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东京电力公司为全球最大民营核供应商

关于古代希腊与罗马的法律，有一种流行的见解，谓前者有法律而无法律的技术，后者有法律的技术但是没有哲学。

大型水坝是人类工业文明的标志。经过近百年的发展，多数发达国家已经进入后大坝时代，对筑坝的生态环境和社会负面影响进行深刻反思，在此背景下国际反坝运动蓬勃发展。本文考察了国际反坝运动的发展过程，剖析了其局限性和合理性及其对发达国家和发展中国家不同的含义，并提出我国在水坝和水电发展政策及决策机制方面进行调整的思路。

很多人注意到，中华人民共和国作为一个现代民族国家和清帝国之间在疆界上具有极大的承袭关系。这就要求在一个复杂的转化过程中讨论“帝国”与“民族国家”的关系问题以及由此涉及到“国家”和“地方”的关系问题，而“地方文化”如果要避免在全球化过程中最终沦为消费奇观，则必须加入到这一复杂关系的辩论中。

《列夫·托尔斯泰传》，［俄］什克洛夫斯基著，安国梁等译，海燕出版社2005年5月第一版，55.00元 今年11月7日（俄历）是俄罗斯伟大作家列夫·托尔斯泰百年忌辰。百年，有多少国王总统、文臣武将、风云人物随着墓草的荣枯而被遗忘。托尔斯泰却以其脍炙人口的作品，以其为社会正义探索、奋斗的一生赢得了千百万民众今昔不废、始终如一的爱戴。时间没有冲淡人们对他的怀念和尊敬。    列夫·托尔斯泰的大部分作品已在中国国内广泛传播，这大大激发了中国读者追寻作家生活的足迹、了解作家生平的强烈愿望。莫德、罗曼·罗兰及不少俄国作家的托尔斯泰传记相继在国内出版。但是，出自形式主义奠基人之一的什克洛夫斯基手笔的《列夫·托尔斯泰传》虽曾引起国内俄罗斯文学专家如陈燊等先生的关注，但译界却少人问津，无人迻译。笔者不揣谫陋，在上世纪八十年代把它译出，几年前，在河南海燕出版社的支持下得以付梓问世，得以流传。    该传的传主是享誉世界的文学泰斗，该书作者是蜚声全球的批评巨擘。以批评巨擘的身份来写文学泰斗的传记，不仅为这一传记提供了独特的视角，而且保证了它在众多的同类著作中不容忽视、不可替代的作用。    要再现列夫·托尔斯泰漫长而充满矛盾的一生，免不了采用传主及其亲友、熟人或偶尔邂逅者的回忆录、日记、书信等材料。什克洛夫斯基却提出了忠告，劝人在利用这些材料时"得极端小心谨慎"（P330），在他看来，每个人都有一个"此时此刻"（P13），而处于各种人际关系中的个人在对同一件事的应激反应中，必不可免地或正或反地染上对方的思想色彩和光晕。对此他在传记中作了精辟的分析，大量的引证。谈到日记，作者认为，"日记常常是为他人阅读而写作"（P330）。托尔斯泰曾这样承认："这本小本子里所写的一切几乎都是谎言--虚伪。她这时会站在我背后读日记的想法妨碍和破坏了我的真实。"（P334）在另一处，托尔斯泰还说："应当附记一笔，我为她--她将会读这些日记--写的东西倒不是不真实，然而是从许多事物中挑选出来的，如果只是为了我个人，我不会这样写。"（P319）托尔斯泰在遗嘱里要求销毁他早年的生活日记，原因是他当日的生活日记像是旧学校的记过簿，没能全面反映出他当时所作的紧张而有效的思想探索，因而，"这些日记将产生虚假的片面的印象"（P685）。书信也不见得件件可靠。作者断言："在书信里，人常常不由自主地隐瞒自己的情况，不让收信人知道。给不同的人的信件各各不同地涂抹上一层收信人的色彩。"（P642）或者相反："人们写信的目的有时不仅为了让收信人看，而且也为了在邮局中被人拆开、偷看，为了拿信来做幌子。"（P299）回忆录有时则更不靠谱。回忆往往因不同的情势而变得前后不一，甚至矛盾悖违："人似乎本身就存在着矛盾，回忆也往往方枘圆凿，因为次次回忆都有一个此时此刻。"（P13）    《列夫·托尔斯泰传》根据这样的观点作了大量的辨伪求真的工作。过去曾广泛流传：《安娜·卡列尼娜》第四部第13节列文和吉提相恋时以句中每个词的第一个字母暗示整句内容让对方猜度回答的经典场面是列夫·托尔斯泰和索菲娅·安德列耶夫娜相恋时真实情景的诗意再现。托尔斯泰的妻子和妻妹在她们的日记和回忆录中言之凿凿，不容置喙。但是什克洛夫斯基指出，她们的日记和回忆录实际都是事后根据小说所作的补正性回忆。事实却如托尔斯泰在1862年8月28日的日记中所说的那样，他只是"徒劳地给索菲娅写了许多字母"（P317），因而，9月9日，即书写字母11天之后，不得不在给未婚妻的没有发出的书简中来解释这些字母的真实含义。她们还为《战争与和平》中的娜塔莎、《安娜·卡列尼娜》中的吉提写的是谁而争论不休，托尔斯泰则说，他的作品中的人物不是哪一个人，他宣称："要是我的整个著作在于为人写照，让人探询，使人追忆，那么，我会羞于把它付梓问世的。"（P360）传记也驳斥了《活尸》是当时发生的吉密尔案的再现。经过什克洛夫斯基这样严格的甄别，经过如此正本清源的梳理，这样进入传记中的材料，应该说是经得住任何检验的。什克洛夫相当自信而且不无自豪地在传记的序言中指出："书中任何地方都没有偏离事实。"（P3）    确保材料的真实性是必需的，但是远远不够。写出一部托翁的真实而出色的传记，还有更多更高的要求。什克洛夫斯基认为，托尔斯泰是"人类历史上的伟人之一"（P7），他"生在一个历史的伟大交接点上。他不了解未来，然而又明白今日已不同于往昔，他属于往昔，没有未来，然而又强烈渴望着未来"（P11-12）因而他不能不是"一位探索者"（P74）。    要写出这样一位"由他的时代创造和诞生的矛盾人物"（P155）的托尔斯泰的真实面貌，绝不能把他与时代、与生活割裂开来。因而，什克洛夫斯基反对托翁传记中的两种写作倾向。他反对"把传记写成一个人仿佛一辈子在走廊里漫步，看到的只是本人在墙上的影子"（P286），也反对把传记写成"一个人只是生活在家中四壁之内，看到的只是他的几个亲人"（P286）。脱离历史发展进程，脱离艰难而生动的生活潮流，就剥夺了托尔斯泰思想发展的动力，就剥夺了托尔斯泰的精神和灵魂的可能的发展。    在什克洛夫斯基笔下，托尔斯泰是一位面对艰难时代"企图在生活中为自己找到真正的位子"（P74），寻找生活目的，寻找整个人类新的可能的生活制度（P127）的人。探索、寻找是艰难的。否定不易，同意又不可能。他彷徨，苦恼，甚至因生活毫无出路而绝望。但是，追求中的颠踬并没使他停止追求的脚步。他在日记中总结自己生活的体验时说，没有谬误，没有悔恨，没有迷乱，就能为自己安排一个幸福而舒适的安乐窝是不可能的，正如不锻炼而想成为健康的人一样不可能。在给姑母的信中，他更把它上升为一种生活的哲理："追求，迷误，开始，抛开，再开始，再抛开，永不懈怠地从事斗争和忍受损失"（P298）。    作为"探索者"，他青年时代追寻而暂时没有找到目的时的生活充满了负面因素，五光十色，一片混乱。他常常彻夜赌博，一掷千金，债台高筑，不得不出卖祖产。他放荡不羁，花天酒地，寻欢作乐，挥洒着青春弥漫的精力。他怀疑苦闷，悲观失望，懒散怠惰，在无所事事中打发日子。然而，他又频频拟定计划，潜心阅读，热心工作，扪心自问，引咎自责，想在自我完善中去完善世界。他时而在农村进行农业改革，设计脱粒机，设计保暖、干净的农舍，改良家畜；时而幻想成家，找到生活中的另一半；最后，他远赴边疆，以志愿兵的身份在高加索为沙皇与车臣人作战......    面对传主这种混乱散漫的生活，什克洛夫斯基指出："必须根据他怎样纠正错误，怎样理解错误，而不是根据他的错误来评判他。"（P72）在作者看来，过正直、善的生活，为此而上下求索、至死靡它的决心和勇气，是传主这一时期生活中的最大亮点。因而，高加索时期的托尔斯泰同时还体验到了精神的昂扬高涨，从事着顽强而不间断的工作，卓有成效而成为一个才华横溢的人。骚动中的前进才是托尔斯泰这时生活的本质。正是托尔斯泰从动荡不安的生活中长时间地、逐步地并最终领悟了生活的真谛、生命的真谛。他宣布："我爱真理甚于人世的一切。"（P669）他深信，"真正的幸福在于自我牺牲，在于对他人行善"（P157），直至他辞世前的1910年11月7日的日记，他仍坚定地宣称："做那应当做的，成败得失在所不计......一切为了他人的幸福，主要为了我的幸福。"（P722）他"希望能对人们的幸福和利益发生一种重大的影响"（P159），他明确提出"废除土地私有的社会制度"是"俄国民族的世界性任务"（P303）。他深感自己周遭的一切与自己的追求是那样的相左，因而是那样的恶劣，那样的疯狂！生活毫无希望，前途无比黯淡，他不由一再呐喊："再也不能这样生活下去了"（P493,604等）！他不能不和它决裂。1880年前后，《忏悔录》的写作，意味着他思想立场的转折，他成了宗法农民的代言人。    这种思想的巨大转变，使他在社会生活中具有了一种很特殊的地位：    对于自己人，他成了外人；    而对于外人，他却成了自己人。（P232）    托尔斯泰的创作是与他的思想探索、与他上述的那种"特殊的地位"同步的。他的作品不单是他思想探索的反映，而且也是他思想探索的形式和结晶，他的创作就是他的思想探索。托尔斯泰生前，曾对正在为他撰写传记的比留科夫说，应该把他的"文艺作品作为传记素材予以注意"（P642）。托尔斯泰这个一向不太为人注意的建议在什克洛夫斯基的笔下得到了前所未有的重视，得到了极充分的实践。    什克洛夫斯基"以灵活自由的叙事方式"（P330）游走在托尔斯泰的写作生活和非写作生活之间，把学习、从军、办校、写作、赈灾、上书、抗议等一系列重大事件，组织成了托尔斯泰复杂、矛盾、多彩的人生，伴随着传主这些活动的则是展开的精神探索和心路历程。传记作家力求赋予托尔斯泰的每个重大行为以心理说明和精神支持。托尔斯泰由此成为一个真实的活生生的人，并从什克洛夫斯基的传记中亲切地向我们走来。《列夫·托尔斯泰传》是托尔斯泰的生活史，也是他的精神发展史，两者的完美结合使其他托尔斯泰传记无法与它一争高下。  

当前大部分关于地缘政治的讨论，均设想我们只能在单边主义和多边主义这两种维持全球秩序的策略之间作出抉择。

David Fincher’s The Social Network, which tells the story of Facebook, is fast and intelligent and mean, a sort of screwball comedy without the laughs. It’s written by Aaron Sorkin, whose credits include The West Wing and A Few Good Men, and based on a novelised history by Ben Mezrich, The Accidental Billionaires. As long as it stays with the details of its tale – the faces, the clothes, the dialogue, the rooms, the parties, the sleek restaurants – the movie seems both restrained and sure-footed, willing to leave the thinking and the conclusions to us. But its larger plot movements are strangely dedicated to an insistence on two intriguing but evasive fables. One says that genius needs humiliation to get it going: so much so that the humiliation may be more important than the genius, a nicely faux-democratic message. The other says you can only make real money, money beyond dreams as distinct from just a lot of ordinary money, if you don’t care about wealth at all. Genius doesn’t calculate, even when it’s a computational genius.The film’s best line appears in a long, intense, information-crowded conversation before the credits. Jesse Eisenberg as Mark Zuckerberg, a student at Harvard, is sitting in a bar with a girl from the far less classy Boston University and boasting about his implausible chances of getting into one of Harvard’s fancy and exclusive social clubs. Once he’s in, he says, he’ll be able to introduce her to a better class of people than the ones she knows. For some reason the girl, Erica Albright, played by Rooney Mara, doesn’t take kindly to this suggestion, and the mood goes from lousy to worse. Finally she gets up and leaves, telling him that he will go through life believing that people don’t like him because he’s a nerd. This won’t be true. They won’t like him because he’s an asshole.Zuckerberg trots back to his dorm room and proves by inventing Facebook that Erica is absolutely right. No, that’s not quite the film’s line of argument, but it is largely what it shows us and a late attempt at a revision of Erica’s line lends it a weird retrospective authority. Just before the movie ends, a woman lawyer who has been present at the depositions regarding various suits against Zuckerberg and what he stole from or owed to whom, looks at our lonely hero, forlorn and with only his computer to befriend him, and says: ‘You know, you’re not really an asshole, you’re just trying so hard to be one.’ Then comes a truly mawkish moment. Zuckerberg hesitates, then types onto his Facebook page a version of the request that millions are now making and receiving every day: will Erica be his friend? No answer, film ends. Just as we’re wondering whether this little scene wouldn’t have been too soppy for David Selznick let alone David Fincher, a text crawls up the screen telling us how much Zuckerberg settled for: $65 million in one case, an ‘undisclosed amount’ in another. Facebook, the text informs us, is worth 26 billion. This is just a grand old American story after all. Nice guys finish last and assholes finish rich. If you’re feeling sentimental, you can ask the key, corny question. Yes, but are they happy?Of course a lot happens between Erica’s insult and this ending, and what humanises Zuckerberg in the movie is the possibility that he’s so angry not because Erica has upped and left him, but because she had the last word and she’s smarter than he is. He can’t have this. When he gets back to his room, he drops a few sexist and ethnic slurs about Erica onto his blog for all who care to see, toys with inventing a web-game where people – I mean male students – are invited to compare pictures of girls with pictures of animals, and then settles for devising another game called Facemash. This involves hacking into the records of the university’s residence halls, collecting photographs of all the female students, and putting them up on the screen in pairs. The game is really subtle. The guys just say which of the two girls is ‘hotter’, and chortle away. The game is so successful that before the night is over Harvard’s computer system has crashed and Zuckerberg is famous.Enter the Winklevoss brothers. These are two athletes, rowers, members of an elite that will never admit Zuckerberg even into its environs, who are looking for a programmer for an idea they have: a computer-based social network trading on the snob value of Harvard’s name, an extended electronic version, in other words, of the system Zuckerberg was describing to Erica. They contact Zuckerberg, who says he’ll work with them but does nothing but stall them for a month or two. Meanwhile he invents his own social network, and calls it The Facebook – later he drops the ‘the’. He and his friends, notably Eduardo Saverin, played by Andrew Garfield, who puts a little money into the venture, start to include other universities in the system, including places on the West Coast, and well before the end of the movie, the network has gone international. The Winklevoss brothers learn about it just after they have narrowly lost a race at Henley. Close but no cigar; just the news that the locals too have Facebook.Did Zuckerberg steal the Winklevosses’ idea? They think so, and the $65 million they received in the settlement suggests there was something ($65 million, to be precise) in the thought. Zuckerberg’s position is that he so transformed a lame, provincial project that he can’t possibly be taken as having nicked it: this would be like saying Shakespeare stole Macbeth from Holinshed, or Newton stole gravity from the apple. The case of Saverin is rather different. At the centre of the movie, with flashbacks radiating out from it, is the room where the depositions are being heard in the two cases. Saverin lent Facebook more and more money, and was CFO of the company. However, once Zuckerberg had met the charismatic Sean Parker (played by Justin Timberlake), and moved to California, Saverin was edged out, and the film pictures him as the model of East Coast caution trumped by West Coast cool. Parker is the real-life inventor of Napster, a music-piracy system whose failure did more damage to the recording industry than even its success could have done, and what Zuckerberg likes about him is not just his savoir-faire, the sort of fast style that makes the poshest Harvard club look like a garden party, but his sense of risk and the future. Saverin too is suing Zuckerberg, ostensibly for cheating him out of the continuing profits but in movie terms for betraying the only friend he has.The acting in the movie is quite wonderful, very disciplined and focused. Timberlake as Parker is charming, funny, reckless, even dangerous, but also nervous, an ex-nerd who hasn’t entirely forgotten his past. The film’s second-best moment, after Erica’s early line, comes when Parker announces at a party, as everything is being filmed, that soon all our lives will instantly be on the internet. Two minutes later the police burst into the apartment and take him off for snorting cocaine. Did somebody set him up? Saverin out of envy and revenge? Zuckerberg because he thought Parker was putting the company at risk?Garfield is good as Saverin: sympathetic, decent, but limited, and easily made to feel inferior, a nice guy who won’t finish last but won’t be near the front either. The triumph of the movie is Jesse Eisenberg as Zuckerberg. He manages that stolid, stubborn, stupid look that clever people often have, and when his expression changes, which is not often, we may think he is getting angry. But then Eisenberg’s closed manner robs us of any confidence that we can read any of his expressions. This is the whole trick of the performance. We can’t gauge the expression, yet our curiosity forces us to do something with a face that is held so long and so often in front of our eyes. So we keep guessing. Was that almost a smile, and if so, what did it mean? Contempt? Some milder form of amusement at the idiocy of others? Some of our guesses are irresistible, and might even be right. Zuckerberg’s social awkwardness, presumably real enough at one stage, has become a style, a mask, an aggressive pose. His confidence in his own intelligence, and his conviction that he owes nothing to anyone, least of all any sort of obligation to be nice to them, come across very clearly whatever expression is on his face, and his only weakness, it seems, is a defensive impatience: he just can’t afford to think anyone else has a mind that matters. He is a monster of sorts, and like all monsters, a mirror of something that humans want or need or fear. Certainly it’s as a monster that he is compelling, and that’s why the attempt to reduce him to a little boy lost, just a nerd after all, is so craven, a shameless reaching out for the Oscar-worthy stereotype.

这种关注文本的语言和由此构成的概念史研究方法是否可以运用于关于中国近代历史问题的讨论上呢？

80年代对“纯文学”的热烈想像与诉求与90年代对“纯文学”的反思与批判似乎构成了中国新时期文学一条充满悖论的内在逻辑线索。

Forget aid-people in the poorest countries like Haiti need new cities with different rules. And developed countries should be the ones that build themLacking electricity at home, students work under the dim lights of a parking lot at G'bessi Airport in Conakry, GuineaOn the first day of TEDGlobal, a conference for technology enthusiasts in Oxford in July 2009, a surprise guest was unveiled: Gordon Brown. He began his presentation with a striking photograph of a vulture watching over a starving Sudanese girl. The internet, he said, meant such shocking images circulated quickly around the world, helping to mobilise a new global community of aid donors. Brown's talk ended with a call to action: developed countries should give more aid to fight poverty.When disaster strikes-as in the recent Haiti earthquake-the prime minister is right. Even small amounts of aid can save many lives. The moral case for aid is compelling. But we must also remember that aid is just palliative care. It doesn't treat the underlying problems. As leaders like Rwandan president Paul Kagame have noted, it can even make these problems worse if it saps the innovation, ambition, confidence, and aspiration that ultimately helps poor countries grow.So, two days later, I opened my own TED talk with a different photo, one of African students doing their homework at night under streetlights. I hoped the image would provoke astonishment rather than guilt or pity-for how could it be that the 100-year-old technology for lighting homes was still not available for the students? I argued that the failure could be traced to weak or wrong rules. The right rules can harness self-interest and use it to reduce poverty. The wrong rules stifle this force or channel it in ways that harm society.The deeper problem, widely recognised but seldom addressed, is how to free people from bad rules. I floated a provocative idea. Instead of focusing on poor nations and how to change their rules, we should focus on poor people and how they can move somewhere with better rules. One way to do this is with dozens, perhaps hundreds, of new "charter cities," where developed countries frame the rules and hundreds of millions of poor families could become residents.How would such a city work? Imagine that a government in a poor country set aside a piece of uninhabited land. It invites a developed country to enter into a new type of partnership, in which the developed country sets up and enforces rules specified in a charter. Citizens from the poorer country, and the rest of the world, would be free to live and work in the city that emerges. It could create economic opportunities and encourage foreign investment, and by using uninhabited land it would ensure everyone living there would have chosen to do so with full knowledge of the rules. Roughly 3bn people, mostly the working poor, will move to cities over the next few decades. To my mind the choice is not whether the world will urbanise, but where and under which rules. Instead of expanding the slums in existing urban centres, new charter cities could provide safe, low-income housing and jobs that the world will need to accommodate this shift. Even more important, these cities could give poor people a chance to choose the rules they want to live and work under.To understand why rules are the way to harness self-interest, and why such new cities could work where old cities have not, look again at the example of electricity. We know from the developed world that it costs very little to light a home-on average, less than one US penny an hour for a 100-watt bulb. We also know that most poor people in Africa are not starving. They could afford some light. Africans do not lack electricity because they are too poor. Indeed, reliable power is so important for education, productivity and job creation that it would be more accurate to say that many in Africa are poor because they don't have electricity. So why don't they?Why the right rules matterConsider development the other way round. US customers have cheap electricity mostly because rules channel self-interest in the right way. Some protect investments made by utilities, others stop these companies abusing their monopoly power. With such rules, companies win; efficient providers make a profit. But customers win too; they get access to a vital resource at low cost. It's the absence of these rules that explains why many Africans don't have electricity at home. It might seem a simple insight, but it took economists a long time to understand it.In the 1950s and 1960s, economic models treated ideas as public goods, meaning that once one existed it was assumed to exist everywhere. Some ideas are like this-for example, the formula for oral rehydration therapy, the mixture of sugar, salt, and water, that stops children dying from diarrhoea. No one owns it and you can find it easily online. If all ideas were like this it would be easier for poor countries to grow. But they aren't: patents and other legal rules stop some ideas spreading, while others are just easy to keep secret.When I started graduate school in the late 1970s I was convinced economists underestimated the potential for new ideas to raise living standards. The body of work that grew out of my PhD thesis came to be called new growth theory, or post-neoclassical endogenous growth theory in Britain (when it was infamously taken up by new Labour in the mid-1990s). Initially I just wanted to understand how good ideas, like those which make cheap electric light possible, were discovered. But then another topic began to interest me: why didn't ideas common in some parts of the world spread to others?Put simply, some countries are better able to establish the type of rules that help good ideas spread, while others are trapped by bad rules that keep ideas out. The rules stopping cheap electricity, for instance, are not hard to identify. The threat of expropriation or political instability stops many western electricity companies moving into Africa. Those that do set up there can exploit their power as monopolists to charge excessive prices. Often they offer bribes to stop rules being enforced, or pay bribes themselves. Good rules would stop all this. So to unleash the potential of the marketplace, poor countries need to find a way to create good rules.The challenge in setting up good rules lies in solving what economists call "commitment" problems. How can a developing country promise to keep the rules that govern investment fair? Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling illustrates this problem with the example of a kidnapper who decides he wants to free his victim. But the kidnapper worries that the victim, once released, will go to the authorities. The victim, eager to be free, promises not to-but there is no way for him to guarantee he will keep quiet. As a result, the kidnapper is compelled to kill the victim, even though both would be better off if a binding agreement could be made. Poor countries face similar problems: their leaders cannot make credible commitments to would-be investors.Rich nations use well-functioning systems of courts, police and jails, developed over centuries, to solve such problems. Two people can make a commitment. If they don't follow through, the courts will punish them. But many developing countries are still working their way down the same arduous path. Their leaders can fight corruption and establish independent courts and better rules over property rights, but such moves often require unpopular measures to coerce and cajole populations, making internal reforms excruciatingly slow. Subsequent leaders may undo any commitments they make. A faster route would seem to be for a developed country to impose new rules by force, as they did in the colonial period. There is evidence that some former colonies are more successful today because of rules established during their occupations. Yet any economic benefits usually took a long time to show up, and rarely compensated for years of condescension and the violent opposition it provoked. Today, violent civil conflicts have led some countries to again consider military humanitarian intervention, but this can only be justified in extreme circumstances. My point was that there is a middle ground between slow internal reforms and risky attempts at recolonialisation: the charter city.There are large swathes of uninhabited land on the coast of sub-Saharan Africa that are too dry for agriculture. But a city can develop in even the driest locations, supported if necessary by desalinated and recycled water. And the new zone created need not be ruled directly from the developed partner country-residents of the charter city can administer the rules specified by their partner as long as the developed country retains the final say. This is what happens today in Mauritius, where the British Privy Council is still the court of final appeal in a judicial system staffed by Mauritians. Different cities could start with charters that differ in many ways. The common element would be that all residents would be there by choice-a Gallup survey found that 700m people around the world would be willing to move permanently to another country that offers safety and economic opportunity.I started thinking about city-scale special zones after writing a paper about Mauritius. At the time of its independence in 1968, economists were pessimistic about this small island nation's prospects. The population was growing rapidly, new jobs were scarce in its only real export industry (sugar), and high tariffs designed to protect small companies manufacturing for the domestic market meant no companies could profitably use their workers to manufacture goods for export. It was politically impossible to dismantle these barriers to trade, so policymakers did the next best thing: they created a special category of companies, ones said to be in a "special export zone." The zone didn't physically exist, in that these companies could locate anywhere on the island, but companies "inside" the zone operated under different rules. They faced no tariffs, or limits on imports or exports. Foreign companies in the zone could enter and exit freely, and keep profits they earned. Domestic companies could enter too. The only quid pro quo was that everyone in the zone had to produce only for export, so as not to compete with domestic firms. The zone was a dramatic success. Foreign businesses entered. Employment grew rapidly. The economy moved from agriculture to manufacturing. Once growth was underway, the government reduced trade barriers, freeing up the rest of the economy.The history of development is littered with failed examples of similar zones. Mauritius was unusual because it had low levels of crime and the government already provided good utilities and infrastructure. The zone only had to remove one bad form of governance: trade restrictions. Yet many developing countries still can't offer the basics, another reason why building new cities is an attractive option. Cities are just the right scale to offer basic conditions. So long as they can trade freely, even small cities are big enough to be self-sufficient. Yet because they are dense they require very little land.To apply the lessons from Mauritius in countries with pervasive problems, the key is to create zones with new rules that are big enough to be self-contained. Big enough, that is, to hold a city. Then let people decide whether to enter.When I returned to Mauritius in 2008, I outlined my ideas to Maurice Lam, head of the Mauritian Board of Investment. Maurice splits his time between Mauritius and Singapore. He and I knew that Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore, had experimented in the 1990s with a similar idea, establishing new cities that Singapore could help to run in China and Indonesia. These ran into difficulties because the local governments retained discretionary powers that they used to interfere after Singapore had made large investments in infrastructure. This convinced us that explicit treaties reassigning administrative control over land were needed. Maurice also said that countries in Africa would be open to this kind of arrangement. Some officials, eager to make a credible commitment to foreign investors, had already made informal inquiries about whether Mauritius would be willing to take administrative control over their special export zones.What could go wrong?Some economists have objected that a charter agreement between two countries will not necessarily solve the commitment problem that lies at the heart of development failures. The leaders of many countries enter into agreements, sometimes with the best intentions, that subsequent leaders or officials do not honour-as Lee Kuan Yew found to his cost. To guard against such an outcome, partners in a charter city must negotiate a formal treaty, like the one that gave the British rights in Hong Kong (see box, right). Under this arrangement the only way for the host country to renege on its commitment would be to invade. Even governments that resent having signed such agreements in the past almost always respect them. The Cubans hate the agreement that gave the US control of Guantánamo Bay, but learned to live with it.Another objection comes from those who study urbanisation. They point out that the location of most existing cities is determined by accidents of history or geography, and suggest, correctly, that there are geographical requirements for a city to survive. But they are surely wrong to think that all the good sites for cities are taken. Here distance matters, but it is not an insurmountable obstacle: Mauritius continues to develop despite its remote location. Flat land is cheaper to build on, but many cities have developed on hilly terrain. A river can provide fresh water and access to the sea, but with desalination, so too can any coastal location where a port could be built. Access to the sea is the only real necessity-as long as a charter city can ship goods back and forth on container ships, it can thrive even if its neighbours turn hostile or unstable. And there are thousands of largely uninhabited coastal locations on several continents that could qualify.Other urban economists fear new cities will repeat the unimpressive history of government-planned ones like Brasília, or Dubai's recent bust. But these are both extreme examples. The state was too intrusive in Brasília and almost non-existent in Dubai. Hong Kong is the middle ground, a state ruled by laws not men, but one that leaves competition and individual initiative to decide the details.The experience in Hong Kong offers two further lessons. The first is the importance of giving people a choice about the rules that govern them. Hong Kong was sparsely populated when the British took over. Unlike other colonial systems, almost everyone chose to come and live under the new system. This gave the rules proposed by the British a degree of legitimacy they never had in India, where the rules were imposed on often unwilling subjects. This is why building new cities, rather than taking over existing ones, is so powerful.The second lesson is the importance of getting the scale right. Most nations are too large to update all their rules and laws at once. The coercion needed to impose a new system on an existing population generates friction, no matter who is in charge. Leaders on mainland China understood this when they attempted to copy the successes of Hong Kong by gradually opening a few places, such as the new city of Shenzhen, near Hong Kong. Yet while nations are too big, towns and villages are too small. A village cannot capture the benefits that arise when millions of people live and work together under good rules. Cities offer the right scale for dramatic change.The demands of migrationAs billions of people urbanise in the coming decades, they can move to hundreds of new cities. The gains new cities can unleash are clear. Picture again the students studying under the streetlights. By themselves, political leaders in poor countries won't provide cheap, reliable electricity any time soon. They can't eliminate the political risk that holds back investment or ensure adequate regulatory controls. But working with a partner nation, they can establish a new city where millions of young people could pay pennies to be able to study at home. And as these cities seek out residents, the leaders and citizens in existing countries will face the most effective pressure for good governance-competition.We know from history that the competitive pressures created by migration can boost economic growth. But strong opposition to immigration in the world's richest economies prevents many people from moving to better systems of rules. Charter cities bring the good systems of rules to places that would welcome migrants. Indeed, charter cities offer the only viable path for substantial increases in global migration, bringing good rules to places that the world's poor can easily and legally access, while lessening the contentious political frictions that arise from traditional migration flows.Intelligently designed new cities can offer environmental benefits too, a point increasingly made by environmentalists like Stewart Brand (see p39.) For example, Indonesia emits greenhouse gases at a rate exceeded only by China and the US. This rate is partly due to logging practices in its rainforest, and efforts to clear land for palm-oil plantations and pulp-producing acacia trees. Brand has cited the experience of Panama to demonstrate the green potential of urbanisation: as people there left slash-and-burn agriculture for work in cities, forest regenerated on the land they left behind. Similar migration to new cities in places like Indonesia could do much to reduce carbon emissions from the developing world.Investment in charter cities could also make more effective the aid rich countries give. The British experience in Hong Kong shows that enforcing rules costs partners very little, but can have a huge effect. Because Hong Kong helped make reform in the rest of China possible, the British intervention there arguably did more to reduce world poverty than all the official aid programmes of the 20th century, and at a fraction of the cost. And, if many such cities are built, fewer people will be trapped in the failed states that are the root cause of most humanitarian crises and security concerns.There are many questions to be resolved before the first city is chartered. Is it better to have a group of rich nations, or a multinational body like the EU, play the role the British played in Hong Kong? How would such a city be governed? And how and when might transfer of control back to the host country be arranged? But as we begin to explore these questions, we must not lose sight of the fundamental insights that advocates of the free market underestimate. The win-win agreements that we see in well-functioning markets are possible only when there is a strong, credible government that can establish the rules. In places where these rules are not present, it could take centuries for locals to bootstrap themselves from bad rules to good. By creating new zones through partnerships at the national level, good rules can spread more quickly, and when they do, the benefits can be huge.The world's fortunate citizens must be able to provide assistance when disasters like the earthquake in Haiti strike, but we must also be wary of the practical and moral limits of aid. When the roles of benefactor and supplicant are institutionalised, both parties are diminished. In the case of Haiti, if nations in the region created just two charter cities, they could house the entire population of that country. Senegal has offered Haitians the opportunity to return to the home "of their ancestors." "If they come en masse we are ready to give them a region," a Senegal government spokesman said. Outside of the extraordinary circumstances of a crisis, the role of partner is better for everyone. And there are millions of people seeking partnerships around the world. Helping people build them successfully is the opportunity of the centuryHong Kong: the first charter city? Hong Kong was a successful example of a special zone that could serve as a model for charter cities. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was the only place in China where Chinese workers could enter partnerships with foreign workers and companies. Many of the Chinese who moved to Hong Kong started in low-skill jobs, making toys or sewing shirts. But over time their wages grew along with the skills that they gained working with educated managers, and using modern technologies and working practices.Over time they acquired the values and norms that sustain modern cities. As a result, Hong Kong enjoyed rapid economic growth-in 1960, the average income was around £2,500; by 1997, it was around £20,000.Even if it had wanted to, the Chinese government acting alone could not have offered this opportunity. The credibility of rules developed over centuries by the British government was essential in attracting the foreign investment, companies and skilled workers that let these low-skill immigrants lift themselves out of poverty. As in Mauritius, authority rested ultimately with the British governor general, but most of the police and civil servants were Chinese. And the benefits demonstrated in Hong Kong became a model for reform-minded leaders in China itself.

从1999年，国家邮政局开始着手修法，到2009年4月24日通过，《邮政法》的修改走过了10个年头。国务院从2006年开始，每年都将《邮政法》列入当年一类立法计划，全国人大法工委2006年就已着手调研，做好了迎接的准备，但由于各方分歧太大，国务院几次都未能提交全国人大。

我们这次利用交易所，不是为了做投机买卖，不是为了赚二百四十万英镑，今后也不做投机买卖。这次利用交易所是一种迂回的保护性措施，是为了使我们不吃亏或少吃亏。

关于“特区城市”的访谈，英文

日本新首相鸠山由纪夫抓紧时间和机会，迅速在国际外交舞台上亮相.

在所有不幸英年早逝的作曲大师里，舒伯特的早逝显然是最让人心痛的。他最后的作品里时时闪过天才的光芒，从中可以看到他有闯出一片新天地的气魄，直逼他敬重的贝多芬。莫扎特早逝当然也让人惋惜，好在他写出了那么多完美的杰作，从他全部作品来看，他似乎已经功德圆满，没有给人留下舒伯特那样的缺憾。说到这个话题，就不能不提到贝利尼。他的早逝不仅让美声歌剧爱好者心痛，也让所有乐迷心痛不已。他33岁写出的《清教徒》比起之前的《诺尔玛》又迈进了一大步，让人不免遐想，要是他能多活哪怕几年时间，也许他不仅能成为意大利最伟大的歌剧作曲家，甚至可能撼动整个世界歌剧版图，让意大利歌剧传统重振雄风。瓦格纳受贝利尼的影响也要比目前更深刻。一贝利尼相貌英俊，有金色的头发和湛蓝的双眸，典型的西西里人。可惜他33岁就英年早逝，死在了成功的顶峰、死在了浪漫主义运动的顶峰。贝利尼死于1835年9月23日，当时他借住在朋友租来的房子里，那座房子就在巴黎郊外的Puteaux村庄附近。他感染了阿米巴痢疾，时常发作，但医生一直没能作出恰当的诊断，当时的医疗水平也不足以治愈他的病。这年夏末，贝利尼就病倒了。那时他所有朋友都不在巴黎，而是和他一样到各处度假。大概八个月前，他的歌剧《清教徒》在巴黎取得轰动性成功，而仅仅几周前，贝利尼还意气风发地出现在社交场合，这也让他的死格外让人震惊。贝利尼死后立即成为一个传奇。那个时代的人们喜欢拿他与肖邦相比，同是风格独特、忧郁温柔的作曲家。当然这样的类比有时显得牵强，首先他们彼此的影响微乎其微，而两人都会时时表现出强悍一面。贝利尼作品不多，在所有音乐体裁里，他选择了歌剧，因为歌剧对有抱负的年轻意大利人敞开着大门。按当时的标准，贝利尼过于挑剔，平均一年才创作一部歌剧，而其他人要写三到四部。1828年6月14日，贝利尼这样写道：“按我的风格（作曲），我就不得不吐血。” 时常有人觉得贝利尼歌剧整体水平不平均。事实如此：拿他的杰作《诺尔玛》来说，里面也有不少平庸之处，只有《梦游女》比较平均，可惜其题材如今也不太时髦了。贝利尼非常擅长写既像说话又有歌唱性的乐段，据说他曾经向朋友阿戈斯蒂诺·加洛解释说，当他“用激情之火”朗诵出剧本中的语句时，旋律就自然而然产生了。《诺尔玛》中有一段波里昂（Pollione）唱出的卡巴莱塔“Me protegge，me difende”，音符与唱词的对应丝丝入扣，开头上升的音程和附点节奏，让人想到罗西尼在男中音唱段里惯用的手法，而波里昂恰好也是一个男中音角色。但贝利尼这段达到更强烈的效果。这部歌剧结尾还有一段咏叹调“Deh! Non volerli vittime”，颇有张力，尤其是重复段落和华彩段落，几乎带有压倒全剧般的旋律魅力和庄严气质。贝利尼歌剧，尤其是早期歌剧里的男性角色往往有非常多的装饰音。这与作品首演时选择的歌唱家息息相关。当贝利尼在为乔瓦尼·大卫（Giovanni David）和乔瓦尼·巴蒂斯塔·鲁比尼（Giovanni Battista Rubini）创作时，有时他往往会采用非常炫目的花腔写法，一旦他面对的是罗西尼歌剧里的男高音类型，也就出现了《比安卡与费尔南多》中的费尔南多、《梦游女》中的埃尔维诺，《海盗》里Gualtiero的某些唱段也有这个特点。不过在《清教徒》中，虽然阿图罗的角色也是为鲁比尼写的，但里面很少有装饰音。这在他后来为其他男高音创作的角色里则几乎全然不见踪迹。值得注意的是，贝利尼为鲁比尼和杜普雷兹等人创作的花腔绝对没有罗西尼的花腔那样大胆而复杂，作为弥补，贝利尼歌剧的花腔和宣叙调唱段的音域都达到了非常高的音区。不过最终是董尼采蒂定下了男高音高音音区，并且把这个做法传给了威尔第。男中音也有相似趋势。贝利尼在给坦布里尼（又一位罗西尼式的歌唱家）写的角色里，常常用到“fioriture”，写出灵巧的乐段，比如《比安卡与费尔南多》中的菲力帕、《海盗》里的埃尔内斯托、《清教徒》中的里卡尔多。不过，《外国人》里的Valdeburgo则保持着质朴本色。随着歌剧潮流发展，男声的花腔渐渐过时了，偶尔为了个别场景的戏剧效果才会出现。贝利尼歌剧的女声角色，主要是女高音，当然也与他职业生涯里接触到的女高音歌唱家有关系。这与那个时代的风气有关，那是一个歌颂女性的纯真和美德的时代。在意大利，人们采用装饰音歌唱来刻画理想的女性形象，把她们塑造成介于人与神之间的形象，比如贝利尼的《凯普莱特与蒙太古》中的朱莉埃塔、《梦游女》中的阿米娜、《清教徒》中的埃尔维拉。在《海盗》里的Imogene这样的女性身上也能看到纯真的色彩，即便是诺尔玛，她优美的唱段也能给人一种高贵的感觉。二1845年，沙皇尼古拉斯一世携王后亚历山大·菲奥多洛夫娜来到西西里疗养，同行的还有他们的女儿奥尔加公爵夫人和数不清的随从。他们住在帕勒摩附近漂亮的别墅里，一住就是一年。为了纪念沙皇这次轰动的拜访，帕勒摩出版了一本精美的图书，里面收录了几幅版画，其中包括这些尊贵客人的肖像画。人们还写了几片短小文章和大量热情的诗歌，当然还有数不清的音乐作品，比如《恢复健康》、“奥尔加圆舞曲”等。在这片歌颂的海洋中，出现了一首特殊的作品，那就是贝利尼在12岁时创作的《蝴蝶》。这首短小而感人的歌曲，是贝利尼为他的“木偶”剧院创作的。当然，贝利尼与沙皇这次轰动的访问毫无关系，那时他已经去世十年了。但人们唱起他的歌曲却那么自然，他的名望是家乡人的荣耀。在这个隆重时节唱起这支旋律，倒是典型的贝利尼本人喜欢的做法。它不仅表现在贝利尼的音乐风格里，也表现在贝利尼与外界的关系里。贝利尼的单纯质朴就像从他灵魂里流淌出来的音乐一样。他是那种生来就有特殊魅力的人，有着某种超乎凡尘的气质。贝利尼的旋律清新而甜美，早年的旋律更是纯真无瑕，伴奏往往极其简单。这样纤细的网络太容易破裂了。学者曾经争论过，到底贝利尼这样做是因为对音乐理论和对位法一无所知，还是刻意远离那些东西。贝利尼倒是曾经说过这样的话，“对位法对我有什么用呢？我想要做的就是丰富人们的耳朵，感动人们的心灵。”这番话当然证明不了什么。如果贝利尼在那不勒斯圣塞巴斯蒂安诺音乐学院学习时，没有上过一点和声与对位法的基础课程，那他是不可能顺利毕业的。一百多年里，贝利尼时不时被人遗忘，可总有机缘出现：当罗萨·庞塞拉（Rosa Ponselle）、玛丽亚·卡拉斯唱起《诺尔玛》，当《梦游女》、《清教徒》焕然一新出现在舞台上，大众的品味忽然转向，恰逢此时，贝利尼独特的艺术重燃生机。先是1920年代的热潮，接着是1950年代，到现在也许仍然在热潮之中。卡拉斯去世，其他卓越歌唱家纷纷退休，上面提到的三部歌剧，已经很少搬上舞台了，好在有录音，它让千万乐迷把这三部歌剧当做贝利尼艺术的精髓。有了录音技术，人们也能听到贝利尼其他几部早已被人遗忘的作品：《海盗》、《外国人》、《凯普莱特与蒙太古》、《扎伊拉》。后面两部作品曾经让贝利尼饱尝失败的苦涩。意大利人从未忘记贝利尼，哪怕是1890年代到1920年代，那时知识分子对贝利尼嗤之以鼻。今天贝利尼的头像还印在5000里拉钞票上。其他国家明眼的音乐爱好者深知，贝利尼是一位个性多么独特的作曲家，尽管作品为数不多，且绝大部分限于歌剧，但他的位置却格外重要。⊙容惠 编译

绿色电子产品排行榜显示了对全球各大手机和个人电脑制造商的环保指数排名。

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本文认为目前在改革理论和政策研讨中颇为流行的“循序渐进”概念并不能确切地说明体制转轨过程中的各种问题,因为各种体制之间是相互依存、相互制约的,不可能改好了一个再改下一个,否则会出现体制“不协调成本”。文章提出了“平行推进”的概念,作为改革政策制定的基本思路,它可以说明为什么在体制转轨过程中,某些体制的改革“超前”和“滞后”(瓶颈) ,都是无效率的。在所有领域(包括政治体制和社会政策)都同时积极推进改革,同时考虑各种体制之间在转轨过程当中(也就是在没有彻底完成改革之前) 的相互协调,应是体制改革的基本政策方法。

国际金融的动荡，使得一些大宗的初级产品变成了金融活动的避险品种，于是价格暴涨暴跌。半年左右，石油价格可以冲高至每桶140美元，也可跌落至40美元。

最近《伦敦书评》发表的一篇关于希特勒与德国上流社会关系的书评文章，以往人们只从社会政治和军事角度理解纳粹社会，但《第三帝国的上流社会》则分析了纳粹等级社会中的炫耀性豪华消费、名人聚会等等现象。