文章 - 笼中美国--为什么矫正监管600万人（英文）

为什么600万人在矫正监管correctional supervision下，监禁制度与奴隶制、监狱和种植园的类比，非洲裔青少年的被区别对待，监禁管理私营化、管理公司提醒董事会若法律修订影响犯人数量则影响盈利，每年狱内多达7万起强奸案而此事实被脱口秀消费，be just和be fair的区别，等等.文后附美国监禁制度的中文维基条目，该条目数字来源清晰。

The Caging of America
Why do we lock up so many people?by Adam GopnikI believe that very few men are capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and agony which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon the sufferers. . . . I hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse than any torture of the body: and because its ghastly signs and tokens are not so palpable to the eye and sense of touch as scars upon the flesh; because its wounds are not upon the surface, and it extorts few cries that human ears can hear; therefore I the more denounce it, as a secret punishment which slumbering humanity is not roused up to stay.
Our growth is generally dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to develop and manage new correctional and detention facilities. . . . The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction and sentencing practices or through the decriminalization of certain activities that are currently proscribed by our criminal laws. For instance, any changes with respect to drugs and controlled substances or illegal immigration could affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them.

A prison is a trap for catching time. Good reporting appears often about the inner life of the American prison, but the catch is that American prison life is mostly undramatic-the reported stories fail to grab us, because, for the most part, nothing happens. One day in the life of Ivan Denisovich is all you need to know about Ivan Denisovich, because the idea that anyone could live for a minute in such circumstances seems impossible; one day in the life of an American prison means much less, because the force of it is that one day typically stretches out for decades. It isn't the horror of the time at hand but the unimaginable sameness of the time ahead that makes prisons unendurable for their inmates. The inmates on death row in Texas are called men in "timeless time," because they alone aren't serving time: they aren't waiting out five years or a decade or a lifetime. The basic reality of American prisons is not that of the lock and key but that of the lock and clock.

That's why no one who has been inside a prison, if only for a day, can ever forget the feeling. Time stops. A note of attenuated panic, of watchful paranoia-anxiety and boredom and fear mixed into a kind of enveloping fog, covering the guards as much as the guarded. "Sometimes I think this whole world is one big prison yard, / Some of us are prisoners, some of us are guards," Dylan sings, and while it isn't strictly true-just ask the prisoners-it contains a truth: the guards are doing time, too. As a smart man once wrote after being locked up, the thing about jail is that there are bars on the windows and they won't let you out. This simple truth governs all the others. What prisoners try to convey to the free is how the presence of time as something being done to you, instead of something you do things with, alters the mind at every moment. For American prisoners, huge numbers of whom are serving sentences much longer than those given for similar crimes anywhere else in the civilized world-Texas alone has sentenced more than four hundred teen-agers to life imprisonment-time becomes in every sense this thing you serve.

For most privileged, professional people, the experience of confinement is a mere brush, encountered after a kid's arrest, say. For a great many poor people in America, particularly poor black men, prison is a destination that braids through an ordinary life, much as high school and college do for rich white ones. More than half of all black men without a high-school diploma go to prison at some time in their lives. Mass incarceration on a scale almost unexampled in human history is a fundamental fact of our country today-perhaps the fundamental fact, as slavery was the fundamental fact of 1850. In truth, there are more black men in the grip of the criminal-justice system-in prison, on probation, or on parole-than were in slavery then. Over all, there are now more people under "correctional supervision" in America-more than six million-than were in the Gulag Archipelago under Stalin at its height. That city of the confined and the controlled, Lockuptown, is now the second largest in the United States.

The accelerating rate of incarceration over the past few decades is just as startling as the number of people jailed: in 1980, there were about two hundred and twenty people incarcerated for every hundred thousand Americans; by 2010, the number had more than tripled, to seven hundred and thirty-one. No other country even approaches that. In the past two decades, the money that states spend on prisons has risen at six times the rate of spending on higher education. Ours is, bottom to top, a "carceral state," in the flat verdict of Conrad Black, the former conservative press lord and newly minted reformer, who right now finds himself imprisoned in Florida, thereby adding a new twist to an old joke: A conservative is a liberal who's been mugged; a liberal is a conservative who's been indicted; and a passionate prison reformer is a conservative who's in one.

The scale and the brutality of our prisons are the moral scandal of American life. Every day, at least fifty thousand men-a full house at Yankee Stadium-wake in solitary confinement, often in "supermax" prisons or prison wings, in which men are locked in small cells, where they see no one, cannot freely read and write, and are allowed out just once a day for an hour's solo "exercise." (Lock yourself in your bathroom and then imagine you have to stay there for the next ten years, and you will have some sense of the experience.) Prison rape is so endemic-more than seventy thousand prisoners are raped each year-that it is routinely held out as a threat, part of the punishment to be expected. The subject is standard fodder for comedy, and an uncoöperative suspect being threatened with rape in prison is now represented, every night on television, as an ordinary and rather lovable bit of policing. The normalization of prison rape-like eighteenth-century japery about watching men struggle as they die on the gallows-will surely strike our descendants as chillingly sadistic, incomprehensible on the part of people who thought themselves civilized. Though we avoid looking directly at prisons, they seep obliquely into our fashions and manners. Wealthy white teen-agers in baggy jeans and laceless shoes and multiple tattoos show, unconsciously, the reality of incarceration that acts as a hidden foundation for the country.

How did we get here? How is it that our civilization, which rejects hanging and flogging and disembowelling, came to believe that caging vast numbers of people for decades is an acceptably humane sanction? There's a fairly large recent scholarly literature on the history and sociology of crime and punishment, and it tends to trace the American zeal for punishment back to the nineteenth century, apportioning blame in two directions. There's an essentially Northern explanation, focussing on the inheritance of the notorious Eastern State Penitentiary, in Philadelphia, and its "reformist" tradition; and a Southern explanation, which sees the prison system as essentially a slave plantation continued by other means. Robert Perkinson, the author of the Southern revisionist tract "Texas Tough: The Rise of America's Prison Empire," traces two ancestral lines, "from the North, the birthplace of rehabilitative penology, to the South, the fountainhead of subjugationist discipline." In other words, there's the scientific taste for reducing men to numbers and the slave owners' urge to reduce blacks to brutes.

William J. Stuntz, a professor at Harvard Law School who died shortly before his masterwork, "The Collapse of American Criminal Justice," was published, last fall, is the most forceful advocate for the view that the scandal of our prisons derives from the Enlightenment-era, "procedural" nature of American justice. He runs through the immediate causes of the incarceration epidemic: the growth of post-Rockefeller drug laws, which punished minor drug offenses with major prison time; "zero tolerance" policing, which added to the group; mandatory-sentencing laws, which prevented judges from exercising judgment. But his search for the ultimate cause leads deeper, all the way to the Bill of Rights. In a society where Constitution worship is still a requisite on right and left alike, Stuntz startlingly suggests that the Bill of Rights is a terrible document with which to start a justice system-much inferior to the exactly contemporary French Declaration of the Rights of Man, which Jefferson, he points out, may have helped shape while his protégé Madison was writing ours.

The trouble with the Bill of Rights, he argues, is that it emphasizes process and procedure rather than principles. The Declaration of the Rights of Man says, Be just! The Bill of Rights says, Be fair! Instead of announcing general principles-no one should be accused of something that wasn't a crime when he did it; cruel punishments are always wrong; the goal of justice is, above all, that justice be done-it talks procedurally. You can't search someone without a reason; you can't accuse him without allowing him to see the evidence; and so on. This emphasis, Stuntz thinks, has led to the current mess, where accused criminals get laboriously articulated protection against procedural errors and no protection at all against outrageous and obvious violations of simple justice. You can get off if the cops looked in the wrong car with the wrong warrant when they found your joint, but you have no recourse if owning the joint gets you locked up for life. You may be spared the death penalty if you can show a problem with your appointed defender, but it is much harder if there is merely enormous accumulated evidence that you weren't guilty in the first place and the jury got it wrong. Even clauses that Americans are taught to revere are, Stuntz maintains, unworthy of reverence: the ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" was designed to protect cruel punishments-flogging and branding-that were not at that time unusual.

The obsession with due process and the cult of brutal prisons, the argument goes, share an essential impersonality. The more professionalized and procedural a system is, the more insulated we become from its real effects on real people. That's why America is famous both for its process-driven judicial system ("The bastard got off on a technicality," the cop-show detective fumes) and for the harshness and inhumanity of its prisons. Though all industrialized societies started sending more people to prison and fewer to the gallows in the eighteenth century, it was in Enlightenment-inspired America that the taste for long-term, profoundly depersonalized punishment became most aggravated. The inhumanity of American prisons was as much a theme for Dickens, visiting America in 1842, as the cynicism of American lawyers. His shock when he saw the Eastern State Penitentiary, in Philadelphia-a "model" prison, at the time the most expensive public building ever constructed in the country, where every prisoner was kept in silent, separate confinement-still resonates:

Not roused up to stay-that was the point. Once the procedure ends, the penalty begins, and, as long as the cruelty is routine, our civil responsibility toward the punished is over. We lock men up and forget about their existence. For Dickens, even the corrupt but communal debtors' prisons of old London were better than this. "Don't take it personally!"-that remains the slogan above the gate to the American prison Inferno. Nor is this merely a historian's vision. Conrad Black, at the high end, has a scary and persuasive picture of how his counsel, the judge, and the prosecutors all merrily congratulated each other on their combined professional excellence just before sending him off to the hoosegow for several years. If a millionaire feels that way, imagine how the ordinary culprit must feel.

In place of abstraction, Stuntz argues for the saving grace of humane discretion. Basically, he thinks, we should go into court with an understanding of what a crime is and what justice is like, and then let common sense and compassion and specific circumstance take over. There's a lovely scene in "The Castle," the Australian movie about a family fighting eminent-domain eviction, where its hapless lawyer, asked in court to point to the specific part of the Australian constitution that the eviction violates, says desperately, "It's . . . just the vibe of the thing." For Stuntz, justice ought to be just the vibe of the thing-not one procedural error caught or one fact worked around. The criminal law should once again be more like the common law, with judges and juries not merely finding fact but making law on the basis of universal principles of fairness, circumstance, and seriousness, and crafting penalties to the exigencies of the crime.

The other argument-the Southern argument-is that this story puts too bright a face on the truth. The reality of American prisons, this argument runs, has nothing to do with the knots of procedural justice or the perversions of Enlightenment-era ideals. Prisons today operate less in the rehabilitative mode of the Northern reformers "than in a retributive mode that has long been practiced and promoted in the South," Perkinson, an American-studies professor, writes. "American prisons trace their lineage not only back to Pennsylvania penitentiaries but to Texas slave plantations." White supremacy is the real principle, this thesis holds, and racial domination the real end. In response to the apparent triumphs of the sixties, mass imprisonment became a way of reimposing Jim Crow. Blacks are now incarcerated seven times as often as whites. "The system of mass incarceration works to trap African Americans in a virtual (and literal) cage," the legal scholar Michelle Alexander writes. Young black men pass quickly from a period of police harassment into a period of "formal control" (i.e., actual imprisonment) and then are doomed for life to a system of "invisible control." Prevented from voting, legally discriminated against for the rest of their lives, most will cycle back through the prison system. The system, in this view, is not really broken; it is doing what it was designed to do. Alexander's grim conclusion: "If mass incarceration is considered as a system of social control-specifically, racial control-then the system is a fantastic success."

Northern impersonality and Southern revenge converge on a common American theme: a growing number of American prisons are now contracted out as for-profit businesses to for-profit companies. The companies are paid by the state, and their profit depends on spending as little as possible on the prisoners and the prisons. It's hard to imagine any greater disconnect between public good and private profit: the interest of private prisons lies not in the obvious social good of having the minimum necessary number of inmates but in having as many as possible, housed as cheaply as possible. No more chilling document exists in recent American life than the 2005 annual report of the biggest of these firms, the Corrections Corporation of America. Here the company (which spends millions lobbying legislators) is obliged to caution its investors about the risk that somehow, somewhere, someone might turn off the spigot of convicted men:

Brecht could hardly have imagined such a document: a capitalist enterprise that feeds on the misery of man trying as hard as it can to be sure that nothing is done to decrease that misery.

Yet a spectre haunts all these accounts, North and South, whether process gone mad or penal colony writ large. It is that the epidemic of imprisonment seems to track the dramatic decline in crime over the same period. The more bad guys there are in prison, it appears, the less crime there has been in the streets. The real background to the prison boom, which shows up only sporadically in the prison literature, is the crime wave that preceded and overlapped it.

For those too young to recall the big-city crime wave of the sixties and seventies, it may seem like mere bogeyman history. For those whose entire childhood and adolescence were set against it, it is the crucial trauma in recent American life and explains much else that happened in the same period. It was the condition of the Upper West Side of Manhattan under liberal rule, far more than what had happened to Eastern Europe under socialism, that made neo-con polemics look persuasive. There really was, as Stuntz himself says, a liberal consensus on crime ("Wherever the line is between a merciful justice system and one that abandons all serious effort at crime control, the nation had crossed it"), and it really did have bad effects.

Yet if, in 1980, someone had predicted that by 2012 New York City would have a crime rate so low that violent crime would have largely disappeared as a subject of conversation, he would have seemed not so much hopeful as crazy. Thirty years ago, crime was supposed to be a permanent feature of the city, produced by an alienated underclass of super-predators; now it isn't. Something good happened to change it, and you might have supposed that the change would be an opportunity for celebration and optimism. Instead, we mostly content ourselves with grudging and sardonic references to the silly side of gentrification, along with a few all-purpose explanations, like broken-window policing. This is a general human truth: things that work interest us less than things that don't.

So what is the relation between mass incarceration and the decrease in crime? Certainly, in the nineteen-seventies and eighties, many experts became persuaded that there was no way to make bad people better; all you could do was warehouse them, for longer or shorter periods. The best research seemed to show, depressingly, that nothing works-that rehabilitation was a ruse. Then, in 1983, inmates at the maximum-security federal prison in Marion, Illinois, murdered two guards. Inmates had been (very occasionally) killing guards for a long time, but the timing of the murders, and the fact that they took place in a climate already prepared to believe that even ordinary humanity was wasted on the criminal classes, meant that the entire prison was put on permanent lockdown. A century and a half after absolute solitary first appeared in American prisons, it was reintroduced. Those terrible numbers began to grow.

And then, a decade later, crime started falling: across the country by a standard measure of about forty per cent; in New York City by as much as eighty per cent. By 2010, the crime rate in New York had seen its greatest decline since the Second World War; in 2002, there were fewer murders in Manhattan than there had been in any year since 1900. In social science, a cause sought is usually a muddle found; in life as we experience it, a crisis resolved is causality established. If a pill cures a headache, we do not ask too often if the headache might have gone away by itself.

All this ought to make the publication of Franklin E. Zimring's new book, "The City That Became Safe," a very big event. Zimring, a criminologist at Berkeley Law, has spent years crunching the numbers of what happened in New York in the context of what happened in the rest of America. One thing he teaches us is how little we know. The forty per cent drop across the continent-indeed, there was a decline throughout the Western world- took place for reasons that are as mysterious in suburban Ottawa as they are in the South Bronx. Zimring shows that the usual explanations-including demographic shifts-simply can't account for what must be accounted for. This makes the international decline look slightly eerie: blackbirds drop from the sky, plagues slacken and end, and there seems no absolute reason that societies leap from one state to another over time. Trends and fashions and fads and pure contingencies happen in other parts of our social existence; it may be that there are fashions and cycles in criminal behavior, too, for reasons that are just as arbitrary.

But the additional forty per cent drop in crime that seems peculiar to New York finally succumbs to Zimring's analysis. The change didn't come from resolving the deep pathologies that the right fixated on-from jailing super predators, driving down the number of unwed mothers, altering welfare culture. Nor were there cures for the underlying causes pointed to by the left: injustice, discrimination, poverty. Nor were there any "Presto!" effects arising from secret patterns of increased abortions or the like. The city didn't get much richer; it didn't get much poorer. There was no significant change in the ethnic makeup or the average wealth or educational levels of New Yorkers as violent crime more or less vanished. "Broken windows" or "turnstile jumping" policing, that is, cracking down on small visible offenses in order to create an atmosphere that refused to license crime, seems to have had a negligible effect; there was, Zimring writes, a great difference between the slogans and the substance of the time. (Arrests for "visible" nonviolent crime-e.g., street prostitution and public gambling-mostly went down through the period.)

Instead, small acts of social engineering, designed simply to stop crimes from happening, helped stop crime. In the nineties, the N.Y.P.D. began to control crime not by fighting minor crimes in safe places but by putting lots of cops in places where lots of crimes happened-"hot-spot policing." The cops also began an aggressive, controversial program of "stop and frisk"-"designed to catch the sharks, not the dolphins," as Jack Maple, one of its originators, described it-that involved what's called pejoratively "profiling." This was not so much racial, since in any given neighborhood all the suspects were likely to be of the same race or color, as social, involving the thousand small clues that policemen recognized already. Minority communities, Zimring emphasizes, paid a disproportionate price in kids stopped and frisked, and detained, but they also earned a disproportionate gain in crime reduced. "The poor pay more and get more" is Zimring's way of putting it. He believes that a "light" program of stop-and-frisk could be less alienating and just as effective, and that by bringing down urban crime stop-and-frisk had the net effect of greatly reducing the number of poor minority kids in prison for long stretches.

Zimring insists, plausibly, that he is offering a radical and optimistic rewriting of theories of what crime is and where criminals are, not least because it disconnects crime and minorities. "In 1961, twenty six percent of New York City's population was minority African American or Hispanic. Now, half of New York's population is-and what that does in an enormously hopeful way is to destroy the rude assumptions of supply side criminology," he says. By "supply side criminology," he means the conservative theory of crime that claimed that social circumstances produced a certain net amount of crime waiting to be expressed; if you stopped it here, it broke out there. The only way to stop crime was to lock up all the potential criminals. In truth, criminal activity seems like most other human choices-a question of contingent occasions and opportunity. Crime is not the consequence of a set number of criminals; criminals are the consequence of a set number of opportunities to commit crimes. Close down the open drug market in Washington Square, and it does not automatically migrate to Tompkins Square Park. It just stops, or the dealers go indoors, where dealing goes on but violent crime does not.

And, in a virtuous cycle, the decreased prevalence of crime fuels a decrease in the prevalence of crime. When your friends are no longer doing street robberies, you're less likely to do them. Zimring said, in a recent interview, "Remember, nobody ever made a living mugging. There's no minimum wage in violent crime." In a sense, he argues, it's recreational, part of a life style: "Crime is a routine behavior; it's a thing people do when they get used to doing it." And therein lies its essential fragility. Crime ends as a result of "cyclical forces operating on situational and contingent things rather than from finding deeply motivated essential linkages." Conservatives don't like this view because it shows that being tough doesn't help; liberals don't like it because apparently being nice doesn't help, either. Curbing crime does not depend on reversing social pathologies or alleviating social grievances; it depends on erecting small, annoying barriers to entry.

One fact stands out. While the rest of the country, over the same twenty-year period, saw the growth in incarceration that led to our current astonishing numbers, New York, despite the Rockefeller drug laws, saw a marked decrease in its number of inmates. "New York City, in the midst of a dramatic reduction in crime, is locking up a much smaller number of people, and particularly of young people, than it was at the height of the crime wave," Zimring observes. Whatever happened to make street crime fall, it had nothing to do with putting more men in prison. The logic is self-evident if we just transfer it to the realm of white-collar crime: we easily accept that there is no net sum of white-collar crime waiting to happen, no inscrutable generation of super-predators produced by Dewar's-guzzling dads and scaly M.B.A. profs; if you stop an embezzlement scheme here on Third Avenue, another doesn't naturally start in the next office building. White-collar crime happens through an intersection of pathology and opportunity; getting the S.E.C. busy ending the opportunity is a good way to limit the range of the pathology.

Social trends deeper and less visible to us may appear as future historians analyze what went on. Something other than policing may explain things-just as the coming of cheap credit cards and state lotteries probably did as much to weaken the Mafia's Five Families in New York, who had depended on loan sharking and numbers running, as the F.B.I. could. It is at least possible, for instance, that the coming of the mobile phone helped drive drug dealing indoors, in ways that helped drive down crime. It may be that the real value of hot spot and stop-and-frisk was that it provided a single game plan that the police believed in; as military history reveals, a bad plan is often better than no plan, especially if the people on the other side think it's a good plan. But one thing is sure: social epidemics, of crime or of punishment, can be cured more quickly than we might hope with simpler and more superficial mechanisms than we imagine. Throwing a Band-Aid over a bad wound is actually a decent strategy, if the Band-Aid helps the wound to heal itself.

Which leads, further, to one piece of radical common sense: since prison plays at best a small role in stopping even violent crime, very few people, rich or poor, should be in prison for a nonviolent crime. Neither the streets nor the society is made safer by having marijuana users or peddlers locked up, let alone with the horrific sentences now dispensed so easily. For that matter, no social good is served by having the embezzler or the Ponzi schemer locked in a cage for the rest of his life, rather than having him bankrupt and doing community service in the South Bronx for the next decade or two. Would we actually have more fraud and looting of shareholder value if the perpetrators knew that they would lose their bank accounts and their reputation, and have to do community service seven days a week for five years? It seems likely that anyone for whom those sanctions aren't sufficient is someone for whom no sanctions are ever going to be sufficient. Zimring's research shows clearly that, if crime drops on the street, criminals coming out of prison stop committing crimes. What matters is the incidence of crime in the world, and the continuity of a culture of crime, not some "lesson learned" in prison.

At the same time, the ugly side of stop-and-frisk can be alleviated. To catch sharks and not dolphins, Zimring's work suggests, we need to adjust the size of the holes in the nets-to make crimes that are the occasion for stop-and-frisks real crimes, not crimes like marijuana possession. When the New York City police stopped and frisked kids, the main goal was not to jail them for having pot but to get their fingerprints, so that they could be identified if they committed a more serious crime. But all over America the opposite happens: marijuana possession becomes the serious crime. The cost is so enormous, though, in lives ruined and money spent, that the obvious thing to do is not to enforce the law less but to change it now. Dr. Johnson said once that manners make law, and that when manners alter, the law must, too. It's obvious that marijuana is now an almost universally accepted drug in America: it is not only used casually (which has been true for decades) but also talked about casually on television and in the movies (which has not). One need only watch any stoner movie to see that the perceived risks of smoking dope are not that you'll get arrested but that you'll get in trouble with a rival frat or look like an idiot to women. The decriminalization of marijuana would help end the epidemic of imprisonment.

The rate of incarceration in most other rich, free countries, whatever the differences in their histories, is remarkably steady. In countries with Napoleonic justice or common law or some mixture of the two, in countries with adversarial systems and in those with magisterial ones, whether the country once had brutal plantation-style penal colonies, as France did, or was once itself a brutal plantation-style penal colony, like Australia, the natural rate of incarceration seems to hover right around a hundred men per hundred thousand people. (That doesn't mean it doesn't get lower in rich, homogeneous countries-just that it never gets much higher in countries otherwise like our own.) It seems that one man in every thousand once in a while does a truly bad thing. All other things being equal, the point of a justice system should be to identify that thousandth guy, find a way to keep him from harming other people, and give everyone else a break.

Epidemics seldom end with miracle cures. Most of the time in the history of medicine, the best way to end disease was to build a better sewer and get people to wash their hands. "Merely chipping away at the problem around the edges" is usually the very best thing to do with a problem; keep chipping away patiently and, eventually, you get to its heart. To read the literature on crime before it dropped is to see the same kind of dystopian despair we find in the new literature of punishment: we'd have to end poverty, or eradicate the ghettos, or declare war on the broken family, or the like, in order to end the crime wave. The truth is, a series of small actions and events ended up eliminating a problem that seemed to hang over everything. There was no miracle cure, just the intercession of a thousand smaller sanities. Ending sentencing for drug misdemeanors, decriminalizing marijuana, leaving judges free to use common sense (and, where possible, getting judges who are judges rather than politicians)-many small acts are possible that will help end the epidemic of imprisonment as they helped end the plague of crime.

"Oh, I have taken too little care of this!" King Lear cries out on the heath in his moment of vision. "Take physic, pomp; expose thyself to feel what wretches feel." "This" changes; in Shakespeare's time, it was flat-out peasant poverty that starved some and drove others as mad as poor Tom. In Dickens's and Hugo's time, it was the industrial revolution that drove kids to mines. But every society has a poor storm that wretches suffer in, and the attitude is always the same: either that the wretches, already dehumanized by their suffering, deserve no pity or that the oppressed, overwhelmed by injustice, will have to wait for a better world. At every moment, the injustice seems inseparable from the community's life, and in every case the arguments for keeping the system in place were that you would have to revolutionize the entire social order to change it-which then became the argument for revolutionizing the entire social order. In every case, humanity and common sense made the insoluble problem just get up and go away. Prisons are our this. We need take more care. ♦

http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics ... arge_gopnik#ixzz1kXcwkrjc

维基百科，自由的百科全书1920至2006年的囚犯人数。在2006年末，有超过720万人或保释，或假释，或在监狱中服刑。"在美国成年人口中，有3.2%的人，即三十一分之一的人在服刑或在保释/假释中。"^[1][2]

美国监禁制度（Incarceration in the United States），是美国对于重罪和其他违法行为的一种主要惩罚和改造方式。如被判轻罪的罪犯，可能只会在当地的市级或县级监狱服刑，或被处以如社区改造（中途之家）或软禁等制裁。监狱的运作安全级别各异，既有主要用来关押一些非暴力犯罪者的最低安全级别监狱，也有关押危险罪犯的超高度安全级别（Supermax）监狱。

美国入档的监禁率居世界首位，^[4][5]截至2009年末，每十万名成年人中就有743人被关押。^{[6][7][8][4][5]}根据美国司法统计局的数据，截至2009年末，全美的联邦、州监狱以及县监牢共关押了2,292,133名成年囚犯--这是美国成年人口的约1%。^{[6][9][10][7]}此外，截至2009年底，有4,933,667名成年人被保释或假释。^[6]2009年，共有7,225,800 名成年人受到矫正监管（保释、假释、监牢或监狱）--约占全美人口的3.1%。^[11][6][2]另外，根据2007年的数据，还有86,927名未成年人被关押于少管所。^[12][13]

历史

监狱系统属于美国宪法规定的并存权力的范畴，即监狱系统由美国联邦政府和州政府共同管理，因此其权限划分十分复杂。美国的监狱的发展可以追溯到18世纪。1776年，大陆会议通过决议，规定被指控犯下联邦罪行的罪犯，可以将其关押到县监牢或州监狱服刑。美国的第一个重罪监狱是设于费城的胡桃街监狱（Walnut Street Prison），成立于1790年，在其成立后不久，大陆会议颁布了联邦刑事法令，明确规定联邦囚犯关押至胡桃街监狱。^[14][15]

胡桃街监狱的矫正制度受到其他地区的效仿，奥本监狱、西部重罪监狱等联邦监狱相继建立，而纽约州、密歇根州、宾夕法尼亚州也纷纷建立起州监狱。1891年，国会批准了《三监狱法案》（Three Prison Act），授权在堪萨斯州利文沃斯、佐治亚州亚特兰大以及华盛顿州麦克尼尔岛（McNeil Island）三处设立联邦重罪监狱，联邦监狱系统建立。^[16]1907年，美国司法部设立监狱总监管一职，负责监督管理联邦监狱。1930年5月30日，国会通过议案批准成立联邦监狱局（Federal Bureau of Prisons），负责管理联邦监狱系统。^[16][15]各州的监狱由各州矫正部门管辖。

人员构成

2008年，美国在监人数为2,304,115人，^[2]即有超过1%的成年美国人入狱。^[9][17] 根据2005年的数字，每136名美国居民中，即有一名在监，^[18]囚犯总数为2,320,359人，其中1,446,269人在州立或联邦监狱，747,529在本地的监牢中。^[19]而在2008年，每31名成年人中就有一人被关押或被监控（保释或假释），按各分类比例如下：

尽管从1988年到2008年，犯罪率有了约25%的下降，但是美国受到监狱系统控制的人数比例有了极为明显的增长。^[20]暴力犯罪和财产犯罪在20世纪90年代早期有了下降。^[21]超过一百万在州立、联邦监狱或地方监牢中服刑的人是因为犯下非暴力犯罪而入狱的。^[22]

该图表展示了自1980年到2008年全美矫正改造系统管理人数，包括在监服刑、假释和保释者。

监狱类型

美国联邦政府、各州、各县以及部分市均有监禁设施。大体上讲，"监狱"（prison）是指关押已宣判的重罪犯（被判处超过一年刑期者）的设施。等待审判的个人、未达到重罪被传唤者以及犯轻罪者（所判刑期不足一年）会关入县监牢（jail）。 ^[23]

在大多数州，由市运作小型的监牢，有时被称为"看守所"（lock-ups），一般作极短的监禁用，关押至多72个工作小时或至多5天，之后被关押者必须出庭面对法官或收到传票，在此之后，或被释放，或转到更大型的监牢关押。部分州有统一的监狱系统，所有监狱和监牢均由州运作。联邦政府亦在多个主要城市地区或靠近联邦法庭的地方设置拘留处（detention centers），以关押将在联邦法庭出庭的刑事被告。

许多小的县和城市监牢并不对囚犯分类关押（也就是说，并不按照所犯罪行的类别和其他因素关押到不同区域）。除了部分小监牢采取"近距离警戒"，防止囚犯间的暴力外，其他的监狱并不考虑囚犯犯罪记录，而直接将他们关押在同一间牢房中。部分地方监狱较大，划分为数个不同安全级别的关押区。例如，美国最大的监牢是伊利诺伊州库科县的库科县监狱（Cook County Jail，位于芝加哥）。^[24]该监牢有11个不同的区域，包括一个医疗区和两个女性囚犯区，不同的区域安全级别不同，有开放式的宿舍型牢房，还有超高安全级别的禁闭牢房。在加利福尼亚州，为了防止暴力，县监牢和加利福尼亚州矫正与康复部中心的囚犯按照种族、民族和性取向分隔开。

根据2004年的统计，入狱人数比例较低的三个州是（单位：人/十万人，下同）：缅因州（148）、明尼苏达州（171）和罗德岛州（175）。入狱人数比例最高的三个州是：路易斯安那州（816）、德克萨斯州（694）和密西西比州（669）。^[26]

截至2009年9月30日，联邦监狱中7.9%的被判刑囚犯是因暴力犯罪入狱的。^[27]2008年末的数据中，在州监狱里这个比例为52.4%。^[27]而在县市的监牢中，定罪囚犯中的暴力犯罪比为21.6%（2002年，这是最新的按犯罪类别分类数据）。而在未定罪的监牢被关押人员中，有34%的最重指控为暴力犯罪。无论是定罪/未定罪的被关押人员中，41%都犯下暴力犯罪或有暴力犯罪史；46%为非暴力累犯。^[28]

2000年到2008年，州立监狱中关押人数增加了159,200人，其中六成为暴力犯罪者。而同期的毒品犯罪者则减少了12,400人。另外，尽管在州监狱中被判刑的暴力犯罪者人数增加，但是其预期刑期却略有缩短。^[27]

暴力犯罪并不是美国入狱人数从1980年到2003年翻了四倍的原因。囚犯数增长的主因是公共政策的转变，使得监禁刑罚更多被使用且刑期延长。州立监狱中新增人数的四分之三都是非暴力犯罪者。"禁毒之战"的开展也使监狱人数激增，2000年，有22%的联邦、州立监狱囚犯是因毒品犯罪被判刑的。^[29][30]

在美国，囚犯中有七成为有色人种。^[31]根据美国司法统计局的数据，2009年在监人口中，非西班牙裔黑人占比为39.4%。^[32]根据2010年美国人口局2010年的调查结果，黑人（包括西班牙裔黑人）占美国总人口的12.6%。^[33][34][35]2009年，西班牙裔美国人（不分种族）占全部在监人口数的20.6%。^[32]在2010年的人口调查中，西班牙裔美国人占美国总人数的16.3%。^[33]

2009年，非西班牙裔黑人男性的入狱比为每十万人中4,749人，白人男性的比例为每十万人中708人，西班牙裔男性的比例为每十万人中1,822人。^[32][36]

该图表展示了1925年到2008年，州和联邦管辖下每十万人的监禁率。该数据并不包括在监服刑囚犯。男性监禁率约为女性的7倍。

2001年底的数据显示，在联邦和州立监狱中共关押有93,031名女性，占监狱人口的6.6%。美国20年来的女性入狱率增长了5倍；这一比例的增长应当归因于近年来对于毒品犯罪的起诉和判刑数增加，对于犯罪的打击力度加大，以及对于触犯法律女性的社区改造及治疗的缺失。^[37]自19世纪70年代，当局开始在矫正机构中将男女分开关押。^[38]但是对于关押女性仍然存在诸多问题，例如监狱系统、规章最初依照男性制定，同怀孕和哺乳问题出现冲突，在获释后女性难以再融入社会。

2000年到2005年，在联邦和州立监狱中年龄超过55岁的囚犯比例上涨了33%，而总囚犯人数只增长了8%。南部法律会议（The Southern Legislative Conference）发现，在南方16州中，在1997年到2007年的十年间，老年囚犯人数平均增长了145%。急剧膨胀的老年囚犯人口带来更大的健康保障开支，最显著的影响就是，2005年到2006年，州立监狱预算平均增长了10%。为了安置一名罪犯，州政府每年要花费18,000到31,000美元，其中平均每名罪犯每天33美元，而老年罪犯则需要100美元。^[39][40]

美国也关押了世界上最多的少年犯。司法统计局2009年12月的一份报告中称，根据2006年的青少年居住安置计划（Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement）进入由青少年司法和犯罪预防办公室（Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention）管理的少管所者计有92,854人。^[12][13]

2005年的报告估计约有27%的联邦监狱囚犯为非公民，他们合法或非法的来到美国，并犯下罪行。^[41]但是，联邦监狱囚犯仅占所有在监人数的6%；在州立监狱和本地监狱中的非公民人数更难估计。世界监狱律师组织（The World Prison Brief）将在联邦、州立和地方监狱中关押的所有外籍囚犯比例确定为5.9%。^[4]

法官给定罪者判处刑期。刑期长短取决于多个因素，比如案件的类型和严重性、州和/或定罪指引，被定罪者的案底，以及法官个人的自由裁量权。这些因素在州之间和联邦系统中都不尽相同。大多数情况下，认罪来自于认罪协商（plea bargain），通过检辩双方协商，以认罪换取更轻的罪行或更短的刑期。

部分罪犯被判处终身监禁。在部分情况下，终身监禁意味着没有假释的可能性。在其他情况下，会在判决时定出可以假释的时间。在部分执行死刑的州，死刑犯被关在死囚区内，直到行刑之日。

许多法案在削减判决时对刑种和刑期的自由裁量权，规定最短刑期以及判刑指引继续减少人的因素在判刑中的影响。由于"三振出局法"，最近十年（1992年到2003年）的终身监禁判刑量增长了83%。^[42]

2002年的调查研究发现，在1994年出狱的将近275,000名囚犯中，有67.5%的人在三年之内再次被拘捕，有51.8%的人重返监狱。^[43]但是，研究中并没有足够的证据表明，在监狱中的时间越长，累犯的机率越大。相反，其中服刑时间较长的人（61个月及以上）的累犯率较其他组别的囚犯明显降低（54.2%）。这一现象的一种解释是，服刑时间较长的人，被释放时的平均年龄也比较大，累犯率和被释放时的年龄成很强的负相关。

囚犯被关押在安全级别不同的关押设施中，在安全措施、囚犯管理、牢房类型、狱警使用的武器和策略等方面不同。联邦政府的监狱管理局使用数字1到5来代表不同的安全级别。第5级是最高安全级别，第1级则是最低安全级别。州立监狱系统也有类似的系统。例如在加州，对它的监狱设施从I到V级（最低到最高安全级别）分级。^[23]

超高度安全级别（Supermax）的监狱设施提供最高级的监狱安保，其中关押的是最危险的罪犯。其中有在较低安全级别的监狱中犯下暴力袭击、谋杀罪或其他严重违法行为的囚犯，或者被发现或被指控是监狱帮派成员的囚犯。大多数州或是在监狱中设有超高度安全级别监禁区，或者整个监狱被定为超高度安全级别。监狱管理局在全国运作着数个超高度安全级别监狱。其中位于科罗拉多州佛罗伦萨（Florence）的ADX Florence监狱被认为是美国警戒级别最高的监狱。除了有如一般的最高安全级别监狱一样的23小时监禁和简陋的环境外，它还有永久性的24小时禁闭室，其中的囚犯很难同人交流，且通过良好表现改善自身条件的机会微乎其微。^[44][45][23]

在最高安全级别（maxmium security）的监狱或区域中，所有囚犯都被关在单人牢房里，牢房的滑动门由远程控制站遥控开关。每天囚犯有1个小时的放风时间。走出牢房的囚犯仍然要留在牢房所在监区内或在户外的牢笼中。在监区外的活动受到严格限制，必须有限制措施并有狱警护送。^[23]

在近距离警戒级别（close security）的监狱中，囚犯常常住在由远程控制室管理的单人或双人牢房中。每个牢房有独立的马桶和水池。囚犯可以离开牢房，完成工作任务或参加矫正计划，还被允许在监区的公共区域或操场上活动。监狱的围墙多为双层，设有瞭望塔，上有岗哨，另外在两层围墙之间常有电网。^[23][46]

被关入中等安全级别（medium security）监狱的囚犯被安排在设置有双层床的宿舍里，并有自己的储物柜放置私人物品。他们可能有公用的澡堂、厕所和水池。宿舍在晚上会上锁，有一名或更多狱警看管。对于囚犯之间的活动监管较少。外墙多为双层护网，定时巡逻。^[23][46]

进入最低安全级别（minimum security）监狱中的囚犯大多被认为对于公众的危害较小，大多是非暴力的"白领罪犯"。最低安全级别监狱的囚犯居住在警戒程度很低的宿舍中，有狱警定时巡逻。和中等安全级别监狱一样，他们也是共用澡堂、厕所和水池。监狱的外墙只有一层护网，且只有荷枪实弹的狱警看守，并不巡逻。在较为偏远或农村地区的监狱中，甚至没有外墙。囚犯可以参加爱社区项目，例如清理道旁垃圾或者自然资源保育。许多小型的最低安全级别监狱设置在军事基地、较大的监狱或其他政府机构中或附近，为他们提供劳动力。许多州都允许最低安全级别的囚犯访问互联网。^[23][46]

过于拥挤的加州州监狱（摄于2006年7月19日）^[47]

非政府组织人权观察（Human Rights Watch）对于监狱中存在的强奸问题和囚犯的医疗问题表示担忧。^[48]在对美國中西部1,788名男性囚犯的调查中，有21%的人表示自己在关押期间，被强迫进行性行为，其中7%表示自己在目前所在的监狱中被强奸。^[49]

2003年8月，《Harper's》杂志刊载了由威尔·S·海尔顿（Wil S. Hylton）撰写的文章，文中估计，当时约有20%到40%的美国囚犯患有丙型肝炎。监狱将医疗保障外包给私人公司，而他们为了获得最大利润，往往试图压缩囚犯的医疗保障开支。

监狱系统的另一大顽疾就是帮派暴力，因为很多帮派成员在入狱后，仍然保有原来帮派的身份认同和联系。将不同帮派的人员区隔开，常常会导致这些帮派成员在入狱后见到自己的朋友或犯罪同伙。有人认为，这样会将监狱变成一个"犯罪分子进修所"。^[50]

美国的很多监狱面临超员问题。例如，加州的33个监狱共可容纳10万人，但他们实际上却关押了17万人。^[51]许多加州和其他地方的监狱不得不将旧体育馆或教室改造成大型的牢房。他们在这些体育馆中摆放数百张双层床，没有任何设施将囚犯隔离开来。再加之人手不足，牢房中的暴力程度升级，每周都会有一人死亡。此种情况促使法庭援引美国宪法第八修正案禁止残酷和非常规惩罚的条文，下令加州必须释放27%的在押囚犯。^[52]根据普拉塔诉施瓦辛格案（Plata v. Schwarzenegger）和科曼诉施瓦辛格案（Coleman v. Schwarzenegger）中法庭要求组成的三人合议庭的意见，加州监狱的超员问题已经成为犯罪的一大温床。^[53]

监狱中关押的囚犯可以有限度的进行宗教活动。2005年，美国最高法院在审理考特诉威尔金森案中，明确表示接受联邦资金的监狱不能拒绝为囚犯的宗教活动提供必要场所。^[54]

美国监狱私营化最早可以追溯到美国革命之后，对于囚犯监禁和照看工作的外包。^[55]到了20世纪80年代，私营化进入了一个快速发展的阶段。政府面对监狱过度拥挤以及不断上涨的成本的压力，而私人资本从中发现了扩张的机会，开始从简单的外包服务发展到完全管理和运营整个监狱。^[56]

1984年，美国矫正公司得到运营田纳西州汉密尔顿县一所监狱的合同。这是世界上首次出现一国政府将整个监狱的运营外包给私人管理者的情况。^[57]之后，美国矫正公司还提议以2亿美元的价码接管整个田纳西州里监狱系统，这引起了公众的广泛关注。由于来自公共机构雇员的反对和州立法机构的怀疑态度，该项交易最终被否决。^[58]尽管如此，美国矫正公司以及其他类似的营利性监狱公司在之后仍得以成功扩张。全美的私人公司共运作着264座矫正机构，可容纳越約99,000成人。^[59]

对于监狱的私有化争论颇多，支持私有化者强调成本的削减，而反对者则强调保障标准，并质疑市场经济运作的监狱会不会导致对囚犯的市场需求（延长刑期以获得低价劳动力）。^[60]对于私人监狱的成本效率进行的24项不同研究得到的评估结果表明，乐观情况下，无法得出结论，而悲观情况下，成本效率并无任何区别。^[61]

据估计，州政府雇员中有九分之一在监狱系统工作。^[62]约有17%的囚犯受雇于联邦监狱产业公司（UNICOR）。^[63]

美国司法统计局。^[64]

在1982年至2006年，监狱机构共花费68,747,203,000美元。^[64]2006年，矫正机构的总开支为68,747,203,000美元。^[64]2005年，每名州监狱囚犯的平均开销为23,876美元。 各州监狱的人均年开支差别较大，罗德岛州需要45,000美元，而路易斯安那州则要13,000美元。^[9][62]2009年，加州监狱的年人均开支为47,102美元，与2001年相比增长了19,500美元。^[65]根据2001年的数据，在由美国联邦监狱局运作的监狱中，年平均成本为22,632美元，即62.01美元。"^[66]

每年为大约500,000名等待审判却无力交付保释金的人的成本是90亿美元。^[67]大多数监狱囚犯是罪行很轻且非暴力的违法者。二十年之前，大多数非暴力犯罪被告都在递交保证书（保证出庭受审）后被释放。现在大多数能够获得保释，而且大多数会请保释代理人支付。^[68]62%的地方监狱囚犯在等待审判。^[7]

解决每年超过十个县出现的监狱超负荷情况的对策，就是修建新监狱。例如，得克萨斯州拉伯克縣决定耗资1.1亿美元修建一座大型监狱，以缓解监狱的拥挤问题。^[68][69]在佛罗里达州布劳沃德县，审前释放花费为每人每天7美元，而监狱系统的开销为115美元。监狱系统开销占布劳沃德县开支的四分之一，是纳税人最大的一笔开销^[70]

在监狱系统的花费大约占各州预算的7%。^[62]每年囚犯的医疗保障花费以每年10%的比例增长。^[62]

数据来自于世界监狱人数名单（World Prison Population List）。第八版。单位为人每十万人。^[71][8][72]

美国的入档监禁率为全球最高，每十万人中共有754名在监（2008年数据）。^[12]2008年2月28日公布的一份报告则表示，在美国，每百名成人中就有超过一人入狱。^[9]美国的人口不到世界人口的5%，^[73]却有世界23.4%的监狱人口。^[4]

在2006年，英格兰和威尔士的监禁率为每十万人中有148名囚犯；挪威为66名，新西兰为186名。^[4]澳大利亚2005年的数据为126名。^[4]在荷兰，2002年的比率为93名。^[74]

2008年，《纽约时报》载文指出^[75]：

而且，刑期长度才真正反映美国的监狱政策。事实上，仅是判刑数量来看美国还不足以位居监禁制度榜首。如果这个榜单是根据每年入狱人数比例来排序的，几个欧洲国家都会超过美国，但是美国的刑期要长得多，因此总的入狱率要高很多......"这40年来加拿大犯罪率的涨落与美国几乎一致，"托尼先生去年写道："但是监禁率却十分稳定。"^[76]

美国联邦、州立监狱的监禁率在2007年时达到最高点。^[77]比起1939年大萧条时期的入狱率极大值（每十万人中137人）还要高5.5倍。^[78]但是目前美国的监禁率仍然比第二次世界大战之前苏联要略低。^[79][80]

高入狱率可能归咎于盗窃和持有毒品的刑期长度。由于对犯罪者的重新融入社会问题重视不足，累犯者可能未被正确处理。第一次认罪如果判处更短的刑期，或许可以减少再犯率，使得犯罪现象消减。^[81]美国国会要求作出监禁判决的联邦法官"意识到入狱并不是改造罪犯，使其重新融入社会的适当方式"。^[82]

批评者认为美国不恰当地监禁了大量非暴力和无受害人的罪犯；^[83][84]在所有被州司法机构判处监禁的囚犯中，有半数是非暴力犯罪者，20%是毒品犯罪。^[19][22]"人权观察组织认为美国不正常的监禁率给个人、家庭和社群带来极其严重的损害，并损伤了整个国家的力量。"^[83][85]

来自华盛顿大学的社会学副教授贝蒂·佩蒂特（Becky Pettit）表示，根据人口统计学研究，20世纪70年代以来美国入狱人数的激增，影响到了五十分之一的美国人。在研究了采集自多方的监狱与大众的数据后，研究人员发现监狱人口的激增掩盖了生育率的降低，增加了向农村地区的非自愿迁移率，并导致诸如結核以及艾滋病的发病率。^[86]

美国监禁制度

• 男性 - 1/18

• 女性 - 1/89

• 非裔美国人 - 1/11（9.2%）

• 拉丁裔 - 1/27（3.7%）

• 白人 - 1/45（2.2%）。

种族和性别

年龄

注释

1. ^
 Glaze, Lauren E.; Bonczar, Thomas P.. Probation and Parole in the United States, 2006 (pdf). U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 美国司法部. 2008-07-02.

1. ^ ^{2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3} Correctional Population Trends Chart. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics

1. ^
 Glaze, Lauren E.; Bonczar, Thomas P.. Probation and Parole in the United States, 2006 (pdf). U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 美國司法部. 2008-07-02.

1. ^ ^{4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5} Walmsley, Roy. World Prison Population List. 8th edition (PDF). International Centre for Prison Studies. School of Law, King's College London. "The information is the latest available in early December 2008. ... Most figures relate to dates between the beginning of 2006 and the end of November 2008." According to the summary on page one there were 2.29 million U.S. inmates and 9.8 million inmates worldwide. The U.S. held 23.4% of the world's inmates. The U.S. total in this report is for Dec. 31, 2007 (see page 3) and does not include inmates in juvenile detention facilities. For the latest info worldwide see World Prison Brief.

1. ^ ^5.0 5.1 New Incarceration Figures: Thirty-Three Consecutive Years of Growth (PDF). Sentencing Project [2007-06-10].

1. ^ ^{6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3} Correctional Populations in the United States, 2009. NCJ 231681. By Lauren Glaze. December 21, 2010. United States Bureau of Justice Statistics. See page 2 of the PDF file for the percent of adults under correctional supervision. See appendix table 2 for the incarceration totals, breakdown, and rates. Its numbers are the custody numbers that avoid the duplication of jurisdiction numbers and multiple correctional statuses. For an explanation see the text box on page one.

1. ^ ^{7.0 7.1 7.2} Prison Brief for United States of America. International Centre for Prison Studies. School of Law, King's College London. See "Prison population rate". It also has the estimated national population at the end of 2009 according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

1. ^ ^{8.0 8.1 8.2} World Prison Brief - Highest to Lowest Figures.International Centre for Prison Studies. School of Law, King's College London. Compare many nations. Select from menu: prison population total, prison population rate, percentage of pre-trial detainees / remand prisoners within the prison population, percentage of female prisoners within the prison population, percentage of foreign prisoners within the prison population and occupancy rate.

1. ^ ^{9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3} One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008. Released Feb. 28, 2008. The Pew Center on the States.

1. ^
 USA QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau. "Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2009: 24.3%".

1. ^
 Total correctional population. United States Bureau of Justice Statistics.. See Correctional Populations in the United States, 2009 (NCJ 231681) where the correctional population numbers have been adjusted to account for some offenders with multiple correctional statuses.

1. ^ ^{12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4} Prisoners in 2008. (NCJ 228417). December 2009 report from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. By William J. Sabol, Ph.D. and Heather C. West, Ph.D., BJS Statisticians. Also, Matthew Cooper, BJS Intern. Table 9 on page 8 of the PDF file has the number of inmates in state or federal public prison facilities, local jails, U.S. territories, military facilities, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) owned and contracted facilities, jails in Indian country, and juvenile facilities. Table 8 on page 8 has the incarceration rates for 2000, 2007, and 2008.

1. ^ ^{13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3} Sickmund, M., Sladky, T.J., Kang, W., & Puzzanchera, C. (2008). "Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement." Available:http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp - click "crosstabs" at the top, and then choose the census year. Click "Show table" to get the total number of juvenile inmates for that year.

1. ^
 Norman Johnston, Ph.D.. Prison Reform in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Prison Society.

1. ^ ^15.0 15.1 Dirk van Zyl Smit & Frieder Dunkel; Mark Fleisher. 《监禁的现状和未来 - 从国际视角看囚犯的权利和监狱条件》（Imprisonment Today and Tomorrow）. 第二版. 法律出版社. 5月 2010年:  P515 ~ 529. ISBN 978-7-5026-9150-8.

1. ^ ^16.0 16.1 The Bureau Celebrates 80th Anniversary. the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

1. ^
 1 in 100 U.S. Adults Behind Bars, New Study Says. By Adam Liptak. February 28, 2008. New York Times.

1. ^
 Elizabeth White. 1 in 136 U.S. Residents Behind Bars. Associated Press. 2006-03-22.

1. ^ ^19.0 19.1 Harrison, Paige M.; Beck, Allen J..Prisoners in 2005 (PDF). U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics: 13.

1. ^
 Moore, Solomon. Prison Spending Outpaces All but Medicaid. New York Times. 2009-03-02: (A13).

1. ^
 Drug Arrests by Age, 1970-2007. Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice [2006-12-09].

1. ^ ^22.0 22.1 America's One-Million Nonviolent Prisoners (pdf). Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. 1999年3月 [2006-06-13].

1. ^ ^{23.0 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 23.5 23.6} Emilio C. Viano.America's prison system.

1. ^
 Cook County Jail Information

1. ^ ^25.0 25.1 Jail Inmates at Midyear 2009 - Statistical Tables. By Minton D. Todd. June 3, 2010. NCJ 230122. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. See Table 7 of the PDF file for percent unconvicted.

1. ^
 Beck, Allen J.; Harrison, Paige M.. Prisoners in 2004 (PDF). Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2005-10-23 [2006-06-28].

1. ^ ^{27.0 27.1 27.2} West, Heather; Sabol, William.Prisoners in 2009 (PDF). Bureau of Justice Statistics. December 2010.

1. ^
 Profile of Jail Inmates, 2002. By Doris J. James. July 18, 2004. NCJ 201932. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. See Table 3 of the PDF file for the percent of inmates in for violent offenses

1. ^
 "Incarcerated America" Human Rights Watch(April 2003)

1. ^
 United States Crime Rates 1960 - 2009. Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports.

1. ^
 Resisting the Prison Industrial Complex. State University of New York - Binghamton.

1. ^ ^{32.0 32.1 32.2} Prison Inmates at Midyear 2009 - Statistical Tables - U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, published June 2010. See tables 16-19 for totals and rates for blacks, Hispanics, and whites. Broken down by year, gender, and age. See page 2 for "Selected characteristics of inmates held in custody in state or federal prisons or in local jails". It has the overall incarceration rate.

1. ^ ^33.0 33.1 Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010 Census Briefs. U.S. Census Bureau. See Tables 1 and 2.

1. ^
 Black population. Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). U.S. Census Bureau.

1. ^
 B02001. RACE - Universe: TOTAL POPULATION. 2009 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates. United States Census Bureau [2010-10-24].

1. ^
 Prison Inmates at Midyear 2009 - Statistical Tables & Prisoners at Year-end 2009 - Advance Counts. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, press release Jun 30 2010. "Black males, with an incarceration rate of 4,749 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents, were incarcerated at a rate more than six times higher than white males (708 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents) and 2.6 times higher than Hispanic males (1,822 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents)."

1. ^
 Zaitow, Barbara H. and Jim Thomas. Women in Prison: Gender and Social Control. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. vii. Retrieved from Google Books on March 10, 2011. ISBN 1588262286, 9781588262288.

1. ^
 Banks, Cyndi. Women in Prison: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO, 2003. p.1. Retrieved fromGoogle Books on March 10, 2011. ISBN 1576079295, 9781576079294.

1. ^
 Aging inmates clogging nation's prisons. Associated Press. September 30, 2007.

1. ^
 Aday, Ronald H.. Aging Prisoners: Crisis in American Corrections. Praeger. 2003.ISBN 0275971236.

1. ^
 GAO-05-337R Information on Criminal Aliens Incarcerated in Federal and State Prisons and Local Jails (pdf). General Accounting Office. 2005-0407.

1. ^
 Mauer, Marc; King, Ryan S; Young, Malcolm C.The Meaning of "Life": Long Prison Sentences in Context (pdf). The Sentencing Project. 2004年5月: 3.

1. ^
 Langan, Patrick A.; Levin, David J.. Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 (pdf). Bureau of Justice Statistics. June 2, 2002.

1. ^
 Jason Medina. ADX Florence or the "Alcatraz of the Rockies": A look at toughest US prison and the need for more like it.

1. ^
 Supermax: A Clean Version Of Hell. CBS news. 2009-06-21.

1. ^ ^{46.0 46.1 46.2} 24 Hours in Prison. North Carolina Department of Correction.

1. ^
 California Prison Reform and Rehabilitation. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

1. ^
 Inhumane Prison Conditions Still Threaten Life, Health of Alabama Inmates Living with HIV/AIDS, According to Court Filings. Human Rights Watch. February 27, 2005 [2006-06-13].

1. ^
 Cindy Struckman-Johnson & David Struckman-Johnson. Sexual Coercion Rates in Seven Midwestern Prisons for Men (PDF). The Prison Journal. December 2000, 80 (4): 379-390.

1. ^
 Gang and Security Threat Group Awareness. Florida Department of Corrections [2006-06-13].

1. ^
 Thompson, Don. Prison Attacks Calling Attention to Overcrowding. Associated Press. 2008-04-05[2009-08-06].

1. ^
 Moore, Solomon. California Prisons Must Cut Inmate Population. New York Times. 2009-08-05: (A10) [2009-08-06].

1. ^
 Order for population reduction plan, pg. 9, three-judge court convened by the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit hearing Plata v. Schwarzenegger and Coleman v. Schwarzenegger

1. ^
 Cutter v. Wilkinson.

1. ^
 Charles Campbell, "The Intolerable Hulks." (2001)

1. ^
 The Sentencing Project, "Prison Privatization and the Use of Incarceration" (2004)

1. ^
 Good Jobs First, " Jail Breaks: Economic Development Subsidies Given to Private Prisons," October 2001, p. 2.

1. ^
 Eric Bates, "Private Prisons," The Nation, Jan. 5, 1998, p. 13.

1. ^
 Schmalleger, F., & Smykla, J. (2007, 2005, 2002).Corrections in the 21st Century. New York: McGraw-Hill.

1. ^
 Stephen McFarland, Chris McGowan, Tom O'Toole. Prisons, Privatization, And Public Values. 2002年12月.

1. ^
 Maahs, J. & Pratt, T. (1999). Are Private Prisons More Cost-Effective Than Public Prisons? A Meta-Analysis of Evaluation Research Studies. Crime & Delinquency, 45(3), 358-371. Retrieved October 2, 2006, from SAGE database.

1. ^ ^{62.0 62.1 62.2 62.3} Liptak, Adam. 1 in 100 U.S. Adults Behind Bars, New Study Says. 纽约时报. 2008-02-28 [2010-01-08].

1. ^
 McCollum, William. Federal Prison Industries, Inc: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives. DIANE Publishing. 1996:  7. ISBN 9780756700607.

1. ^ ^{64.0 64.1 64.2 64.3} Direct expenditures by criminal justice function, 1982-2006. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics [2009-12-29].

1. ^
 California Criminal Justice FAQ: How much does it cost to incarcerate an inmate? California Legislative Analyst's Office.

1. ^
 Expenditures/Employment. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics [2009-12-29].

1. ^
 Inmates Who Can't Make Bail Face Stark Options. By Laura Sullivan. 2010-01-22. National Public Radio.

1. ^ ^68.0 68.1 Bail Burden Keeps U.S. Jails Stuffed With Inmates. By Laura Sullivan. 2010-01-21. National Public Radio.

1. ^
 Jails Stuffed To Capacity In Many U.S. Counties. 2010-01-20. National Public Radio. Chart using 2008 jail statistics showing "50 U.S. counties with the largest numbers of inmates."

1. ^
 Bondsman Lobby Targets Pretrial Release Programs. By Laura Sullivan. 2010-01-22. National Public Radio.

1. ^ ^71.0 71.1 World Prison Population List. 8th edition. By Roy Walmsley. Published in 2009. International Centre for Prison Studies. School of Law, King's College London.]

1. ^ ^72.0 72.1 Human Development Report 2007/2008(HDR 2007/2008). For prison population per 100,000 people see Table 27 on page 322 of the full report. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), using data from the World Prison Population List, 7th edition. HDR 2009 does not contain a prison population table.

1. ^
 US & World Population Clock. U.S. Census Bureau.

1. ^
 Walmsley, Roy. World Prison Population List (fourth edition) (pdf). International Centre for Prison Studies. School of Law, King's College London.

1. ^
 American Exception. Inmate Count in US Dwarfs Other Nations'. New York Times. Apr 22, 2008. Page 1, Section A, Front Page.

1. ^
 原文：Still, it is the length of sentences that truly distinguishes American prison policy. Indeed, the mere number of sentences imposed here would not place the United States at the top of the incarceration lists. If lists were compiled based on annual admissions to prison per capita, several European countries would outpace the United States. But American prison stays are much longer, so the total incarceration rate is higher. ... "Rises and falls in Canada's crime rate have closely paralleled America's for 40 years," Mr. Tonry wrote last year. "But its imprisonment rate has remained stable."

1. ^
 Incarceration Rates Reach Highest Historical Levels.

1. ^
 Prisons and Executions-The U.S. Model.

1. ^
 The Russian economy: from Lenin to Putin. By Steven Rosefielde.

1. ^
 Gulag: a history. By Anne Applebaum.

1. ^
 The effect of prison on criminal behavior. Public Safety Canad]. 1999年11月 [2009-08-28].

1. ^
 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)

1. ^ ^83.0 83.1 Fellner, Jamie. US Addiction to Incarceration Puts 2.3 Million in Prison. Human Rights Watch. November 30, 2006 [2007-06-02].

1. ^
 Abramsky, Sasha. Hard Time Blues: How Politics Built a Prison Nation. Thomas Dunne Books. January 22, 2002. ISBN 0312268114.

1. ^
 Slevin, Peter. U.S. Prison Study Faults System and the Public. 华盛顿邮报. 2006-06-08.

1. ^
 Schwarz, Joel. Bulging Prison System Called Massive Intervention in American Family Life. University of Washington. 2008-08-03.