐。三者都不是他所界定的善，也不是甚么不走极端的执中。看看〈卷六〉，论的是智善；一开卷就问，我们怎样才可以明白何谓执中。﹝顾名思义，那就是不走极端的态度。﹞再看看论公义的〈卷五〉，问题就更突显了：在他眼中，公义，也算不上完备的执中，甚至只能用算术的比喻才能述说它。﹝中国人说公义，侧重社会伦范；亚氏说的公义，侧重制度法律。﹞那么公义也不是严谨的中庸行为；而智善要明白的，更是中庸的理性基础。 略为抽离来看，可见一个十段长的秤，像个杠杆，支点在第六段，而后四段的份量，看来比前六段较重。那是不是意味着说，知识比起行为更为重要？ 本书中互有关连、前后呼应的两大主题，是公义和情谊；公义载〈卷五〉，情谊是八、九两卷，谈的是各类身分的人际关系。两者分别置在支点的反向。公义，是善，也类近执中；情谊吗，不太像善，也不近执中。亚氏却说：“情谊和公义都关乎同样情事。”为甚么会这样？那得从全书的安排说起。 〈卷一〉一开始就说，人以追求与善俱来的最高福乐为鹄的。福乐是人在实践美善时的灵性活动，那是亚里士多德的名言了。他在开卷没有排除智善，但谈论再三的，是高贵情操与德善。那也许不足为奇。古典哲学倾向贬抑人贪求庸俗的快慰，要求人崇尚德善。这在柏拉图的作品中尤其易见。到了〈卷十〉论愉悦，他却说愉悦本身不是活动，但可使活动更完善；而人得愉悦 -- 也就是快慰的感觉，竟然属智善多于德善。首尾两卷像个倒向：福乐一开始从追求高贵德善而来，到最后转移为从追求愉悦与智慧而来。 全书首尾已经点题。现在略说其中穿插。亚氏在〈卷二〉告诉大家，人寓德性于行为。他很简单地把德善和执中连起来，说德善属习惯而不属理性，也不属人的情意欲望。然后他回头详论执中这个主题，说事“必连续并可分”才有执中可言；而说执中，可对事言，可对人言，两者不尽相同。经典例子是，他说六斤食物是两斤和十斤的“中”，但人并不一定要吃六斤才算“执中”。孔子说“勇者不惧”。亚氏说“勇者不莽不惧”；勇者，是莽夫和懦夫的“中”。 说执中，不如说中庸。亚里士多德所谈的，是“不偏不倚、无过不及”的境界，和我们说的中庸之道，颇有吻合。待人接物，恰到好处，固然是知易行难的东西了。事物的中点是中，人情的中庸也是中，两种情况当然有差异。为方便计，下文就用中庸吧。不过，大家得小心。我用“中庸”一词，是“为方便计”。对中文读者来说，“中庸”多少有个概念，所以说“颇有吻合”。但他说的接近“黄金分割”，和我们惯用的“中庸”，并不一样。不脗合的情况可能更多。要明白双方差异，得先读通他的书才行。 德善，是关乎苦与乐的，或者说是带出苦与乐的情意与行动。那么，苦与乐、情与行，都是道德行为上的。为甚么可以这样看，暂时还不清楚。起码，我们可以怀疑，这个德善有甚么理性基础。在〈卷十〉中谈到同一问题时，亚氏说愉悦与福乐，是个整体，不可分割，就像算术中的单位，几何中的一点，或人的视觉。但为甚么善就是中庸？他跟着有解说。第三、四两卷，谈的是各项德善。首先说到的就是”勇气”。他说勇气是恐惧与卤莽两端的中庸之道。其后各项都界定得不十分严谨。我们可知他所云何事，却不清楚知道何以德善是中庸，何以我们能这样去理解它。亚氏提醒我们，说这类道德谈论不是自然科学论证，不可要求绝对准绳的。 结束〈卷二〉时，他说人行善当褒，人不守中庸当贬。怎样定夺是否偏倚行事，用的不是理智而是人的洞察力。洞察力因人而异，可以十分主观。人的德善要能施展，需要有个共处的环境和某种客观的准则。这准则，在〈卷五〉给笼统叫作”公义”。 〈卷六〉论的是智善。一起卷亚氏就说，他要看中庸是否理智决定的。完卷时他说，善不归在理智旗下，它只是与理智相一致而已。那么说人洞世事、察人情、施褒贬，不从理智来，却可能与理智相去不远。 “克己”是第七卷的主旨。亚氏说克己并不就是善，却与善同类；它也是从习惯而来，却受理性影响，甚至支配。克己与〈卷三〉谈的节制有度相近 -- 都跟苦乐有关，尤其涉及触感。﹝所谓触感，是指人的经验知识。经验知识通过五觉而来，左右着人怎样趋乐避苦。﹞看起来，倒像重述〈卷三〉似的。读者会问：有节制者与克己者有何区别？亚氏说，克己者有低俗的欲望，有节制者没有。那是说，克己者才真正表现出他有驾驭欲望的能力；而低俗欲望，从柏拉图开始，就是人灵性中最底部分，必须让理性束缚。所以克己者是最完整的，最能给理性来指引行事的。奇特的是，亚氏提到过度孝顺之弊，还用上两则轶事，披着”暴躁是自然”的外衣，给挞父掩过。谈克己用这类例子，是不是伏笔？〈卷七〉终卷前，他指出追求赏心乐事是人性本然，花了好些笔墨给愉悦“不反”。那是〈卷十〉的先声了。 〈卷八〉〈卷九〉详细讨论的，是“情谊”。刚提过，那是人与人的某种关系，包括人对他人的、人对自己的。中国传统的五伦，他都谈论到；也细细地推敲，为甚么友谊占那么大的比重？为甚么人追求最大的自足，会发现”对己”的情谊会比“对人”的为高？为甚么最崇高的情谊，是哲学性质的？为甚么人对别人的情谊，必然是近亲远疏的？如果人在社会生活，和远近的人都要打交道，那”情谊”可以站甚么位置？为甚么它不能应付所有问题？为甚么到最后得回到公义上去？亚氏论五伦，明显把政治层﹝君臣﹞分了出来，认为不能混为一谈；这跟传统儒家说法全不一样。他论父子，更会教一些读者读来难堪。大家也许有这么一个印象：不必说最高的福乐了，就是最高的情谊吧，也不容易得到呢！ 〈卷十〉是《伦理学》最后一章。全卷分几部分。首先重拾愉悦，跟着是福乐的最后定论，认为福乐必然是赏心乐事，所以不能缺少快慰。但接下去的，却是两组互需调洽的事物：一是对哲学的推崇，一是向政治的过渡。亚氏花了不少笔墨，说玄思是最高境界；也就是说，人的哲学活动能带来最美好的福乐；甚至认为，那是最能接近诸神所处的福乐世界；可诸神高高在上，并不需要靠赖甚么德行，来享有最高的福乐。那岂不是说，追求最高境界 -- 像诸神的福乐境界，是一种精神境界，或者说哲学境界；那是智善层面的。这样看，是智善高于德善了。 但众生不是神。众生是群体动物，在社会相处，必须靠德善来维系。这就有赖教化。教化，需要有智慧的人来实施。“在我国古代，这叫”先圣昔贤之教”，或者是”先王之教”。”　那么众生的德善教化，可以靠智者来达成吗？ 不管怎样，全书最后的述说，在表明老百姓有恰当的道德教育 -- 也就是和谐的政治生活，所需的不是哲学家而是政治家。但政治家缺乏理论的认识，也不懂导民为善，所以，当政的要向有智慧的学习。亚氏跟着说，他的前贤并没有好好探讨立法的问题，所以他要在他的《政治学》里详为陈述。看来他是相信，他自己才明白甚么叫平民百姓。 如果玄思是最高的福乐，那为甚么哲学家要那么不惮烦，去教化百姓？我们不肯定亚氏是否要教化万民；他的目标，似乎是那创制律法的人，要他们懂得怎样做个有启迪的立法者。可他为甚么要那样做？在全书最后一段中，亚氏表明他要探讨政治，因为那可以把人世间的实际智慧推向完美。我们暂时只能说，他沈思世事，为要追求智者的福乐；但如果我们不能洞明世事的实质层面与哲学层面，我们也不可能阐明，何以玄思的生命是美好的。那份澄明，亚氏说，惟有政治哲学家才能冀盼。 所以《伦理学》的“下集”，就是他的《政治学》。 ※ ※ ※ ※ 批评亚氏道德哲学的人，历来不少。十七世纪英国哲学家霍布斯﹝T. Hobbes﹞就认为，你说人追求美善，是自然而然的，人只要不固步自封，带着开放的心灵，累积经验，细细思量，就能接近善的门坎，也就是善恶的判别了。﹝倒有点像我们说的“天理自在人心”。﹞这样说，太危险了，因为这等于说，人可以凭着自身的修为，懂得辨善恶是非，不必靠赖社会政治法律的力量！这类自然论，太“颠覆”了 -- 君令，还有谁听？ 持相对论的，又有另一种说法。美善固然崇高，但说美善来自自然，那人间的崇高价值，是推而放诸四海而准的了。历史，可不是这样说。世上社会众多，不见得人人认定同一价值；你亚氏认为是义的，我们社会不见得同意。所以吗，美善，并不来自自然，是来自社会文化和历史。 是不是历史发展的因素，亚氏就看不到？是不是人需要社会，他竟然无视？抑或他的学说，虽然很有目的论、自然论的色彩，但正因为他早看到各种可能，使他在立论时带有保留？使他的学说不走极端、不绝对、不僵硬？ 犹有进者。我们读书能够用心一点，仔细推敲，当不难发现，在看似绝对的道德术语背后，有很多犹豫不定的论点。在善恶好坏的判断下，见到的不是黑白分明而是困境。读完全书，更不难发现，打从一开始，就有了不那么稳定的感觉。亚氏陈义固高，他却明白，再高，也躲不了风吹雨打的考验。 近代政治哲学一抬头，就是一场早来的风雨。比霍布斯早出两百年的马基维里﹝N. Machiavelli﹞，就不满亚氏的中庸论。一个指挥官，如果用“中间落墨”做他的座右铭，他就糟糕了。一个统治者，如果只懂黄金分割，凡事处处不走偏锋，不行霸道，那一定失败。 他当然不喜欢亚氏“中庸是美”的观点，也不要亚氏的公义论。公义，是两端的中庸吗？勇夫站在莽夫和懦夫之间。义人呢？公义，是不义的反面，不是甚么中庸的东西；稍后谈到的克己，也不属中庸论调。亚氏学说包罗甚广，更没有一条公式通全卷的事情。很多时候，在不知不觉间，我们就从一个领域滑进另一个；如果观察不敏锐，以为德善只有中庸，那就是毫厘之差，千里之谬了。 那还不止。《伦理学》一书，奇特之处甚多。世人一向以为，亚氏的伦理学，是要鼓吹德善；书，必然是一本道德教诲的书。不错，书的前部分多谈德善；过半后，智善冒升，直是凌驾德善之上。到了最后，亚氏所高举的、人当追求的美善，是要攀寻智慧！那不是大家所期待的、满口仁义道德的训诲吧？ 亚氏书有趣，除了是内容丰富外，还有学说不死板、没教条味道。就是论德善吧，也不见得很有训诲口脗。他明白到，道德判别的基础，并不坚如盘石；而人生在世，道德判别并不是惟一的判别。亚氏的教训，超越了这个判别，让我们看到更高的。 ※ ※ ※ ※ 近年，施特劳斯﹝Leo Strauss﹞是个颇受争议的学者。他的不少作品，我国都出版了中译本。施特劳斯学派﹝The Straussian School﹞中人，多秉承了他的治学风格，在研究西方古今政治哲学上，屡有佳绩。但作品主要是德文和英文的。用中文写的，这是第一本。自己既然身为学派在中国惟一门人﹝-- 没有听说过有同门的学长﹞，不敢说有甚么成绩，但为师门略尽绵力，也很应该。 施公本人三十多年前去世，”掌门”一职就落到克罗普西教授﹝Joseph Cropsey﹞的肩膊上；他是施公指定的遗稿管理人，也是我的恩师。年前好些国内出版社，都希望取得翻译施公著作的中文版权。芝加哥大学出版社向老教授请教，老师就要他们跟我联络，说我是学派的惟一中国学生。后来我也给他们介绍了一些中国的出版社。说来可惜，我离开学校以后，到老师退休为止，再没有听到有中国学生向老师求学。 施公教益我无缘亲炙，克罗普西先生的渊博学问，我倒有幸见闻多时，多年前也曾翻译了他论阿当‧斯密﹝Adam Smith﹞的作品。老师也鼓励我给中国读者介绍西方东西。看到我国近年的风气，人人都在说要”认识西方”，可人人都从工业革命开始着手。这着实有问题。要认识，就当从西方的根源开始；那才比较全面。想了好些时日，才决定动笔。希望这本小书，能有助读者了解西方古典哲学精粹。 要了解西方哲学，总得多少知道它的流变。在文艺复兴以前，欧洲人的道德观，背后有两条主线：一是基督教的宗教影响，一是亚氏的伦理教化。中世纪，教会力量淹盖所有；亚氏的作品，无形中给”压”了下去。所以文艺复兴一到来，人人重拾古典，回到亚氏的作品上去。随着科学的兴起，欧洲思想界掀起了持续的论辩。从意大利的N. Machiavelli，到法国的R. Descartes，到荷兰的B. Spinoza，到英国的T. Hobbes，都或多或少的针对着亚氏来立言。沈寂了多年的《伦理学》，又回到活跃的思想界舞台。 这场论辩，使亚氏伦理学说再散光芒。稍后的J. Rousseau和I. Kant，更奉亚氏为至宝。而康德的道德学说，他所谈论的善恶计算，满载着亚氏的声音。近世的J. Rawls论人性品格，也宗师亚氏。可说是日久常新的学说了。张东荪序严群书﹝见下﹞，曾这样说：”是以亚氏此书虽为最古之书，但同时复为最能经久之作……泰西言道德者仍必奉为经典。”可谓中矣。 今天，我们要明白西方人的思想背景，从《伦理学》入手，应该没有错。 如果多少了解了西方思想的源流，却不能启发我们多点儿了解自己的思想，也不太妥当。所以在想到可以比照的地方，我会补上一些自己的见解，拿中国的传统看法来稍作比较。倒不必定孰优孰劣，但起码可见两者异同。 比如说，孔子说中庸。亚氏说中庸。张君劢曾经这么说：“亚氏不采理性与非理性之二分说……而遇事以人情斟酌其间，故其言曰：中庸者，因人而异，因事而异，其不欲超乎人情之隐曲而立一绝对的标准明矣。”那么两位古代贤者论中庸，没有区别？如果有，在甚么地方？在人性的认识上，先秦儒和古代希腊哲学，有何差异？二千年前的差异，引发出怎样的后果？不论中国西方，在面对今天、回顾过去的时候，能够多明白各自的起点，能进一步取彼之长、补己之短，那我们今天重温亚氏《伦理学》一书，就十分有意义了。 假如这本小书真能抛砖引玉，带出更多的讨论，岂不甚好？ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ 亚里士多德，是个音译名。大家都知道。但显然是个英文音译，不是希腊文的。就是英文名吧，念来也觉得有点问题：为甚么不叫阿里士多图？再说，音译名以音近为准，那为甚么不是阿瑞斯拖图？现在提出来，已经太晚了。我明白。大家都惯用亚里士多德。总觉得，是阿不是亚，本来想略改一字，叫阿里士多德，希望日后我们译外文作品的时候，多加注意。但发觉，亚里士多德一名早已流通，人人习惯用它，如果现在更动，会产生不便的。就用大家熟悉的名字好了。 读者稍稍翻阅今天的译书，随处可以发现，我们的译名，没有画一准则。比方说，同类同音的名字，可以有不同的汉译。例如Aristides是阿里斯提得斯，Aristodemus是亚里斯托得摩，Aristippus是亚里斯提卜，Aristotle当然是亚里土多德了。我希望改亚作阿，也不是全无根据；尽管我们的汉译外文，并不那么准确。 大家一定会问：那我们自己有没有用中文书写，解说《伦理学》的作品？有。那是严群﹝严复后人﹞着，名《亚里士多德之伦理思想》，一九三三年商务印书馆出版。二O O三年北京商务重印。原书面世距今七十多年。﹝为甚么这么重要的西方经典，七十多年来都没有中国学者著书谈论，值得大家深思。﹞不过，该书的特色，和本书很不一样。一是严君所用原书，据他说是J. Weldon的英译本。﹝其实名字弄错了。严君书所引原译者名字，是Welldon不是Weldon。﹞通篇不见参考希腊文原著。这颇有问题。比方说，当原文和英文用语有出入，又或者希腊文涵义比英文广的时候，紧贴英文就无法全面表达作者的原意了。严君在解说八、九两卷时，正碰上这个问题。另一是严君自己改动了亚氏原书的次序。我们不知何故。那着实不好。但次序一更动，亚氏原来的连贯就没有了。再一是严用文言，我用语体。严格来说，文言较精简短洁，但比较不容易推广。本书行文，尽量避免用上艰涩深奥的术语，也尽量做到书写清简，段落分明，以便读者。 说起“以便读者”，还有一点值得一提。我用深入浅出的行文，来介绍亚氏的学说，有两个原因。第一。施特劳斯学派的治学风格，着重细致的文本解说。繁冗的旁征博引，详引学者的相互辩论文字，是侧重考证。考证学自有好处，却不是本书的用力所在。也不便读者。文本解说，也是我国前人注释经典的方式，只是没有用到研究西方经典上去。还有，要达到最理想效果，应该是拿原书﹝中/英译本﹞一起读。文字会有出入；但不要紧，耐着性子就行了。近代学术，多套用一大堆理论，往往语词艰涩难懂，教读者如堕五里雾中；好些时甚至是硬套。学者自己的深思反省，都不见了。我的治学方法，对读者该是更合适的。 第二．两年多前，当时任职江苏教育出版社的席云舒兄，要我写这本书，好推广给国人认识。当时的共识是，既然要推广，那得有便推广的条件才行。学究式的书，读起来太沉重。如果全国只有十七位学者看得懂，那我是彻底失败了。如果有十七万读者看得懂，那才叫推广成功。怎样下笔，才可以教人人读懂，才能”以便读者”，一直是我的考虑。 《伦理学》原书分十卷，每卷下分节。长短不一。本书因应分为十章，章下分节，完全对应原书。读者对照着看，会倍感便利。 鸣谢 几年前，办了个研讨小组，谈西方古今哲学。首先读的，是亚氏《伦理学》。没有洪逸逸、冦夏萍、萧文琴、黄少贤等同学的不懈，给我多所启发，我不会重新拿起这本经典作品。 没有余国藩兄﹝芝加哥大学荣休教授﹞的指点，本书错漏一定更多。 没有李欧梵兄﹝哈佛大学荣休教授﹞的敦促和鼓励，我也许不会提笔写书。 没有父母的支持，我没有机会到芝加哥升学。 没有克罗普西﹝J. Cropsey﹞先生﹝芝加哥大学荣休教授﹞多年的教导与启蒙，我根本不会懂西方哲学，更不必说古典希腊思想。这本小书，就献给他老人家。

近些年来，劳资矛盾的急剧增加使得社会各界对进一步深化改革的呼声越来越高。对中国改革方向的思考，不能离开对当下生产方式以及劳动关系变化的思考与探讨，亦唯有如此，才能厘清中国劳资关系的现状并探索其出路所在。

非常概括，上海简介此篇为首。

朱苏力教授2009年6月2日在华东政法大学“中华学人”讲座的演讲

The Libyan uprising is entering its fourth week. The courage and persistence of the Libyan people's efforts to overthrow Gaddafi have been met with ongoing regime brutality ranging from shoot-to-kill policies to the indiscriminate use of artillery against unarmed civilians.In addition to the current no-fly zone, the UN Security Council unanimously issued a resolution imposing tough measures against the Libyan regime including an arms embargo, asset freeze, travel ban and a referral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court for investigation.The desire to act in solidarity with the Libyan people demands that we assess the available options against the core principle of legitimacy that any intervention must satisfy: Do no harm (that is, do not do more harm on balance by intervening).The likelihood that coercive intervention would satisfy this principle is severely constrained when evaluated against the historical record, logistical realities, and the incentives and interests of the states in a position to serve as the would-be external interveners.Put simply, coercive external intervention to alter the balance of power on the ground in Libya in favor of the anti-Gaddafi revolt is likely to backfire badly.The attendant costs would, of course, be borne not by those who call for intervention from outside of Libya but by the Libyan people with whom we hope to show solidarity. In what follows we argue that embracing the call for solidarity requires a much more careful appraisal of the interventionist option, precisely because the potential risks will be borne by Libyan civilians.Mixed motivationsOf the arguments against intervention, the most straightforward draws on an assessment of the long history of external intervention in the Middle East and North Africa.There is no need to rehearse that history here since the failure of such past interventions to advance the humanitarian welfare or political aspirations of local populations is well-established. But because the possibility of intervention is debated in some circles as if the starting point is a clean slate, it is important to begin by recalling this dismal history. For instance, the imposition of a no-fly-zone on Iraq did little in and of itself to shift the balance of power against the Saddam Hussein regime, but it did result in the deaths of hundreds of civilians.Further, the no-fly zone served as a predicate for the subsequent invasion and occupation of Iraq insofar as the ongoing use of this coercive measure against the regime from 1991 until 2003 was cited in support of the argument that there was "implied authorisation" to forcibly topple the regime.While humanitarian considerations are often invoked in defense of intervention, humanitarianism is far from the only issue on the table. Other reasons that have been adduced in favor of intervention in Libya include vindicating international norms, re-establishing the leadership of the US in the region, preventing spill-over of the refugee crisis into Europe, and the stabilisation of world oil markets. The Libyan people are struggling to change their regime on their own terms and there is no reason to presume an overlap between these various logics of intervention and their interests.The historical record clearly establishes that an external regime change intervention based on mixed motives - even when accompanied with claims of humanitarianism - usually privileges the strategic and economic interests of interveners and results in disastrous consequences for the people on the ground. Indeed, the discord currently evidenced among Western powers concerning intervention in Libya is precisely based in their doubts as to whether their strategic interests are adequately served by such a course.The incongruence between the interests of external interveners and those on the ground in Libya is already apparent. Beyond their eleventh hour timing, serious mobilisations for intervention on the part of Western powers were issued only after most Western nationals had been safely evacuated from Libya.The fact that outside powers were unwilling to act while their nationals were on Libyan soil demonstrates their understanding that treating the regime with coercion may lead to civilian deaths either directly as a result of an intervention or indirectly through reprisals against civilians identified as opponents.Furthermore, the evacuation channels made available to Western nationals – airlifts across the Mediterranean – were not and are not being offered to Libyan civilians nor African migrant workers trapped in Libya. If the humanitarian welfare of civilians in Libya were paramount, they, too, would have been offered this secure escape route. Instead, once Western nationals were safely out of harm’s way, coercive measures were adopted without any effort to protect or evacuate the civilians that were left behind in Tripoli and beyond.No-fly zone, local calls, and solidarityTo be clear, we are not categorically rejecting any and all forms of intervention irrespective of the context. Instead, we reject forms of intervention that, on balance, are likely to produce more harm than benefit. This is a context-specific determination that requires an assessment of the forseeable consequences of particular proposed interventions. With respect to the context in Libya today we are critical of current proposals for intervention in light of the identities and interests of would-be interveners and the limited understanding of intra-Libyan political dynamics on which they rely. There are circumstances under which a no-fly zone might conceivably serve a humanitarian purpose.In particular, if air strikes were the principal means by which the regime was inflicting civilian casualties, there would be a much stronger case for a no-fly zone. Though the military situation within Libya remains unclear, the empirical evidence that is available suggests that Gaddafi’s artillery poses a more serious threat to both civilians and rebels than air strikes.In addition, the regime's aerial assaults have primarily employed helicopter gunships, which would be difficult to counter through a no-fly zone because they fly lower and are harder to target than warplanes.Further, the no-fly zone imposed through the UN Security Council involves attacks on Libyan runways, radars, and anti-aircraft artillery installations with the potential for significant "collateral damage" against civilians and civilian infrastructure. A no-fly zone that risks killing Libyans would also run the risk of strengthening the regime's hand by enabling Gaddafi to style himself as an anti-imperialist defender of Libyan sovereignty.Rather than persuading elements of the military and air force to defect, such a move might produce a counter-productive rally-round-the-flag effect in parts of Libya still under the control of the regime.The fact that for logistical and political reasons a no-fly zone poses a serious risk of backfiring is an important consideration. But it is not the only reason to question whether heeding local calls for a no-fly zone necessarily represent an act of solidarity.Fragmentation riskFurthermore, a response to calls emanating from one region may risk fragmenting the country. The fact that we know so little about the domestic context among non-regime actors in Libya is precisely the reason that the types of external intervention currently taking place are likely to backfire.The desire to act in solidarity with local Libyans struggling for their liberation is important. But without a clear sense of the consequences of a particular intervention – or the interests and diverse actors likely to be impacted – there is no way to satisfy the do-no-harm principle. Notwithstanding the provenance of the no-fly zone – whether within Libya or the Arab League – and their attendant "authenticity" or legitimacy, we cannot justify intervention unless we can appraise its likely consequences for the civilian population with whom we are allegedly acting in solidarity.This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that neither the Western nor Arab powers currently calling for intervention have a record of privileging particular domestic partners based on the interests or aspirations of local populations. There is little reason to expect that Libya will be exceptional in this regard, particularly in light of the mixed motives of any potential intervener.We do not argue that the international community has no obligation to support Libyan civilians. To the contrary, we strongly believe there is such an obligation, but that current coercive options pose serious risks to the Libyan population with little concomitant benefit in terms of humanitarian protections.The interests of potential external interveners are not well aligned with those of Libyans on the ground beyond that of regime change.Further, the identities of involved in the process of intervention reinforce concerns about such proposals. Many members of the Arab League are currently undertaking repression of democratic uprisings against their rule. The legitimacy and representativeness of any call they issue should be called into question by their own internal anti-democratic practices.As Saudi troops operate in Bahrain to shore up the defenses of an authoritarian ruling family against its own people, the bankruptcy of calls for intervention in Libya by members of the GCC and the Arab League is evident.Members of the Group of 8 are also compromised by their ambivalence towards democratic demands met with repression by their regional allies and their own long history of brutal interventions and direct support of authoritarian regimes.ICC referral 'counter-productive'Libyans have already made great inroads on the ground and without external support towards a goal of regime change in which they will determine the day-after scenarios for their country.To date, measures adopted by the international community have done little to aid, and may have undermined, Libyan efforts at liberation. For instance, the call for an ICC referral in the measures adopted by the UN Security Council was most likely counter-productive. The first priority should have been a negotiated exit strategy for Gaddafi and his family, not unlike the path already paved for the other recently deposed Arab despots, Ben Ali and Mubarak.Instead, by immediately referring the regime for investigation by the ICC the international community has signaled to Gaddafi that neither he nor his children will be allowed to go quietly, potentially redoubling his resolve to fight to the last.Allowing a negotiated exit to exile in an African or South American country would not have precluded a subsequent ICC referral, but might have facilitated an early end to the violence currently ravaging Libya. Further, the same resolution that referred Libyan authorities to the ICC contained a specific exemption from ICC jurisdiction for foreign interveners not party to the Rome Statute, anticipating and providing impunity in some cases for civilian deaths that result from possible UN Security Council-authorised operations in Libya down the line.The ICC referral has been described as an attempt to incentivise those around Gaddafi to defect. Rather than vindicating international accountability, this logic of incentives suggests impunity for last-minute defectors notwithstanding decades of crimes against the Libyan population.At its most basic, the ICC referral represents the triumph of a set of international goals (vindicating a constrained conception of international accountability through the Libyan regime) over the immediate interest in an early resolution of the Libyan crisis through the provision of a regime exit strategy. This privileging of international over local interests is typical of external intervention and would only be exacerbated by options involving the use of force.Useful assistanceWe argue for forms of international assistance that reverse this privileging and begin from the known interests of Libyan civilians. At a minimum, resources must be mobilised to offer relief supplies to the Libyan population that is currently outside of the control of the regime (bearing in mind some of the problematic dynamics also associated with such forms of "aid").Urgent priority should be given to addressing shortages of medical supplies and provision of essential foods and clean water. Beyond these basics, an evacuation corridor for civilians – including non-Libyan African workers trapped in the territory – should be secured and responsibility for shouldering the burden of refugee flows should not be restricted to Tunisia and Egypt.To the contrary, rather than imposing these costs on Libya's poorest neighbors – in the early stages of transitions of their own – Libya’s relatively wealthy northern neighbors in Europe should be absorbing a much larger share of the costs, human and material, of offering refuge to fleeing civilians.The fact that the airlifting of Libyan and other African civilians to safety out of Tripoli is an option that is not currently on the table speaks eloquently to the misalignment of priorities. Dropping the xenophobic European rhetoric on the "dangers" of African immigration would also have the benefit of removing one of the Libyan regime's major levers with the EU.As Gaddafi threatens to terminate the agreements by which he has been warehousing African migrants at Europe's behest, he lays bare the cruel logic of tacit alliances (based on immigration, energy, and security interests) that has long lent support to his rule.A Europe willing to take concrete steps to facilitate the evacuation to its own shores of civilians who wish to leave Libyan territory regardless of nationality would at least have broken with its record of shameful complicity in regime brutality.Acting in solidarity with the Libyan people within a do-no-harm principle presents many constraints and frustratingly few options. This is not because of an absence of concern for the interests of the Libyan population but because there are few good options beyond the provision of relief supplies and evacuation channels.Support Libyan rebels?There may be other alternatives short of external coercive intervention that might be considered – such as sharing tactical intelligence with Libyan rebels or jamming regime communications – though such options would have to be carefully evaluated in light of potential risks.By contrast, overt and covert coercive options ranging from no-fly zones to arming Libyan rebels or using regional commandos to train them all implicate external actors in altering the balance on the ground in unpredictable ways.To engage in such coercive strategies without being able to evaluate the full range of consequences amounts to subordinating the interests of the Libyan people to our own sense of purpose and justice.We strongly advocate creative strategies of solidarity with the Libyan people while underscoring that calls for coercive external intervention do not qualify. Indeed, it is possible that demands for Western support to the rebels may already have done more harm than good.In the end, we argue for humility in imagining the role we might play in the course of Libyans' struggle. The international community is neither entitled to take the reins today nor dictate the post-regime scenario tomorrow. Further, those of us who wish to stand in solidarity with Libyans from outside of their country must recognise that we may not be best placed to identify which local actors enjoy broad-based support.Solidarity cannot be reduced to the diplomatic politics of recognition nor to arguments for external intervention.In the end, we counsel acting from the outside only when our actions are clearly aligned with the interests of Libyan civilians. Imaginative strategies to offer much-needed relief and refuge to Libya’s vulnerable population represent a challenge the international community has yet to meet. That is a good starting point for transnational solidarity.Asli Ü. Bâli is a professor of law at the UCLA School of Law. Her research interests also include comparative law of the Middle East.Ziad Abu-Rish is a doctoral candidate in UCLA's Department of History. He is the co-editor of Jadaliyya Ezine.  The  article above first appeared on Jadaliyya.The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

分析奥巴马的当选演说。 “如果还有人对奥巴马的演说才能将信将疑，还有人怀疑一场草根性的群众运动在中产阶级的美国能否真正成功，还有人对激情和希望所能激发的巨大能量怀抱狐疑，……”

历史上南朝士族专政，士族阶层也主导了各文化领域的创造和发展。南朝士族普遍信仰佛教，在佛教文化建设方面倾注巨大力量。南朝士族佛教形成一些鲜明特色：多有高门人士出家为僧尼；士族阶层积极参与义学讲论和佛学著述；士族家族盛建塔寺和造像，热衷奉佛实践；这一阶层信仰心特别诚挚与热烈。这样，南朝士族所创造的佛教文化丰富多彩，具有重大价值，也为隋唐时期的佛教和佛教文化大发展奠定了基础。

哲学的新方向