在1986年雷克亚未克峰会(Reykjavik summit)上，核武器并不是唯一的议题。美国总统罗纳德•里根和苏联领导人米哈伊尔•戈尔巴乔夫讨论的多个问题，从人权问题到苏联入侵阿富汗问题等，都有涉及。然而，核武器仍是那场谈话的核心。直到今天，提起那次峰会，人们还会想起，当时的两国领导人差一点就同意了在十年内消除各自的核武器。
二十年后，当奥巴马总统在莫斯科会晤俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫和总理普京时，议程仍然很满，所涉及的问题从阿富汗困局到俄罗斯卫星国的地位等多个方面。然而，考虑到奥巴马政府正在寻求完全“重启”美俄关系，在核武器问题上的进展必须仍是最优先的政治选择。
最近数月，裁军和不扩散问题的政治环境已经改变。两国都原则上同意将为实现无核世界而努力。旨在创建一个新的裁军机制，以取代将要到期的《消减战略武器条约》的对话正在顺利进行。多年以来，美俄双方有可能首次完全履行不扩散条约中的裁军义务。
从一般意义上来讲，增进美俄合作有利于解决一系列问题。但是，除了核武器外的任何其他问题都不会如此依赖美俄的合作。俄罗斯和美国的核武器占世界核武器总量的90%。如果美俄双方不能达成坚定和大胆的协定，必定不会有核裁军的发生，维护和巩固不扩散条约也是空谈。事情就是这么简单。
有些人可能会说，军控条约是冷战的遗产，但是，我们要知道，新的条约将会有助于定义未来。《消减战略武器条约》的替代者不一定是关于“控制”，而是应该更加关注“合作”。二十年来，美俄的核武器的战略目标也在逐步演进。两国不再是大洋两岸的对手，不再以相互确保摧毁对方相威胁。双方可以把裁军作为一种合作性的全球行动，而这种行动对双方都有好处。
如果在12月份没有一个新的机制来取代《消减战略武器条约》，那么就将没有一个双方同意的法律机制来控制美俄双方的核武器了。相比于削减自身的核武器，这将给美国带来更大的代价与危险。尽管2002年的《莫斯科条约》仍将继续有效，但是作为《消减战略武器条约》的替代还是不够，因为它不包括验证机制，很容易被双方忽略。裁军是一项非常复杂的实践工作。如果没有正式的条约，裁军就不会进行。不确定性将滋生不信任，美俄双方现在对这种不信任都承受不起。没有正式的协定，未必就会导致新的军备竞赛，但是这种（导致军备竞赛的）可能性本身就足以使得许多其他问题更加难以解决。
新的双边军控承诺，将有利于巩固全球的核不扩散机制。随着2010年不扩散条约审议大会的临近，无核国家希望看到美俄在履行自身的裁军义务上取得实质进展。过去美俄都不愿履行这些义务，使得旨在维护条约的执行条款以及增强国际原子能机构的监督能力的种种外交努力都受到很大困扰。如果现在我们在裁军方面采取具体的步骤，将会有利于我们在上述两项及其他不扩散工作（包括那些可能直接影响某些国家，如伊朗获得核能力的工作）方面取得进展。在核裁军上面的进展，也将为俄美在防止流氓国家导弹威胁方面进行合作创造条件。
美国还有许多重要的不扩散和安全目标需要俄罗斯给予全面的支持与合作。美俄如能在军控问题上取得进展，将会促进这种支持和合作。《Nunn-Lugar通过合作减少威胁计划》仍在有效运作，这降低了核原料扩散的风险。两国通过在全球监督和拦截可疑货运的方式，在防止核恐怖主义方面进行了良好合作，这对各方都很有好处。美俄可以考虑继续扩展这种合作，对旨在支持暴力极端组织从而威胁到美俄双方利益的贩毒和轻武器交易活动，也进行监督和拦截。
今年2月，我们签署了一个由“美国安全合作组织”(Partnership for a Secure America)起草的两党声明，提出了一个增进美俄关系的路线图。在其中列出的6个步骤中，只有一个涉及到限制双方各自的核武器问题。事情就该如此。核武器是两国共同历史的一部分，在未来不应该成为两国关系的决定性因素。现在是跨越冷战的时候了，美俄需要建立坚定的承诺，减少和消除核武器这个冷战最具危险性的后遗症。奥巴马访问俄罗斯是这个进程的下一步，但不会是最后一步。
作者简介:
詹姆斯•柯林斯(James Collins)曾于1997-2001年任美国驻俄罗斯大使。杰克•马洛卡(Jack Matlock)曾于1987-1991年任美国驻苏联大使。
Nuclear weapons were not the only item on the agenda at the pivotal 1986 Reykjavik summit. U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev discussed issues ranging from human rights to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But understandably, nuclear weapons were at the heart of the talks, and today, the summit is mainly remembered for how the two leaders came within a hair's breadth of agreeing to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within 10 years.
Two decades later, as U.S. President Barack Obama meets in Moscow with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the agenda is similarly crowded, with concerns ranging from logistics in Afghanistan to the status of Russia's satellite states. But as the Obama administration seeks a complete reset of the U.S.-Russia relationship, progress on nuclear weapons must still be the top priority.
The political environment on disarmament and nonproliferation has changed drastically in recent months. Both countries have agreed in principle to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Talks to create a disarmament mechanism to replace the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are well underway. For the first time in many years, it seems likely that the United States and Russia will make dramatic moves toward fulfilling their Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) disarmament obligations.
Improved U.S.-Russian cooperation would be generally beneficial on a range of problems. But on no other issue does so much depend on the agreements reached by just two countries. Combined, the United States and Russia account for more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. If the two countries do not come to a strong and bold new agreement, then there will be no disarmament. Nor will there be any real chance to preserve and strengthen the NPT. It is that simple.
Some will say that arms-control treaties are relics of the Cold War, but a new agreement can help us define the future. The successor to START need not be about control, but instead can focus on collaboration. The strategic purpose of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals has evolved over the last two decades. The two countries no longer stand unblinking on opposite sides of the ocean, facing each other down with the threat of mutually assured destruction. Today, both sides can approach disarmament as a cooperative global exercise with mutually beneficial outcomes.
If START expires in December without a successor, there will be no agreed legal mechanism for controlling nuclear arsenals on both sides. This would be far more costly and dangerous for the United States than any cuts in its own nuclear arsenal. The 2002 Treaty of Moscow (SORT) will remain in force, but it is not an adequate replacement since it has no verification mechanisms and can be easily ignored by both parties. Disarmament is an exercise that is too complicated to occur on its own without a formal agreement. Uncertainty breeds mistrust, which neither the United States nor Russia can afford right now. The absence of a formal agreement may not result in a new arms race, but even the specter of such a possibility is enough to make achieving other goals that much more difficult.
A renewed bilateral commitment to arms control will also help advance the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. With the NPT Review Conference approaching in 2010, states that don't possess nuclear weapons are looking for the United States and Russia to demonstrate meaningful progress on their disarmament obligations. The reluctance of the United States and Russia to do so in the past has hindered diplomatic efforts to strengthen the treaty's enforcement provisions and increase the monitoring capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Taking concrete steps on disarmament now will help us to move forward on these and other critical nonproliferation tasks, including those that will directly affect the ability of countries such as Iran to achieve nuclear weapons capability. Progress on nuclear disarmament should also create the conditions for U.S.-Russian cooperation on a joint system to defend against rogue missile threats.
The United States has many other critical nonproliferation and security objectives that require the full cooperation and support of Russia, and that will be advanced by progress with Russia on arms control. The highly successful "Nunn-Lugar" Cooperative Threat Reduction programs steadily continue to reduce the possibility of nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands. The two countries already work closely on preventing nuclear terrorism by monitoring and intercepting suspect cargo around the world, a program that can be expanded to the benefit of all. The United States and Russia can extend that cooperation to include countering drugs and small-arms trade that supports violent extremist groups and poses threats to both countries.
In February, we signed a bipartisan statement from the Partnership for a Secure America that laid out a road map for improving the relationship between the United States and Russia. Of the six steps we listed, only one involved curbing the two countries' respective nuclear arsenals. And that is how it should be. Nuclear weapons are a part of the shared history of the two countries, but they should not be the dominant factor in our collective future. It is time to move beyond the Cold War with a firm commitment to reduce and eliminate its most dangerous legacy. President Obama's visit to Moscow is the next step in that process, but hardly the last.
二十年后，当奥巴马总统在莫斯科会晤俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫和总理普京时，议程仍然很满，所涉及的问题从阿富汗困局到俄罗斯卫星国的地位等多个方面。然而，考虑到奥巴马政府正在寻求完全“重启”美俄关系，在核武器问题上的进展必须仍是最优先的政治选择。
最近数月，裁军和不扩散问题的政治环境已经改变。两国都原则上同意将为实现无核世界而努力。旨在创建一个新的裁军机制，以取代将要到期的《消减战略武器条约》的对话正在顺利进行。多年以来，美俄双方有可能首次完全履行不扩散条约中的裁军义务。
从一般意义上来讲，增进美俄合作有利于解决一系列问题。但是，除了核武器外的任何其他问题都不会如此依赖美俄的合作。俄罗斯和美国的核武器占世界核武器总量的90%。如果美俄双方不能达成坚定和大胆的协定，必定不会有核裁军的发生，维护和巩固不扩散条约也是空谈。事情就是这么简单。
有些人可能会说，军控条约是冷战的遗产，但是，我们要知道，新的条约将会有助于定义未来。《消减战略武器条约》的替代者不一定是关于“控制”，而是应该更加关注“合作”。二十年来，美俄的核武器的战略目标也在逐步演进。两国不再是大洋两岸的对手，不再以相互确保摧毁对方相威胁。双方可以把裁军作为一种合作性的全球行动，而这种行动对双方都有好处。
如果在12月份没有一个新的机制来取代《消减战略武器条约》，那么就将没有一个双方同意的法律机制来控制美俄双方的核武器了。相比于削减自身的核武器，这将给美国带来更大的代价与危险。尽管2002年的《莫斯科条约》仍将继续有效，但是作为《消减战略武器条约》的替代还是不够，因为它不包括验证机制，很容易被双方忽略。裁军是一项非常复杂的实践工作。如果没有正式的条约，裁军就不会进行。不确定性将滋生不信任，美俄双方现在对这种不信任都承受不起。没有正式的协定，未必就会导致新的军备竞赛，但是这种（导致军备竞赛的）可能性本身就足以使得许多其他问题更加难以解决。
新的双边军控承诺，将有利于巩固全球的核不扩散机制。随着2010年不扩散条约审议大会的临近，无核国家希望看到美俄在履行自身的裁军义务上取得实质进展。过去美俄都不愿履行这些义务，使得旨在维护条约的执行条款以及增强国际原子能机构的监督能力的种种外交努力都受到很大困扰。如果现在我们在裁军方面采取具体的步骤，将会有利于我们在上述两项及其他不扩散工作（包括那些可能直接影响某些国家，如伊朗获得核能力的工作）方面取得进展。在核裁军上面的进展，也将为俄美在防止流氓国家导弹威胁方面进行合作创造条件。
美国还有许多重要的不扩散和安全目标需要俄罗斯给予全面的支持与合作。美俄如能在军控问题上取得进展，将会促进这种支持和合作。《Nunn-Lugar通过合作减少威胁计划》仍在有效运作，这降低了核原料扩散的风险。两国通过在全球监督和拦截可疑货运的方式，在防止核恐怖主义方面进行了良好合作，这对各方都很有好处。美俄可以考虑继续扩展这种合作，对旨在支持暴力极端组织从而威胁到美俄双方利益的贩毒和轻武器交易活动，也进行监督和拦截。
今年2月，我们签署了一个由“美国安全合作组织”(Partnership for a Secure America)起草的两党声明，提出了一个增进美俄关系的路线图。在其中列出的6个步骤中，只有一个涉及到限制双方各自的核武器问题。事情就该如此。核武器是两国共同历史的一部分，在未来不应该成为两国关系的决定性因素。现在是跨越冷战的时候了，美俄需要建立坚定的承诺，减少和消除核武器这个冷战最具危险性的后遗症。奥巴马访问俄罗斯是这个进程的下一步，但不会是最后一步。
作者简介:
詹姆斯•柯林斯(James Collins)曾于1997-2001年任美国驻俄罗斯大使。杰克•马洛卡(Jack Matlock)曾于1987-1991年任美国驻苏联大使。
Nuclear weapons were not the only item on the agenda at the pivotal 1986 Reykjavik summit. U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev discussed issues ranging from human rights to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But understandably, nuclear weapons were at the heart of the talks, and today, the summit is mainly remembered for how the two leaders came within a hair's breadth of agreeing to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within 10 years.
Two decades later, as U.S. President Barack Obama meets in Moscow with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the agenda is similarly crowded, with concerns ranging from logistics in Afghanistan to the status of Russia's satellite states. But as the Obama administration seeks a complete reset of the U.S.-Russia relationship, progress on nuclear weapons must still be the top priority.
The political environment on disarmament and nonproliferation has changed drastically in recent months. Both countries have agreed in principle to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Talks to create a disarmament mechanism to replace the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are well underway. For the first time in many years, it seems likely that the United States and Russia will make dramatic moves toward fulfilling their Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) disarmament obligations.
Improved U.S.-Russian cooperation would be generally beneficial on a range of problems. But on no other issue does so much depend on the agreements reached by just two countries. Combined, the United States and Russia account for more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. If the two countries do not come to a strong and bold new agreement, then there will be no disarmament. Nor will there be any real chance to preserve and strengthen the NPT. It is that simple.
Some will say that arms-control treaties are relics of the Cold War, but a new agreement can help us define the future. The successor to START need not be about control, but instead can focus on collaboration. The strategic purpose of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals has evolved over the last two decades. The two countries no longer stand unblinking on opposite sides of the ocean, facing each other down with the threat of mutually assured destruction. Today, both sides can approach disarmament as a cooperative global exercise with mutually beneficial outcomes.
If START expires in December without a successor, there will be no agreed legal mechanism for controlling nuclear arsenals on both sides. This would be far more costly and dangerous for the United States than any cuts in its own nuclear arsenal. The 2002 Treaty of Moscow (SORT) will remain in force, but it is not an adequate replacement since it has no verification mechanisms and can be easily ignored by both parties. Disarmament is an exercise that is too complicated to occur on its own without a formal agreement. Uncertainty breeds mistrust, which neither the United States nor Russia can afford right now. The absence of a formal agreement may not result in a new arms race, but even the specter of such a possibility is enough to make achieving other goals that much more difficult.
A renewed bilateral commitment to arms control will also help advance the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. With the NPT Review Conference approaching in 2010, states that don't possess nuclear weapons are looking for the United States and Russia to demonstrate meaningful progress on their disarmament obligations. The reluctance of the United States and Russia to do so in the past has hindered diplomatic efforts to strengthen the treaty's enforcement provisions and increase the monitoring capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Taking concrete steps on disarmament now will help us to move forward on these and other critical nonproliferation tasks, including those that will directly affect the ability of countries such as Iran to achieve nuclear weapons capability. Progress on nuclear disarmament should also create the conditions for U.S.-Russian cooperation on a joint system to defend against rogue missile threats.
The United States has many other critical nonproliferation and security objectives that require the full cooperation and support of Russia, and that will be advanced by progress with Russia on arms control. The highly successful "Nunn-Lugar" Cooperative Threat Reduction programs steadily continue to reduce the possibility of nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands. The two countries already work closely on preventing nuclear terrorism by monitoring and intercepting suspect cargo around the world, a program that can be expanded to the benefit of all. The United States and Russia can extend that cooperation to include countering drugs and small-arms trade that supports violent extremist groups and poses threats to both countries.
In February, we signed a bipartisan statement from the Partnership for a Secure America that laid out a road map for improving the relationship between the United States and Russia. Of the six steps we listed, only one involved curbing the two countries' respective nuclear arsenals. And that is how it should be. Nuclear weapons are a part of the shared history of the two countries, but they should not be the dominant factor in our collective future. It is time to move beyond the Cold War with a firm commitment to reduce and eliminate its most dangerous legacy. President Obama's visit to Moscow is the next step in that process, but hardly the last.
请您支持独立网站发展，转载请注明文章链接：
- 文章地址: http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/c10/1629
- 引用通告: http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/trackback.php/1629
